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**THE LAW RELATING TO THE LAND TENURES
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THE LAW RELATING TO HINDU WILLS.

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1901.

The Failure of the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament

BY

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LONDON

JOHN BALE, SONS & DANIELSSON, LTD.

Oxford House

83-91, GREAT TITCHFIELD STREET, OXFORD STREET, W.1

—
1923

LONDON :
JOHN BALE, SONS AND DANIELSSON, LTD.
23-91, GREAT TITCHFIELD STREET, OXFORD STREET, W. 1.

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN.

PREFACE.

SOME explanation is necessary of the circumstances under which this book appears. My father had finished it just before the war, but its publication was then inevitably deferred. When conditions again became more normal steps were taken to procure publication, and the arrangements were practically concluded when my father died at the beginning of 1921. Unfortunately his sight had greatly failed during the last years of his life, and he was not able to give the finishing touches to the book. In consequence the arrangement is not as orderly as it might be, and there is a good deal of repetition. Still, the defects of this kind are not great, and it seemed best to make no more alterations than some necessary verbal ones, and to add headings, indexes, &c.

The title of the book may give the impression that it advocates a more thorough rejection of the results of the Higher Criticism than in fact it does, or even that it desires a return to the idea of verbal inspiration. That is not my father's position, as will be seen especially from Chapters I and VIII, the theory of verbal inspiration, in particular, is explicitly set aside. It is allowed that there is a human as well as a Divine element in the Old Testament, but it is contended that the human element was not allowed to overpower the Divine purpose (see especially p. 6). The "failure" with which the Higher Criticism is charged is the failure to see that the traditional account of Israel's development is much nearer the truth than the account of it given by the critics. Especially this book protests that much stronger evidence is required than is forthcoming before we can consent to believe that the Mosaic Law was not in substance given before the entry into Canaan, or that it was really a creation of the prophetic period. The question of the dates of the Pentateuch or parts of it is subsidiary.

"It is not essential to the traditional view that Moses should have written the whole, or, indeed, any part of the Pentateuch, as we now have it; or that it should be the work of one man; or even that it should be of the Mosaic period" (p. 141).

At the same time the literary acumen of critics has been, it is urged, too readily allowed. It does not follow because two passages show different characteristics that they are by different authors, or were composed at different times. "It might almost as well be argued that cloth striped in different colours was made in strips, as that a narrative has as many authors as it has characteristics" (p. 200). Nor is the reliance on "cumulative proof" of some of the critical assertions well founded.

"There can be no cumulative result from a series of unfounded assertions. If each of these grounds was sound, although each proved something less than the full proposition, the sum of them might prove the complete proposition. Cumulative evidence may be compared to a battery of artillery; if the fire of each gun misses the target the effect is nothing at all; if some hit the target, the effect is the sum of the effects of all the blows" (p. 201).

Such questions are, however, of secondary importance. The question of primary importance is whether the education of Israel proceeded on the whole as we were accustomed to believe until recently, or was radically different. The gist of the book is to be found in the following statement.

"The main issue is whether the entire Law was, in substance, given in the Wilderness, or, as it is often expressed, whether the Law or the Prophets came first. The fact of the giving of the Law was easy to carry down. It has been carried down by the Tradition. That fact is almost unaffected by criticism of the written Tradition. It could only be disproved by surer and better evidence contradicting it. The evidence for the fact is clear, emphatic and convincing; it can be contradicted only by evidence clearer, more emphatic and more convincing. As already suggested, this is the dominant fact until disproved; the fact with which apparently discrepant facts, when themselves proved, must either reconcile themselves or remain contradicted. The Tradition was not formed with any purpose of explaining such discrepancies, and it is surely idle to expect such explanations after thirty centuries" (pp. 245-246).

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August, 1923.

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The Failure of the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament.

CHAPTER I.

THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

Introduction.

IT may seem too late for any attempt to resist the progress of the new ideas as to the Scriptures which are proclaimed by Criticism, and which have been so widely adopted, even by Christian believers in the Scripture history. There must, however, be vast numbers of believers who have not accepted those ideas. And the most pressing need is to confirm them in their belief, by showing them that nothing has yet been established which can require, or even justify, the abandonment of that belief. It will be time enough to reconvert those who have yielded to Criticism, when those who have not yet yielded are established. The considerations offered in this book are, however, submitted as largely appropriate to both classes, to unbelievers, as well as to believers. The aim of the present discussion is to show that those who have accepted as credible the traditional belief as to the Scriptures, are not bound by anything which has yet been proved to abandon their belief, or justified in doing so; and that only a doubtful grasp of that belief can have led those who have felt compelled to abandon it (with pain in some cases, no doubt) to yield to the attack of Criticism. This discussion does not aim at showing that the Tradition can now be proved afresh: that is impossible at this distance from the events to which the Tradition bears witness. The aim of the present discussion is to show that the Tradition has not been proved to be either incredible, or otherwise in substance wrong. This could be proved only by producing evidence

contradicting it—evidence surer, better, more credible, than that of the Tradition which is to be displaced. None such has been produced. Those who have yielded (with or without pain) to theories and guesses, not capable of being tested by facts, must either have come to feel doubt of the credibility, or sufficiency, of the Tradition; or must have failed to discern what was necessary to displace it. It is difficult to understand, in any case, how any reasonable mind could come to reject the traditional account of the Pentateuch—that it is, in substance, true, and of Mosaic origin—because of some supposed discrepancies; and then to swallow, without even a pretence of proof, the critical theory that the bulk of it was the product of some late period.

What are the grounds upon which a belief in such a tradition should be surrendered? To make the answer plain, we must consider on what grounds it has been accepted: because evidently, the grounds for its rejection must be stronger than those which led to its acceptance, and which are to be displaced. Those who have allowed their acceptance of the Tradition to be displaced, originally accepted it on trust from the Church; as the babe draws milk from its mother, that authority being confirmed by the constant scrutiny, and opportunity of scrutiny, to which it was subject, and by the acceptance of many centuries, going back to remote ages, and including both Jewish and Christian times. Obviously, no modern authority—of scholars, for instance—can, for Christians, at any rate, be superior to this. The Tradition, however, might, nevertheless, be shown to be in itself incredible, or insufficient to carry conviction, or be disproved; although no authority could displace that on which it was received. It could, however, hardly be contended, to believers, that it was incredible, or insufficient for conviction, on the face of it. In any case it would be a sufficient answer to such a contention, to reply that it had been accepted by myriads of men, at least as capable of judging of its credibility and sufficiency as the present generation.

There remains then, only, to displace belief in the Tradition by disproof of it—by better and surer evidence than is supplied by the Tradition itself (which includes the writings) confirmed, as it is, by an overwhelming weight of authority. Theory and conjecture are, it is submitted, of no force as evidence, unless verified by *facts*. Tradition is evidence

which may be of all degrees of force; but if not incredible, or insufficient on its face (as, perhaps, the story of Romulus and Remus suckled by a wolf), it can only be displaced by fresh facts of greater weight—better, surer facts—and not by guess or by theory, which, unless verified by facts, is only a network of guesses, more or less consistent with each other. Guess and theory have their place and value in most branches of inquiry; they are the fruit of imagination; working, when in healthy operation, upon facts, and pointing to lines of investigation which may lead to the discovery of fresh facts, and may confirm or displace the theory or guess, from which the inquiry started. But it is in all cases accepted fact, and not theory, which displaces fact. In the case of the Old Testament, Tradition is the sole available external evidence of the authenticity, or date, of the various works composing it. Whether it goes back to the origin of these works, or stops short at a more recent period, it is still the sole available evidence, until it is displaced by fresh facts. If credible, it can hardly be doubted that it is sufficient evidence. The scientific theories of modern times make no claim to acceptance, as proved, except when verified by facts. But Criticism boldly—to use the mildest term—claims a convincing value for its unverified theories and demands almost instant acceptance of them, pardoning, at most, a “reasonable delay.”¹ The aim of the present discussion is to show that Criticism has not produced any fresh facts, or any evidence which is better or surer than that of the Old Testament itself, and the extrinsic unwritten Tradition; and that, consequently, there is not, as yet, any need or justification for a surrender of the Tradition, whether such surrender happens to be painful or pleasant. No attempt is here made to prove the Tradition. That proves itself; and the evidence by which it could be tested has now perished. What is attempted is to show that it has not yet been disproved.

Belief in the Old Testament.

It will be useful before we proceed further to point out some features of the position of the believer in the Old Testament Tradition, with reference to modern Criticism. In his belief:—

¹ See Dr. Sanday’s “Inspiration” (Bampton Lect., 1896), p. 414.

(1) The Old Testament, as we have it, is substantially the same as that which has been before Jews and Christians successively. All that is now visible in it was always visible and might have been seen; and few, if any, of the important features relied upon by Criticism could have escaped notice, e.g., the use of the names Jehovah and Elohim, the alleged doublets (different accounts of the same transaction), the alleged discrepancies, and other "literary" features.

(2) The Jews of all ages regarded their history, recorded in Scripture, as not only true, but as supremely, divinely, true; and as showing the special divinely guided development of the nation, under the discipline of the Law, and the teaching of the Prophets, in accordance with the Law—the Law comprising the Ceremonial as well as the Moral Law—of the Pentateuch. Upon this Tradition they lived. The Law was administered by the designated authorities. It was an organic factor in the life of the people.

(3) The Gospels, and the New Testament generally, show beyond dispute, that Our Lord and his disciples accepted the Jewish position; and made the Old Testament the foundation of the claims of Christ to acceptance of Himself by the Jews of His time, as the fulfilment of all that the Law and the Prophets had foreshadowed. Upon that foundation the belief of the first disciples was supported, and through them the Church derived its belief.

(4) The Christian Church has, on the authority of her Lord, embodied the Old Testament Tradition in her own tradition, and has affirmed it by including it in the Canon. On that tradition she has, like the Jews before her, lived throughout, and still lives. That Tradition, as accepted by her Lord, is an organic factor in the life of the Christian Church.

(5) The Old Testament has always been regarded as divinely inspired. The channels through which its message was communicated were, indeed, known to be men; and were not regarded as being lifted by their inspiration entirely above human infirmities; but the message they delivered was deemed the word of God; the very words in which it was delivered being held, although human, to partake of the divine influence, even if not the very words of God.

It would have been thought, a few years ago—before about 1890—almost impossible to persuade those who had accepted such a belief, as that outlined above, that the Old Testament, particularly the Pentateuch, actually inverts the order in

which Israel developed; that the bulk of the Law was not, as represented, in existence in the wilderness, but came into existence in the time of Josiah and of the Exile, and was not the instrument of the training and discipline of the nation; that it was never ordained by Jehovah as described in the Pentateuch; or that, in particular, the Ceremonial Law, including that of sacrifice, priesthood and ritual, was not ordained by Jehovah before the Exile; although some features of Ceremonial Law, and a practice of sacrifice, may have been in use from more ancient times. And it would have seemed even more incredible that the believer—with his belief in an unique manifestation of God in His dealings with Israel—should surrender that belief at the summons of Criticism. That belief was supported by a tradition of many centuries, a tradition which is itself unique in massive weight, and in its supreme and unapproachable strength, even apart from Divine authority. It would have seemed incredible that the believer should come to parley with suggestions involving not only an inversion of the recorded course of Jehovah's dealings with the chosen race, but also requiring the substitution of human development for special Divine control, and, moreover, involving the acceptance by Our Lord Himself of a fundamentally and vitally erroneous account of those dealings, and His condemnation of the Jews on that basis for their rejection of Him.

The mode in which this apparently invulnerable position of the believer has been turned is, however, very simple. The Divine oracles were intended to reach men's minds; for that purpose they were conveyed through human minds, and in human words, which, however, could only imperfectly express them. The Divine character thus stamped upon even the words had led, at times, to some failure to recognize the possibility of a human element in them; and the tardy recognition of that possibility involved a profound disturbance in the believer's mind—although it was no new discovery—and thus paved the way towards a similar neglect of the all-pervading Divine control, this neglect ultimately culminating in denial of the Divine influence upon the human words employed. Criticism, consequently, approached Scripture from the point of view of its evolution as ordinary literature, and of the development of Israel as an ordinary human development—judging and interpreting the "literature," the history, and the development by analogies from ordinary human literature, history and development—a

method which, if applied even to a unique human literature, history, or development, is calculated to produce startling results; as has actually happened, and in an eminent degree, alike in the case of the development of Israel and in the history of it. Such a method, it is submitted, is fundamentally inapplicable to sacred writings, or sacred history, in which there is, or may be, a Divine element. The theory of verbal inspiration was, of the two extremes, more reasonable; for the Divine element must be paramount, it must control and mould the human element. The two elements are, however, not separable or distinguishable by human skill; nor can their proportions be discovered or estimated, or allowance be made for either element. Consequently, the application of human analogies to dealings or writings which have, or may have, Divine elements, is radically unsound, and may be expected to produce the confusion, dislocation, inversion, and final destruction of records such as the Scriptures, either of the Old or New Testament.

In the case of Scripture, however, there is ample evidence to support their substantial truth. Even on critical principles the Scriptures need not quail before any foe; for, as will be more fully shown hereafter, the evidence afforded by the Scripture records—under the circumstances of their production—and by the Tradition in which they are included, is better, stronger, and weightier, even as entirely human testimony, than anything that has, as yet, been produced against them, or that could be produced against them.

Before dealing with this subject more fully it is, however, necessary to consider, a little more in detail, some of the points already indicated, or otherwise connected with this branch of the subject; and, in the first place, it will be desirable to make clear what is the real issue which confronts the believer when he is invited to accept the results of Criticism on the assurance that those results leave the Divine element, and the inspiration of Scripture, unimpaired. That assurance may be alluring, but is immaterial to the believer, who can, of course, accept no theory of Scripture at variance with the Tradition, without full conviction that it is absolutely true. Such variance necessarily impairs its inspiration unless absolutely true, and if absolutely true, he must accept it, even if the inspiration is impaired or destroyed.

But the point in issue is, whether anything is proved which calls upon him to quit the Traditional position. It will,

however, not be useless to examine the alluring assurances offered to him.

The Special Relation of God to Israel.

The Old Testament History, as it stands, presents the development of a Revelation, which is intended ultimately to reach all mankind; but which is mainly communicated, in the first instance, to selected individuals and a selected race, particularly to the family of Abraham, and the nation which sprang out of that family.

The selection was based on a fitness not necessarily visible to human eyes. The training and discipline of that nation were apparently designed to fit it to receive the Revelation, and to hand down the knowledge of the ways of God, as revealed in His dealings with these selected recipients. This training and discipline were an exhibition of the ways of God, in a practical concrete shape, and a revelation of Him to them and ultimately to all mankind.

The keynote of this dispensation is its special character. Special training and discipline are applied to selected subjects, fitting them to exhibit the character of God as imparted specially to them, and as shown in their history. The modes of revelation adopted by God in His dealings with mankind in general are not thereby excluded from operation upon these special instruments; they might also be applied by God, when He saw fit, to develop in them, as well as in mankind in general, true conceptions of His character; but the characteristic feature of Old Testament Revelation seems plainly to be its *special* character, its employment of selected channels of communication, and of a special discipline for them, with special guidance and control, special functions and a special destiny, "You only have I known among all the families of the earth."¹

Out of this selected race special individuals and classes are again selected—priests, administrators, law-givers, prophets, &c. All are taken under the direct control and guidance of God. None are left entirely to the ordinary operation of the influences on human life or of environment, through which mankind is led by God to attain some general conception of Him. The Old Testament hardly notices this development of Revelation to mankind in the natural course.

¹ Amos iii, 2.

It deals only or mainly with development under the influence of special communication by God, imparting special, fuller and truer knowledge of Himself than was otherwise attainable. God is always "rising up early and sending" His messengers to His chosen people. They are not left to follow the impulses of their own nature, or the influences of their environment. They are not left to "entirely" human influences, and are not the subjects of "entirely" natural development. The intended course of their development could not be discovered by human faculties; Comparative Religion, Anthropology and Psychology cannot trace or explain their development; that is recorded and interpreted by the Scriptures alone. It is with this development and its true history that we are now concerned, not with the character of a "literature," however interesting.

It seems clear that such a development cannot be traced or gauged by analogy with a lower development, or with any other human development, not similarly guided. The present state of thought seems to have produced a tendency, more or less explicit, to seek to bring this special development into line with ordinary religious development, as exhibited among other races under no similar guidance. This special development of Israel is depicted in the history, as we have it, as having been under the same definite influence throughout. Its essence was progress through obedience, founded on faith, to that knowledge of the truth which should ultimately fit the obedient subjects of its discipline to partake in the Divine Life, as its consummation.

The mode of education, however arbitrary it may seem to a generation which has largely lost its appreciation of obedience, does not appear to have jarred upon ancient feeling; Abraham left his home to go in search of a country which was to be shown to him as he journeyed. He was directed to circumcise his son, and afterwards to sacrifice him. In like manner his descendants were directed to leave Egypt in order to receive the land promised to Abraham. They were to sacrifice in the wilderness. Their escape from the destruction which overtook the firstborn of Egypt was conditioned by their obedience to the command to sprinkle upon the doorposts of their houses the blood of the Paschal Lamb. In the Wilderness the history tells us that Moral and Ceremonial Laws were given them, through Moses. Their ripeness to receive either law was not necessarily manifest, or even perceptible to human eyes. Even their

ripeness for obedience was far from visible; had it been attained there would have been less need for either Law. An elaborate Ceremonial Law was, perhaps, even more fitted to act as a discipline in obedience than the Moral Law. And a nation fitted to evolve either Law would have had less need of the imposition of either. The history cannot be made to say that either Law was at any time evolved by the nation. It is emphatic, from first to last, that both the Laws were imposed by Jehovah in the Wilderness and nowhere else. The same principle of development, under submission to discipline and obedience to law, runs through the whole of Jewish History; and nowhere is there indicated any other instrument of discipline than the entire Law.

With the coming of the Messiah, for Whom the race had been taught to look with infinite hope, the principle of development through obedience did not lose its place. Obedience was still the means of discipline and preparation. The Church was to prepare for the Second Coming of her Lord by keeping His Commandments.

Nowhere does natural evolution obtain the slightest foothold, either in Judaism or in Christianity. There is no possibility of bringing either into line with religions naturally developed.

The writings which Criticism discredits—but cannot disprove—appear to be the only history which was preserved of the people of Israel. Criticism discredits their history, and indeed calls it a “literature.” Out of this entirely discredited history it claims to have found sufficient material—which the authors of it had done their utmost to eliminate or conceal, but with scant success, according to the critics—to enable it to reconstruct a true history. The true history so constructed, of course, contradicts the false history at every step. The “true” history makes the Levitical legislation the product and consummation of Israel’s development. The Tradition makes it a part of the Law delivered by Moses in the Wilderness, and a principal means of the training and development of Israel. It is obvious that the burden of proof for Criticism is stupendous. It has to bring the true out of the false, to separate “the precious from the vile.” It is not surprising that it seeks, in the first place, to shift some of the burden from its own shoulders by calling upon the Tradition to prove its own truth. Even if this claim could be justly made, still failure to prove the Tradition would, at most, get it out of the way, and would leave

Criticism with its burden of reconstruction; but this reconstruction is impossible without the aid of the damaged materials from the ruined Tradition. These materials, however, may—it is hoped by the critics—prove, with cunning handling, a sufficient quarry of building material. Criticism is, however, still further hampered, in its destructive and reconstructive efforts, by other difficulties. How can it persuade us that its distillation of the true facts out of this false history, which has radically perverted the truth, is effective, except by some striking and decisive proof of the truth of its product? How can it allure us to contradict the Tradition, and not only to believe that the Tradition is false, but also that the opposite is true, except by some such proof? And yet to offer such proof would be dangerous; for if such striking and decisive evidence of its own falsity appeared in the Tradition, such confession of self-contradiction could not have escaped notice; and the Tradition would have been purged of such self-contradiction by the Exilic Editors; as it has, according to Criticism, been studiously purged of subtler and less incriminating indiscretions. In fact Criticism sits upon a bough which it is cheerfully sawing off.

More dangerous to Criticism than the difficulties of steering between the extremes of its familiar *dicta*, “too plain to be doubted” and “only to be judged by scholars,” is the alarm of faith, which Criticism has been able to distress but strives in vain to reassure or succour. It cannot offer any mode of reconciliation between Faith and Free-thinking, except in “slightly healing” the wounds of Faith by a new theory of the interaction of the Divine and Human, so adjusted as to leave the human predominant to human eyes. Thus the critical theory of the Incarnation is that Our Lord “emptied Himself” not only of the Divine Glory, but also of the Divine Knowledge; so that He had to grow in Divine as well as human knowledge, like other men; and, consequently, imbibed the ideas current amongst His class of people, and was, in fact, almost indistinguishable from them to human sight. This view harmonizes with the Critical Presupposition that the “outward form and composition” of the Old Testament are “entirely human.”¹ In face of the mystery of the union

¹ Ryle, “Holy Scripture and Criticism” (1904), p. 34. Driver, “Introduction” (1897), preface, pp. ix-xi.

of the human with the Divine, the human mind has oscillated between the swallowing up of the human by the Divine, and of the Divine by the human. Faith in the union of both in their perfection is alarmed at the idea of some separable "entirely human" element, either in her Lord or in His Word, and instinctively rejects the assumption of such a doctrine, especially when it goes the length of ignoring the all-pervading influence of the Divine upon all parts of the human; Criticism ignores that influence by its "entirely human" assumption, by its theory of Inspiration, and by its assumption as to the extent of the "emptying."

Influence of Criticism on Faith.

Some English critics earnestly insist on the perfect compatibility of critical conclusions with absolute faith in the Gospels, and in Our Lord. The assurance is welcome as showing that these critics are not consciously hostile or indifferent to the Christian faith. But it hardly suffices to reassure ordinary minds, or to show that the unconscious attitude even of these critics is as satisfactory as they wish or believe it to be.

Criticism insists that a new view of Inspiration must be adopted, pushing back the Divine element in Scripture, entirely excluding its operation as far as its outward form and composition are concerned, and attributing to it a much less direct operation upon the substance of the Scriptures. The writers were, according to this view, not influenced as to the mode in which they expressed themselves by any considerations except such as would influence ordinary men. Inspiration is thus, after all, nothing special, hardly capable of being consciously recognized as distinguishable from other lofty or blameless but purely human promptings, and recognizable by others only, if at all, by their own impulse to assent to its utterances as true; even the predictions of the prophets, Isaiah amongst them, are, by Criticism, largely attributed to human sagacity coupled with faith in Jehovah. Thus Inspiration is narrowed down to the lowest limits.

Again, as already indicated, Criticism is compelled to adopt equally narrow limits for Our Lord's knowledge in His human life—the Kenosis theory of His "emptying" Himself. The declaration which He Himself made on this subject was not as to His human knowledge, as compared

with that of ordinary men, but as to the function or office of the Son as compared to the Father. He said the Father had reserved to Himself not the knowledge only, but the determination of the *time* of the Last Judgment.

We are invited to regard Him, in His human nature, as not only truly human, but as intellectually uninfluenced by the Divine Nature to the extent of accepting without more than ordinary scrutiny the ideas prevailing around Him; so that He reflected the current ideas of His day as to Jewish history, and as to the course of the discipline employed by God to train the race in preparation for His coming. In His boyhood, indeed, conscious of His Divine Sonship, He sat among the Rabbis in the Temple, astonishing them by His understanding and answers; but later, according to the Kenotic views, He must have relapsed into almost the ignorance of a Galilean peasant. He declared, as we read in the Gospel, that St. John Baptist was the Forerunner predicted by the Prophets, the Elijah who was to come. He told the Jews that Circumcision was instituted before the time of Moses, and Marriage in the beginning. He was in constant communion with His Father. He communed with Moses and Elijah at His Transfiguration; yet He is *assumed* to have been either ignorant of the true course of the development of Israel as a chosen people, or to have been indifferent to it; and to have been, for instance, either unconscious that Psalm cx. was not an inspired witness by David to the Divinity of his son, the Messiah, or not only to have allowed the current belief to pass uncorrected, but even to have Himself used it as a fit instrument for His own teaching. It is assumed by Criticism that He adopted current ideas; and He must, consequently, have regarded the history of the national and religious development of the race as truly described in those books which have now been declared by Criticism to invert the order of that development, in accordance with the ideas of the Exilic age. He not only regarded that history as true, but He also stamped it with His approval. If, as only a man, He so stamped it, still, as perfect Man, His faculties transcended those of other men, and His judgment would, for believers, be conclusive. It is needless to multiply instances of the radical change of view as to most vital questions respecting Him and the Scriptures, of which Criticism makes its boast.

The tests by which the Scriptures are tried by Criticism

are all human tests—the analogy of purely human utterances, of heathen writings, of heathen religions, comparison of the Prophets with men “entirely human”; just as Our Lord Himself is assumed to have adopted not only the current language, but also the current ideas of His time and class; and all this is justified by the assumption that the Scriptures, and the development of Israel, can be dissected, and the component human elements separated and compared with those of ordinary literature and ordinary developments; the human element being treated, for the purposes of comparison and examination, as a skin, which can be flayed off, leaving the organism unimpaired! But this cannot be done in a living organism without fatal results. The style, the language used, even the extent to which grammar is employed, the structure of the composition, all that literary Criticism seeks to deal with as separable, is inseparable from the thought, as the skin is from the living body—it is moulded by the thought, and if the thought is moulded by special Divine guidance, or, indeed, by any unique influence, its expression must also be similarly moulded or influenced, although that moulding may not altogether displace the human nature which it moulds. It must, however, modify it so profoundly that no true analogy with human nature not so moulded can be *assumed*. We find no common ground for comparison between Our Lord, perfect in His Human Nature and profoundly conscious of His Divine Nature, and any other man. His words and acts could not be gauged by those of other men, the higher by the lower!

“The Bible like any other book,” “the Jewish religion like any other religion,” assume as axiomatic, what requires convincing proof. The inevitable climax of these assumptions is obvious, “Christ like any other man!”

Some critics,¹ however, assert, as already noticed, that the conclusions of Criticism do not “conflict with the Christian Creeds, or with the articles of the Christian Faith,” that “they affect, not the *fact* of revelation, but only its *form*, its ‘stages,’ and the process by which the record of it was built up. They do not,” it is said, “touch either the authority or the inspiration of the Old Testament. They imply no change in

“(1) The Divine attributes revealed in the Old Testament;

¹ Driver, “Introduction” (1897), preface, p. viii.

“(2) The lessons of human duty to be derived from it;

“(3) The general position . . . that the Old Testament points forward prophetically to Christ.”

These critics however, like the rest, freely apply human analogies. The Criticism, which, adopting a conservative pose, speaks in the passages quoted above, seems to suggest that it is concerned only with literary matters—the skin—with date of composition or publication, with style or manner of composition, and the like. It cannot, and does not, so limit itself; although, doubtless, many are thus led to imagine that the matter is one for scholars, and that it would be presumptuous for “the common, unbiased, unsophisticated” man to question their opinions, although his judgment is appealed to.¹ Even a literary work could, however, hardly be criticised without involving some inferences as to its substance or author. Its date might fall to be judged by its style or matter, and what purported to be a youthful work or passage might be held to belong to a later period; and conclusions might then follow as to the author’s situation at that later date, which might involve a reconstruction of his life-history. Every literary work is the expression, to some extent, of a mind at work in it. It speaks, and its speech is like the tune played on a musical instrument. The instrument may be examined while silent, and the mechanism by which a living hand, or a living breath may make it speak, may be discovered; but when the living hand or breath plays upon it, the instrument speaks, and expresses what the player constrains it to express. It is all important who the composer and player are. The literary work corresponds to the tune or piece as played, and criticism of it involves criticism of the composer and the player. Scripture claims—and the believer accepts the claim—that God is its effective author; it cannot be rightly criticised without reference to this claim; and, as treated by Criticism, the author is involved in the criticism as well as the work. It cannot be criticised without involving questions far deeper than the superficial matters with which criticism of the kind above referred to starts, or affects to start. The date of the writing, or even of its origin, may happen to be a surface matter, or may be of various degrees of importance in itself; but it becomes

¹ Driver, “Introduction” (1897), preface, p. viii.

of supreme importance when the giving of the Law in the Wilderness by Moses is displaced by means of it. We are mockingly asked if faith is to depend on whether Moses wrote the Pentateuch? But the question of authorship, which may be in itself superficial or indifferent, becomes of crucial importance when it is alleged that the supposed author could not have written it, because the events it relates never happened. When Criticism draws such inferences as to events from its "literary" examination of a record, to which it denies the credit of correctly representing the history to which it relates, or of correctly reproducing the original record, it is ridiculous for it to pose as only engaged in such innocent and harmless work as the study of its "literary" structure, date, and authorship alone.

The alleged superficiality of its work need not be disputed! The merit claimed for it cannot, however, be admitted; for if it had really no more effect than the superficial effect apparently claimed for it in the above extract, it would have proved almost useless and superfluous. Although the "literary" features relied upon lie on the surface, the inferences drawn from them are admittedly destructive. Such destruction may be claimed as a gain for truth; but it can only be so claimed because it makes substantial changes; it cannot be claimed at the same time as conservative, or as effecting no substantial change.

Critics who claim to be conservative freely apply human analogies to the Old Testament record, and to the development described in it, and virtually treat the religion of Israel as "one of the religions of the world, no more and no less." By means of human analogies they invert the history, and substitute a human development on natural lines for the highly specialized development portrayed in the record, as we now have it.

It would be very strange if such radical changes produced no effect, beyond a change in "form," &c. The substitution of the natural "stages" for the special Divinely appointed stages involves a displacement of the supernatural by the natural, which is a radical change in substance, unless we regard the supernatural as identical with the natural; and the necessary consequence of such substitution is that the laws which are removed from the Mosaic period to the Exilic period, or later, have no such sanction as they had when delivered from Mount Sinai or in the

Wilderness through Moses. In fact there is no evidence at all of their origin, or of the origin of the record of them, or of the building up of the record, except as found in the Pentateuch, as we now have it.

Deuteronomy and the Ceremonial Law are, in the Critical theory, written by unknown persons at unknown times; and there is no evidence of their Divine origin or authority in the Old Testament, except that which Criticism rejects—the contradicted or discredited testimony that they were of the Wilderness period, the Laws being delivered by Jehovah Himself, through Moses.

Is the authority of the Old Testament not affected by striking out the testimony that the entire Law (which is declared to be the initial stage of the national and religious life of Israel, and upon which all the subsequent stages of that life were founded) was given by God himself to Moses in the Wilderness? Or again, is not its authority affected by substituting the Critical theory, even if it allows, as it does only grudgingly, if at all, that some vague and almost insignificant nucleus was enacted by Moses himself? There is no explicit evidence of his authority to enact such a small nucleus, but only of his authority to enact the whole Law. Is not the Inspiration equally affected by the absence of any explicit evidence of its being received from Jehovah? Is the opinion of some critics—that there is intrinsic evidence that the laws and the development were, in some sense, “the work of men whose hearts have been touched and minds illuminated, in different degrees, by the Spirit of God”—a satisfactory or sufficient substitute for the explicit declaration that they came direct from God Himself? The same critics, whose assurance is to fill the aching void which they have sought to create, proceed to deal with the development and the record in the same way as the main body of critics, by applying human analogies, without taking any further notice of the shadowy inspiration formally recognized. It is evident that the inspiration admitted cannot, at best, be distinguished, either in its character or in its results, from that movement which inspires in various degrees all that is good and true in human thought, feeling and action, and which is not confined to any particular race or individual, but is shared by all mankind, and consequently does not differentiate Israel from other races. These critics, therefore, may be consistent in treating the development of Israel, and the record of that development, as

entirely on the human plane. Even so, the development of Israel and its record are both plainly unique among other—supposed similar—human phenomena, if such exist.

This kind of inspiration is essentially different from the special, direct communication of God with man asserted in the Scriptures. The Scriptures do not so much as notice the existence of that movement of man's heart and mind towards the good and true, which is the Critical "inspiration"; much less do they regard it as having any kinship with the revelation to Israel. It is not in what human nature can evolve that that Divine truth is to be found; even although any measure of truth or goodness which may be found in man is doubtless due to the Divine influence. Such measure of truth or goodness points indeed to God, but is so mixed with human infirmity as to be unsuited to be a fit mirror of the Divine nature. The Old Testament is everywhere emphatic that the thoughts and ways of God are infinitely above the natural thoughts of men, even of men who exhibit some reflection of the Divine mind, and who are even stamped as after God's own heart. The Jewish as well as the Christian Church believed that a sure Divine standard and touchstone of truth and goodness had been delivered to them by God's direct voice, speaking to them through channels chosen by Himself. Criticism offers us something as far below this certainty as man is below God. It is true that the employment of created instruments, as the channels of communication, confronts man with a problem which he cannot solve unaided. Is the voice which he hears, whether issuing from the lips of man or from the thunders of Sinai, really the voice of the Uncreated God? Is there any human admixture in it, and, if so, to what extent? Up to the time of the Incarnation that question still awaited an authoritative answer. The Incarnation, the union of perfect man, as a channel, with God, as Revealer, solved the problem; Our Lord, the Truth, the supreme touchstone of truth, unquestionably affirmed the Divine authority of the Old Testament, as we have it now. Criticism is, consequently embarrassed, and constrained to be somewhat reticent on this subject. What is left by Criticism is little, if anything, more than the natural religion common to mankind; its "revelations" being evolved in the course of natural evolution and practically not supernatural at all.

(1) Again, if the Divine attributes were revealed in the

course of God's dealing with Israel, the inversion of that history, and the elimination from most or much of it of His special and direct superintendence and influence, must displace or materially affect our knowledge of those attributes, and our appreciation of their operation. The words in which the Divine attributes are expressed are possibly still there, but where is the Divine authentication of them? The dealings which disclosed the Divine nature are eliminated. Those dealings were largely accompanied by Divine utterances. These were afterwards recorded in their original connection, and both together found the Revelation which had been received, and was afterwards recorded.

(2) The lessons of human duty must be equally affected by the substitution of a relation to God in which all mankind share, as objects of His general Providence, for the special and intimate relation of Father and son, subsisting—as insisted upon throughout the Old Testament—between Jehovah and Israel. These lessons, it is even contended, would be of equal authority and value if the stories which convey them are fiction instead of fact. This point will be dealt with presently.

(3) Once more, as to the looking forward to Christ. Criticism has largely eliminated the prophetic and predictive element from the Old Testament; it reads literally many passages formerly understood to be essentially, although possibly, on the surface, secondarily, symbolic, predictive or figurative; it reduces them from Divine oracles to history, poetry or rhetoric; it attributes to entirely human sources the whole, or, at any rate, a very much larger share of their prophetic force than the Scripture attributes to such sources, if, indeed, it allows anything to them.

The want of authority and inspiration, already noticed, as involved in the Critical view of the origin of the Pentateuch, and other sections seems to remove these sections from the category of Divinely inspired prophetic anticipations of the Messiah and to dislocate their historical order—an order adopted by Our Lord Himself on the Emmaus road, when He began with Moses as His first witness, Moses being almost entirely eliminated by Criticism. Is not the prophetic pointing to Christ greatly changed by the postponement of the Priestly Code to the Exile or later?

Not only is the essence of the Divine discipline of Israel, together with the Divine attributes revealed in that discipline, as well as the lessons of human duty to be derived

from it, vitally affected by the Critical theories, but the prophetic references to Christ are placed on a materially different footing; their foundation in special inspiration, claimed for them by Our Lord Himself, being altogether or largely destroyed; while in the Psalms and other books the references to Him are greatly overshadowed and obscured by the prominence assigned to the supposed primary references of passages relating to Him. The Messianic references everywhere recede into the background. Criticism stubbornly persists—whatever the cost in disparagement of Our Lord's knowledge—in treating Psalm cx. as obviously not David's; and this is but the climax of a tendency, everywhere manifest, to attenuate to the utmost the inspiration and predictive character of the sacred writing. Although strenuous efforts are made to discredit the opposition to Criticism as due to intellectual feebleness, obtuseness, obscurantism, prejudice, &c., and to render it ridiculous by contrasting with these odious defects the wide-mindedness, prescience and grasp of critics, and of their not too independent followers, it cannot be concealed that the unrest, which admittedly has resulted, is caused by the shock to faith at finding the very essence of its belief in imminent danger of evaporating under the manipulation of Criticism, in the human crucible which Criticism represents to be the proper vessel for extracting "the precious from the vile." For those who feel the blighting effect of Criticism there can be "never glad confident morning again!"

We are invited to believe that the earthy dust, which this process offers us, is the true and precious metal, and that it appears to be dross only to eyes dimmed by prejudice. Even if the claim to have left unchanged the elements specified could be maintained, the Old Testament would be almost eviscerated.

Truth or Fiction.

The Jewish Nation and the Christian Church have alike believed—as Our Lord Himself admittedly did—that God revealed Himself in His dealings with Israel, and with mankind from the beginning; and that the account of those dealings was made and preserved by His Providence; that He assisted, guided, and controlled the human instruments employed, whether in the dealings or in the record of them, so as to direct those dealings, and to secure a sufficient

knowledge of them, according to His purpose. It is from this Revelation, through Jehovah's recorded dealings, that we derive the lessons and principles already derived by those who witnessed them from the Divine dealings themselves, not from any story of them. Such a story might, if God had seen fit, have been made the vehicle of the Divine Revelation, but the Revelation was made, not in any story, but in the actual dealings, the record of which we now have. In a dramatized story we must *bring* to the story the lessons to be conveyed, unless, indeed, God had seen fit so to convey them. There is no trace in the record of any suggestion that it is a dramatized presentation of fictitious events. The record is a record of acts and dealings by word and deed. "He made a covenant with Jacob and gave Israel a Law." There is no suggestion anywhere that the facts stated are dramatic only, and not actual.

Besides the ample guarantee of the Tradition the believer has the Divine guarantee that the record, in substance, is true beyond all human truth, Divinely true! He will, by no means, be allured into accepting a dramatized fiction, or even "first-class" human evidence, in its place, and so empty it of its special Divine significance, throwing away the kernel to keep the husk, dropping the substance to clutch the shadow!

To eviscerate the Old Testament is, however, not enough for Criticism. It galvanizes the corpse and presents the dead body as still alive, or as good as alive.

Obviously the Old Testament, as dislocated, transposed in various parts, and altered by Criticism, would still contain statements as to the matters said to remain unaffected. It must do so, because, after Criticism has done its worst, after it has corrected the illusions of Priestly editors, and remodelled the entire work, there still remains too much of the very language of the book, as we now have it, to admit of complete exclusion of the *words* which convey vital truth, although these are largely deprived of their present character, meaning, inspiration and authority. The prophets are not, perhaps, quite so ruthlessly dealt with as the Law. Moses is, however, deposed from his unique position as the typical Lawgiver and prophet in one; even supposing him to escape the mythical mist. And all the succeeding prophets come into a doubtful and precarious heritage, with a highly disputable title. Their authority could hardly be maintained when that of Moses is assailed. If God did not speak

to Moses, as testified by the Pentateuch, did He ever speak at all? The appearance of Moses at the Transfiguration must, apparently, be also eliminated, along with the title by which alone he could claim that exalted honour. Our Lord Himself, moreover, was to be in the line of Moses, as "a prophet like unto him." (Deut. xviii, 15.)

The Law and the Prophets are organically, vitally bound up together. The Prophets had to bring home to men's hearts the principles and precepts of the Law. They do not proclaim a new commandment. It is nowhere suggested that they had any authority to do so, or to make new laws. It is an essential part of the Critical case that they never go beyond the Law. They do not proclaim a new commandment; Criticism contends, indeed, that the bulk of the Law sprang out of their teaching, but not that it was then enunciated; the theory seems to be that it was evolved by the nation at a later period under the influence of the Prophets.

But the authority of the Prophets is seriously undermined by Criticism. Passing over the disparagement so freely showered upon the Nebiim, seers, &c., the utterances of the Prophets are regarded by Criticism as largely the product of human faith and sagacity. Isaiah's insight is said¹ to be largely, if not entirely, due to shrewd observation of current events, coupled with a passionate belief that Jehovah would never desert Israel. This view is, itself, as far removed from the view of the Prophet himself as human knowledge is from the inspiration which Isaiah and the other prophets claimed, as the Earth is below Heaven!

¹ G. A. Smith's Isaiah.

CHAPTER II.

THE CANONS OF CRITICISM.

"Entirely Human" sometimes.

CRITICISM, which ostentatiously disclaims reliance upon assumptions, does, in reality, rest entirely and fundamentally upon them. In order to infer from the various features of Scripture a variety of sources, editors, redactors, &c., and in order to date events purporting to be of a particular period, e.g., the time of Moses, as actually of another period, e.g., the time of Josiah or the Exile, it must have recourse to the analogy of other writings, not of similar character, for there are none such; it must treat the Scriptures as "Literature," and judge them by the analogy of other literature, applying so-called "literary canons" themselves of little value, even when applicable; it must judge of the development of the national and religious life of Israel by the analogy of the life and development of other races, of different character, religion, history, habits, and ideas. It must and does, in short, apply purely human standards, canons and analogies to a development which claims to be under special Divine guidance and, at lowest, to be unique; to Scriptures which make similar claims, and, even as to their historical statements, purport to be written by men moved to write them, and guided and controlled in writing them, by the Spirit of God. It cannot, in making the case it seeks to make, escape from the application of such purely human standards; and, in fact, it avows the application of such principles. It maintains that the external form, &c., of the Scriptures is "entirely human";¹ and its use of other evidence as comparable to that of Scripture, conclusively shows that, however much some critics may admit of inspiration or special guidance, all claim and must claim that there is a large and separable factor, both in the

¹ Ryle, "The Holy Scripture and Criticism" (1904), p. 34 (cp. p. 24), "in their outward form and composition entirely human."

Scriptures, and in the development—of which they purport to be the record—which is “entirely human.” It is, indeed, alleged that the proof that this factor in the Scriptures, its “outward form,” &c., is “entirely human,” is found in Scripture itself.

The Scriptures certainly nowhere make any such statement. They can only be made to do so, indeed (if at all) by the application of the very “entirely human” analogies, the applicability of which is in dispute. The test of an “entirely human outward form” is not defined or indicated by Criticism. Obviously such a result could only be reached by the application of analogies drawn from human literature and development, and not from Divine literature and development, which are the things to be tested. An “entirely human” touchstone is evidently essential for Criticism.

As has been already indicated, the Church has regarded such analogies as inapplicable for such a purpose. Such application involves the pushing back of the inspiration so as to leave all the external form, &c.—whatever that may be—uninspired and uninfluenced. There has, apparently, never been any felt need for a definition by the Church on the subject; doubtless because there has been little, if any, dispute or divergence on it. Criticism now claims to restrict Inspiration so as to leave the “outward form,” &c., uninfluenced; and so to render it subject to “entirely human” canons of Criticism, literary, historical, and other canons; and to interpret Scripture in the light of superficial discrepancies, of imperfect expression, disregard of grammar, abruptness, want of connexion, silence, and the many other human tests which it applies to measure the departure from the human standard which it presumes to prescribe for writers, whom some critics allow to be inspired, up to such a limit as suits Critical views. “A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump”—critics do not seem to think Inspiration such a leaven. The Inspiration being thus eliminated from the “outward” elements of Scripture, the way to its disintegration is prepared; but its disintegration must be followed by the inversion of the development, the way to which is thus to some extent laid open.

Critical Canons.

The Jewish nation does not seem to have produced any literature except the Old Testament and some other writings,

all of a more or less religious character. With their belief that the whole of the national life, both corporate and individual, was under the guidance and special control of Jehovah, a secular or profane literature could hardly arise. It is misleading to speak of their religious writings as a literature, although they were all they had. These writings were all regarded as more or less sacred; they were, to a large extent, regarded as either the Word of God, or so closely connected with it as to be distinguishable from all entirely human writings. There is a marked tendency in modern thought to minimize the difference between the supernatural and natural, to ignore inspiration, to make "genius" take its place, and to regard the "man of God" as little, if anything, more than the "man of genius," whose heart God had touched, and whose natural faculties were exalted, and who was then left, without any direct communication from God, to deliver the products of his own genius as the message of God, and to say of it "Thus saith Jehovah."

It is this tendency which has given birth to the new Criticism. The corresponding formula, however, goes beyond the theory in declaring the outward form and composition of Scripture to be "entirely human"; as that formula gives no effect to the influence of God, in touching the hearts and exalting the faculties of selected men, whether of genius or of ordinary capacity, upon the products of their minds, but excludes the outward form and composition from that influence, so as to bring them into line with writers of ordinary literature. And having, by analogies drawn from ordinary literature, secured a human character for the contents of the Jewish Scriptures, it proceeds to deal with the history, and the development of the race, as largely, if not entirely, to be judged by similar analogies. It holds that the development, and the history of it, have been inverted in those Scriptures; the Jews themselves failing to discover that such inversion had happened, because they were not "Critical," that is, were not aware that the development and its history ought to have been criticized and judged by "entirely human" analogies; but, on the contrary, persisted in regarding them as, in all respects, both in their outward form and composition, and in their inward spirit and substance, as under the special guidance and control of God Himself; between Whom and the Jewish race there was the unique relationship of Father

and son, and a binding covenant affiliating Israel to Jehovah, placing Israel in that unique relation with Jehovah, in which no other race or nation had or could have any share, except by admission into and identification with the Jewish nation. The Jews consequently never dreamed of seeking to interpret their development or their history by considering analogies with any human development or history. The development had proceeded as the outcome of the inviolable relation of Father and son, which could not be broken; and the record of it was framed by the co-operation of both, Jehovah taking the same place in the record as in the events recorded.

We have no reason to assume that either in the development or in the record of it Jehovah saw fit to raise the human participators above human infirmities. It seems to have been His purpose to train them to conform their wills to His purpose, but not to suffer their wills to defeat His purpose. As the training was to last as long as His purpose remained unfulfilled, future generations might need a record of it.

Can we believe that Jehovah would suffer His purpose to be defeated by an insufficient record? Human infirmity or perversity might introduce some human error or failure, but would it be suffered to defeat the purpose of producing a substantially true record? Our Lord's acceptance of it, assures the believer in Him, that this would not be suffered, and was not suffered. Criticism, which so strenuously insists on the record being human, tries to nullify that acceptance by suggesting that Our Lord's references to the Old Testament are not to be understood in their obvious meaning; that when He speaks of Moses He only means the books that bear the name of Moses; when He speaks of the Flood, He means such a catastrophe as the Flood is represented to be; of Lot's wife as a typical fable, and so on. Such subtleties, however, cannot be reconciled with the theory of Kenosis, which Criticism also adopts, that Our Lord accepted the current ideas of the time—including necessarily acceptance of the Old Testament—as true, without knowing that it was, in important respects, false, because He had willed to be ignorant.

But, even if the Scriptures of the Old Testament were composed, as Criticism at times assumes, by men, whose hearts God had touched, and whose faculties He had exalted, but without any belief on their part in the special co-

operation of Jehovah in their work, they would not be ordinary literature; to be compared with literature produced by men without any such Divine influence, unless, indeed, this inspiration—which is all that Criticism seems to allow—besides leaving their work untouched in its outward form and composition, is to be further watered down. Still less would they be on the same level as ordinary literature of a different class, or of a different race. To justify criticism of them by rules of grammar, or literary canons drawn from other literatures, it must be shown that these men, exceptionally influenced, as Criticism sometimes admits, were governed in their work by grammar, or moulded it according to canons of composition, of which they do not appear even to have had knowledge. Must not their work be judged on the same principles as those on which it was composed? As for treating it “like any other book,” of whatever character, that is evidently impossible.

Criticism stands over these apparently artless records, in which many different topics are comprised, with its pedagogue’s rod, and brings it down sharply and mercilessly on any deviation from the canons of historical and literary Criticism; no one must venture to deny the infallibility or applicability of “the ordinary principles by which history is judged and evidence estimated”¹ as tests for the contents and authorship of a work which is unique, even putting inspiration out of the question; it must be assumed to be a “neutral field of investigation,” that is, “like any other book.” There is no need to shrink from the challenge thus thrown out. Even ignoring all that Criticism ignores, would any ordinary mind, giving the matter, of course, the necessary attention, be persuaded that a record of mingled law, history, patriotic sentiment, earnest exhortation, &c., not alleged to adopt any language or style unsuitable to its varied topics, was necessarily the work of several authors, that even repetition requires a fresh author?

But in fact the “common, unbiased, unsophisticated reason of mankind”¹ has long ago given its judgment as to these records upon the same materials, for there is nothing new, and all that is relied upon lies upon the surface. It has answered, with unwavering and unvarying voice, that they are substantially Mosaic as they purport to

¹ Driver, “Introduction” (1897), preface, pp. viii-x.

be, and, consequently, not of ages varying from Mosaic times to those of Josiah and the Exile.

Genesis and the Babylonian Epics.

The Christian Church believes that she has, in her Tradition, which includes the life, work and teaching of her Lord, and the dealings of God with men, recorded in the Old Testament, and especially with the Chosen race, a Revelation furnishing a test and standard, by which she is enabled sufficiently to distinguish truth, that which comes from God, from falsehood, to "take out the precious from the vile."¹ She will hardly believe that God saw fit to start His revelations to the Chosen people with the "vile," with Babylonian or Assyrian confusions, Hindu Vedas, &c., and after purifying them, to base His revelation of Himself, in any degree, upon them!

The theory that such heathen traditions were, in any degree, the basis of the Revelation can only spring from a tendency to bring Revelation into line with natural development.

There is a document giving an account of the Creation, which starts with a combat between Bel or Merodach, the highest of a company of gods, and Tiâmat the watery chaos, personified as a woman, in which Merodach captures her and afterwards all her host, in a net with which he has provided himself. He kills her, stamps on her, breaks her in two, and with the two parts, like the skin of a dried fish, he seems to have covered the sky; and under, or over, he framed receptacles for her waters. He then goes on to create the stars, sun, moon, and the trees, plants, animals, &c., in an order following the order of the signs of the Zodiac, and said to correspond, more or less, to the order in Genesis i. This document in its present form is considered by some to be of the seventh century B.C., the century in which Isaiah prophesied.

This polytheistic and mythological "Creation Epic" is welcomed by Criticism as preserving an older account of the Creation than Genesis i, which is treated as being founded upon it, after purifying it from its polytheism, &c. This process of purification seems to come to a substitution for the Babylonian story of a different story, namely, the

¹ Jer. xv. 19.

story in Genesis i, which is the true story, and, consequently, agrees with the pagan one so far as that is also true.

One of the resemblances is that both begin with the phrase, "In the beginning," which, as both profess to start with the beginning, seems easily to be understood, without any copying of one by the other. The opposition of their theology seems to forbid the idea of Genesis being indebted to the Creation Epic. It is admitted that the writer of Genesis would have shrunk with horror from using so foul a piece of paganism!

It is not proved—to say the least—that the Creation Epic was in existence before Genesis, still less that it was known to the writer of Genesis. The suggestion that Genesis was founded upon it, purified or unpurified, is a mere conjecture, supported by no evidence except that supplied by the resemblances, such as they are; which, if the facts in Genesis are true, must appear in all accounts which are true in those respects. It seems much more likely that the Babylonian Creation Story, if borrowing occurred, borrowed from Genesis and added its own mythology.

The traditional view is that the story of the Creation was revealed to man, perhaps to Adam, and came into the possession and custody of the Chosen people; they preserved it, while other races fell away from the knowledge of the true and only God, and invented a variety of distorted representations of Him and of His works and dealings—of which distortions the Creation Epic is an instance.

Dr. Driver says,¹ "The differences between the Babylonian epic and the first chapter of Genesis are sufficiently wide; in the one, particularly in the parts not here repeated, we have an exuberant and grotesque polytheism; in the other, a severe and dignified monotheism; in the one, chaos is anterior to Deity, the gods emerge, or are evolved out of it, and Marduk gains his supremacy only after a long contest; in the other, the Creator is supreme, absolute from the beginning. But in spite of these profound theological differences, there are material resemblances between the two representations, which are too marked and too numerous to be explained as chance coincidences. The outline or general course of events is the same in the two narratives. There are in both the same abyss of waters at the beginning denoted

¹ Driver, *Genesis* (1904), p. 30.

by almost the same word, the separation of this abyss afterwards into an upper and a lower ocean, the formation of heavenly bodies and their appointment as measures of time, and the creation of man."

Speaking of the writers of Genesis, Dr. Driver says (p. 31): "The function of inspiration was to guide them in the disposal and arrangement of these materials, and in the use to which they applied them. And so, in his picture of the beginnings of the world, having nothing better available, the author has utilized elements derived ultimately from a heathen source, and made them the vehicle for profound religious teaching . . . We have said 'derived ultimately'; for naturally a direct borrowing from the Babylonian narrative is not to be thought of; it is incredible that the monotheistic author of Gen. i, at whatever date he lived, could have borrowed any detail, however slight, from the polytheistic epic of the conflict of Marduk and Tîâmat. The Babylonian legend of Creation must have passed through a long period of naturalization in Israel, and of gradual assimilation to the spirit of Israel's religion, before it could have reached the form in which it is presented to us in the first chapter of Genesis. How, or when, it was first introduced among the Hebrews, must remain matter of conjecture." There seems to be no other evidence of this process than is afforded by the comparison of the account in Genesis with the Babylonian account, the use of which is *assumed*, although its relative date is unproved. The date of origin of this production does not appear, but it is assumed by Dr. Driver to be the original source of the Scriptural writer's account of the Creation, without even a pretence of any evidence of his knowledge of it, purified or unpurified. It might just as well be asserted that the Genesis account is the source of the Babylonian. However striking the similarities of the two accounts may be, there could hardly be less in common in any two stories of the Creation of a Universe in which firmament, ocean, man, animals, plants, trees, and the celestial bodies existed; these facts must figure in any account of it. Such common features seem quite insufficient to establish any connection between them. They are part of the subject common to both; that is all. Unless the Babylonian author supplied the writer of the Scriptural story with a word for "the abyss of waters," said to be "almost the same" as the one he employed, the Scriptural writer owed

nothing to him; no writer needed to borrow from the Babylonian Epic, he needed only to look around him to supply himself with all the rest of the matter which is regarded as common to the two accounts. Even the insignificant contribution from the Babylonian story had to be "purified," and especially the account of the formation of the firmament. The purification of the Babylonian story consisted in blotting out all of it except those supposed "similarities," which do not need any explanation, as "chance coincidences," or otherwise, being necessarily part of such a story, and equally obvious to all observers or writers. It was the nature of their Creator which required to be revealed, and that was altogether misrepresented and befouled in the Babylonian story. This story seems to be entirely unconnected with the story in Genesis, unless it is an outrageous distortion and perversion of it. But Criticism, which cannot tell how the Babylonian account originated, or how or when it was first introduced among the Hebrews, prefers to assume that it was permitted to the Scriptural writer—under Divine inspiration, "in the disposal and arrangement of his materials, and having nothing better available"—to use this Babylonian story, purified, presumably by the same Divine Providence, after it had saturated their minds and been assimilated by them, only to be purged out again, and replaced by a purer story.

We must, apparently, not dream that God could or would, even to the writer of Genesis, reveal the truth as to His own Creation—for He does not (so Criticism asserts) provide materials¹—although no mortal could know this truth otherwise. Yet it does not seem contemplated that the writer of Genesis should await further or better materials; for, as Criticism tells us, in the above quotation, God was guiding the Scripture writer in the use of this very tainted story as materials. Where did the writer of Genesis get the materials for the rest of his account—besides the common items—which must, if true, have been revealed?

The process of purification is difficult to realize. The Hebrews, into whose hands the Babylonian story is supposed to have come, could not have recoiled from it with horror, for it was designed to be assimilated. And yet, without that

¹ Driver, "Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament," preface, p. x.

spirit of recoil, how could the assumed purification happen? The double process of assimilation and purification involved its more than tolerant acceptance, in all its foulness, at the start, to be followed by repugnance, and then by rejection of all but the insignificant common items, these being accepted ultimately in profound unconsciousness that the legend had ever existed, much less won acceptance or been regarded with any less horror than was in that late time felt for it; or that the purified items, which were being unconsciously embodied by the Hebrews in their own sacred story, for want of anything better provided by Jehovah, really still bore the taint of polytheism. In fact, the process had brought them back to the starting point, as far as their consciousness went, but still left a taint, of which they were unconscious! These items, apparently features of nature, open to common use, which are assumed to have been borrowed from the Babylonian story, would never, we are told, have been consciously embodied, even though purified, had not the writer of Genesis been led, under the inspiration of Jehovah, to use them. All which appears, to the piercing eye of Criticism, to be deducible from the appearance of those few innocent-looking items common to the two accounts, as they must likewise be to all accounts of the Creation.

The picture here presented of Israel grubbing among the dust-heaps of Babylon and picking up this treasure, too foul for use until purged of everything it contained, except the most obvious facts, contrast strangely with the picture of the tender Father leading His son, "rising up early and sending" His messengers to teach and guide him. It would need the most cogent proof. Even if fully proved it would only show that God saw fit so to act in this instance; it would not suffice to contradict the Tradition in the Old Testament which declares that God revealed His character and purpose by direct communication, and in no case recognizes any such indirect, roundabout method as Criticism assumes.

It is strange to find the Scriptures opening with no better sources than a heathen document, which must have taken centuries to purify in the simple course of a father teaching it to his children, and gradually dropping out the more flagrantly odious parts of it, in the course of centuries, until the writer of Genesis fell in with it, and knowing nothing about its history, or the history of the Creation, adopted it. How many centuries this process would take is unknown;

but, if the purified epic emerged in the 7th century B.C., it emerged in an atmosphere in which Israel had long heard of the Law and of Prophets; both claiming to disclose the revealed will of Jehovah, the prophet Isaiah being conspicuous in that century. Dr. Driver has left the period at which this source so fortunately prepared, purified and accepted—in the bareness of information—without even hazarding a conjecture about it, prolific as Criticism usually is of such guesses. It would, it is true, be hard to find a gap of centuries in the chronology which would allow the necessary time for the slow perception and action of the pictured family to reach the goal at the right moment. The incident throws a flood of light upon the kind of evidence which Criticism thinks good enough to displace that of the Old Testament.

Critical Tests of Development.

The development of Israel under special Divine guidance cannot be measured or judged by the development of men or nations in the ordinary course without such direct guidance, notwithstanding that the Spirit works in them too, but in a different way, and in restricted measure. Yet, where it plainly appears that men raised to a higher plane are then left to develop with less special guidance, it may sometimes be helpful to find that the course of such development can be traced, and, possibly, to find that there is a certain analogy between the workings of the Spirit in the two cases—whether under special direct and express guidance as in the case of Israel, or under a more hidden and hardly perceptible guidance, as in other cases. Such analogies may strengthen faith, but can never overrule it, for there can hardly be complete identity in the two modes of working, that of the fuller inspiration being the test and standard.

Human reason cannot attain to truth unaided; all it can do is to sift, and to reject what is inconsistent with revealed truth; for truth cannot be grasped by the unaided human faculties; it must be revealed to them. Men, indeed, often set up standards of truth, and presume to test even the workings of the Divine Spirit by such standards. Such standards are not, of necessity, absolutely false, although usually the element of truth in them is perverted. That element of truth, however, has come from God, and is, in

its measure, a true standard for judgment. It cannot, however, if rightly applied, condemn God's actual workings. It cannot overrule faith, although it may confirm it.

We hear much of Comparative Religion, a study still in its infancy. Science, when full-grown, is apt to differ astonishingly from its promise in infancy. This branch of inquiry has apparently had a profound influence on Criticism. The analogy of other religions is constantly appealed to—an appeal which, in due subordination, as above suggested, may be helpful. It is, however, used to contradict and dislocate the Scripture history. Because the neighbour races of Israel, following mainly their own self-will, could not develop any true life, and—although, doubtless, under a measure of Divine influence—only developed, if at all, by slow and uncertain stages, it is inferred, by an unfounded analogy, that Israel must have done the same—the special guidance of Jehovah, and His character, as the only true Guide of man, being ignored or denied. It is thus *assumed* that, as the Israelites could not in the Wilderness, in the opinion of the Critics, be in a suitable stage for its development, the Law, especially the Levitical Law, could not have been imposed there, in direct contradiction of the narrative, however skilfully it is tortured to make it speak otherwise. And this conclusion is recommended for our acceptance as being “natural.” In this region, where Revelation and Inspiration act, we are not in search of the natural, but of the Divine, which cannot be tested by the standard of what is natural. The analogy is not admissible for such a purpose. There may be in the result an element of the natural, and so far there is a common element. But its extent is hidden from us, and we cannot doubt that its operation, in harmony with the Divine influence, must be so profoundly modified that no inference can be drawn from a comparison of the two cases which can in any way adversely affect the Scriptural account of it, or can show it to have worked otherwise than as it is recorded to have worked. If the analogy is in harmony with the recorded Revelation, it may confirm the Scriptural record, but it cannot, in any case, displace it. Development under special Divine guidance furnishes an infallible standard. Development in a similar manner shows us that the same Divine influence works also in other ways, which should help our faith.

The Qualifications of Critics.

If the Old Testament narrative could be treated, as Criticism *assumes*, as subject to the same conditions as other works, "at the same place and time,"¹ some qualifications not forthcoming would still be required of critics, who claim to be experts in interpreting, analysing and reconstructing them, especially if their examination might happen to result in anything similar to that of modern Old Testament Criticism, which inverts the history it criticizes. If, for instance, that history was contemporary with the time of the critic, would he be entitled to be so much as listened to, unless he belonged to the same people as those whose history he professed to criticize? Should we accept the history of our own time and country in the shape which it might take in contemporary French or German, or even American writers, in preference to its shape in our own writers? When one reads foreign accounts of our own history, or even accounts by foreign observers of our own proceedings, one frequently, if not invariably, has a strange bewildered feeling of having got the facts upside down—a feeling such as produces a puzzled look on the face of a person with impaired sight, who has got his book upside down and cannot make out what gives it a look so unfamiliar to him. The Old Testament, as moulded by Criticism, produces a similar impression; and the confident and vehement assurances of critics, that it is now all right, but was upside down before, are not satisfying. If we ask what qualification the foreign critic possesses, the only advantage that can be claimed is that of a different point of view, if that should happen to be an advantage.

A foreign critic, even if contemporary with the events recorded in the history, cannot be in as good a position as a native for correctly interpreting the facts, since he is primarily a stranger to the habits and ideas of the people in question; that is a disability inseparable from his position of greater detachment, and of a less prejudiced point of view. He cannot have the advantage of both ways; he cannot have the intimate appreciation of the native as well as the detached point of view of the foreigner. A foreigner may, in exceptional cases, know a great deal about some country other than his own, but he cannot compete with the native in that respect.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," preface, p. x.

If this is true of a foreigner contemporary with the events, the case of a foreigner at a distance from the events, in time or place, is evidently one which needs no emphasizing. We know little of India, for instance, in spite of having been intimately connected with it for a century. Even those Anglo-Indians who have spent much of their lives there cannot presume to claim any approach to equality with the native-born subjects in knowledge of their habits and ideas. At present Criticism has largely refrained from remoulding the sacred books of the Hindus, Mohammedans, and other races and religions in India. They, no doubt, afford abundance of scope for criticism. Not to speak of the Vedas, the later Hindu sages present systems of law which are probably capable of kaleidoscopic rearrangements. The Koran might prove no less alluring to Criticism than the Old Testament. As to the history of the Indian peoples, the disintegration of it might be easy, but its reconstruction would be a gigantic task. Criticism would, in those fields, be comparatively free from traditional obstacles. It could, however, hardly be imagined that either the law or the history could at this distance of time and space be reconstructed, especially by foreigners.

Modern critics, moreover, are not only foreigners as regards Israel, but Westerns and moderns as well. While it is difficult to understand thoroughly, or even adequately, people of our own race, who live within the influence of the same civilization, and of the same religion, but under foreign, or even the like conditions, the difficulty in understanding Eastern ideas and systems is immeasurably greater.

Again, there is the difference in time. Besides the difficulty of getting back to facts and events of so many centuries ago, there is the still greater difficulty of entering in imagination into ideas sundered in time from those of the present day by many centuries—ideas with which we are out of touch, and largely out of sympathy.

When a critic, under modern conditions, goes forth light-heartedly to reconstruct the Jewish history and law, he cannot be unconscious of these difficulties in his way—these gulfs which he must pass over. He must, necessarily, go with his own standards by which to form his judgments; with his foreign, Western, and modern frame of mind, habits and experience, he cannot get rid of these, however much he may strive to do so. It is as natural to apply the local and personal standards habitual to us as it is to apply

those more general standards which are "entirely human," rather than those which, wholly or partially, transcend human nature.

It is, of course, not contended that Criticism is therefore impossible, or that all knowledge of the distant past is barred. On the other hand, the cherished aim of proving that a nation like the ancient Jews had been radically mistaken as to the course of their own history is an impossible aim, even for Jewish critics living at a period when fuller evidence was still available. But that this feat should be performed by Western scholars at the present day is so staggering as, perhaps, on that very account, to take assent by storm. It will, moreover, be obvious that critics equipped—as Western scholars must be—with Western ideas and standards, and applying "entirely human" analogies to such a development and history as that of Israel, may be expected to produce surprising results. Especially must this be the case when so much of the structure, which is thus built up, consists of conjecture, founded on what seems to the critic possible, probable, or plausible. In such conjectures the reference to some standard in the inquirer's mind is the ground of decision; and this standard is the "entirely human" experience and ideas of Western minds, as far removed in character from the mind needed by such a critic—as the West is from the East. And these critics do not feel the need of fuller knowledge¹ of the time with which they have to deal. They are quite satisfied and of impregnable confidence.

There is visible, at the present time, a tendency, which has developed during the present generation, to something like impatience at the comparatively slow process of proof, with a readiness to accept striking theories, and to chafe at the delay which adequate verification involves. We see this tendency even amongst scientists, although some are disturbed by its appearance, and seek to check its growth. Surprise has been expressed that the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection should be so largely and almost definitely accepted, even by scientists, while still unproved and unverified, as Science requires. As Huxley emphatically declared, a single established fact, really inconsistent with the Darwinian theory, must shatter it. Scientific men, who

¹ Driver, "Introduction," preface, p. viii.

were inclined to accept the theory, and were sometimes restive at having to wait for the exhaustive verification rigorously demanded by Science, managed to assuage their impatience by the confident expectation that the "missing link" would ultimately be found, the assumptions in the theory verified, and the gaps and breaches in it filled up and repaired. It is not improbable that many have been led to accept the "assured results" of Criticism in a like optimistic spirit. With the phrase, "probability is the guide of life" echoing in their minds, they may, possibly, be inclined to ignore, or even to resent, insistence on the necessity of convincing proof of those "assured results," and to accept the dogmatic pronouncements of "scholars" as the judgments of experts, whose authority they are at liberty, if not absolutely bound, to accept, and as conclusions which may seem sufficiently probable, especially when sweetened by the soothing assurance that no vital truth will be sacrificed by such acceptance. This matter has been already, to some extent, touched upon. It may, however, be useful to point out that to apply probability as a test of truth is once more to presuppose the entirely human character to which it is so applied. Criticism naturally applies it to the entire sacred, and—as some critics allow or insist—Divinely influenced field of Scripture. But the application of the test of probability is merely the application of human experience to *entirely* human subjects.

Probability is the ground of inference as to some case in question from similar cases in past experience, which may enable the person who needs its help to judge what the result of his action in the case in question may be expected to be. It is a rough practical method of forecasting the future by past experience, and is very often the only guide available to short-sighted human beings in the practical affairs of life, when a decision must be made, either to act in a certain way or to abstain from so acting. It applies past human experience in order to judge what may be expected in the future to result from action in the present similar to that taken in a like case in the past. It applies human analogy, and assumes the uniformity for practical judgments of human experience. It is not applicable to inference by analogy from human experience to Divine action; it is only applicable on the human plane, and accordingly reduces all it deals with to the human level. Expectation is, however, permissible as to Divine action in the

future from Divine action in the past; always subject, however, unless Divinely enlightened, to fatal error in judging the thoughts and ways of Him Whose thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor His Ways as our ways. Criticism relies almost entirely on human probabilities in a sphere in which special Divine influence is, or at lowest, may be, working. This method, as already insisted, vitiates all its conclusions, and is its *fundamental* error. The development of Israel, and the record of that development are, at the very lowest, unique, if only because of the outstanding "genius for Religion" of Israel, claimed for it or recognized by Criticism; and this uniqueness forbids the Critical assumption that its manifestations can be tested by analogies with other developments or their records. Neither history nor Comparative Religion can pretend to afford any test by which the Jewish development and its record can be judged or contradicted in any material respect. No other development or record can pretend to superiority over them as to truth; all other developments, and their records, must submit to be tested by the Jewish—or rather by the Christian—as the highest.

Criticism takes full advantage of the attitude of thought at the present time in dealing with ancient history. The vast additions to our scientific knowledge have prepared an atmosphere in which faith seemed doomed to asphyxiation. Although that atmosphere has become less deadly, the conditions still produced are abnormal, overweighing the supernatural by the natural. It is for Criticism that modern tendencies desperately fight, yet with entire confidence in the power of modern weapons to overmaster the antiquated artillery of the age of Moses or of Christ. From a truer point of view, however, it should be remembered that the battle is not destined for the big battalions.

It is impossible to get back to the age of Moses or of Christ, although it is often suggested that a scientific observer of to-day might be capable of projecting his mind backward so far, and might thus supply scientific accounts of events of those times. And it is very frequently assumed that present-day criticism is applicable to those past events, which are only known to us through a history, which is itself a leading subject of dispute. For the scientific man or critic to bring all up-to-date knowledge and methods to bear on primitive history is almost enthusiastically welcomed as pure gain, although the perspective of the primitive

scene must be radically altered to suit a modern Western eye. That eye does not suit a primitive scene; it cannot perceive it as it presented itself at the time. It is with that scene, it must be remembered, that we are primarily concerned, and only secondarily with the description of it, as a means of grasping the events and penetrating to their real character and significance. When we endeavour to perceive those events, by means of the description, we necessarily read that description in the light of modern Western knowledge and ideas, and expect to see the events in their true proportions. The light in which, and the perspective in which, the events were seen when they actually happened, have utterly vanished, and cannot by any human faculties be recalled. This question, however, does not, for our present purpose, press for an absolute decision, the practical question at present being, whether the past can be recalled so as to contradict the cardinal statements of the history, namely (1) that the entire Law was given, in substance, in the Wilderness, and (2) the subordinate statement, that it and the bulk of the Pentateuch were written by Moses.

CHAPTER III.

INSPIRATION.

The Fact.

WE are nowhere told that the human channels of Revelation are altogether free from human infirmities or from all liability to error. No man was found free from liability to error until our Lord came, uniting a perfect and sinless human nature with the Divine nature. Our Lord revealed the fulness of the Godhead in a human body.

Consequently we have, as our test of what is the Divine Revelation, the Revelation in Him, and are thus enabled, so far as our own imperfection allows, to judge (by the illumination of the Holy Spirit) what, in revelations through other channels, is truly the essence of the Divine message, and what is mixture due to the imperfection of human nature, although the Divine and human elements are not separable by human faculties. Science may rightly give its help. If it shows any part of the Scripture to be inconsistent with what can be proved by human faculties, it may show that it is not part of the Revelation, but can in no way discredit its Revelation.

Criticism proposes to eschew a priori views of Inspiration while assuming that Inspiration does not affect the outward form and composition of the record of the development of Israel. Conservative Criticism professes to presuppose Inspiration subject to the limitations imposed by itself, for which no warrant can be found. Such limitations as would defeat the purpose of God in the development or its record are obviously inadmissible.

As already indicated God doubtless revealed Himself to other nations as well as to Israel, as the Epistle to the Hebrews declares, but in a different way and in a different measure. All that is true and permanent comes from Him—every good gift and every perfect gift—and reveals Him. Every true or pure thought, every just or righteous act, every loving or unselfish deed,

is a revelation of God. The prophet has Divine gifts in an unusual degree. There is no need or reason to deny that such gifts were found among other nations. What is lacking in their case is the assurance of truth given in the Revelation to Israel; but this does not prevent our finding that such gifts were bestowed. If we accept the Revelation through Israel we can test all other revelation through other nations by the accepted Revelation to Israel, since that was stamped as true by the infallible assurance of Our Lord.

In claiming the acceptance of the Old Testament by Our Lord as an infallible stamp of its truth we do not claim that it is necessarily entirely free from human error; the channels of Inspired Revelation were, until He came, as far as we know, not altogether lifted above human infirmities. As God had seen fit to use them, we must recognize that He controlled their work so as to fulfil His purpose; and, amongst other things, to produce a sufficient record, although it might not be entirely free from human error. As God had suffered it to be, so Our Lord stamped it as sufficiently correct and substantially true. The believer may with perfect confidence regard such errors, if proved to exist, as immaterial and as insignificant. It can only be on the assumption that it must be entirely free from human error that the existence of such error could be fatal to its authority.

Criticism eliminates Inspiration.

Criticism claims that it throws light upon the meaning of the Old Testament. The method adopted tends to eliminate the Divine element as far as possible, and to make the Scriptures more "natural," and so more intelligible by such elimination. This process, of course, brings the Scriptures down to the human level, and so renders them more congenial to the human mind, and thus more intelligible to it. The process is based upon, or at least involves, the *assumption* that the national and religious life of Israel followed the natural course of human development, with little or no direct or special intervention of God. It assumes that God revealed Himself mainly through the natural workings of human minds and the regular order of nature, in all of which an influence from Him is at work at all times and under all circumstances. Under this influence it is assumed that revelations or discoveries await the due preparation of the human mind, and can never appear until the human

mind is ripe—and ripe to human discernment—to evolve or receive them.¹

The traditional view does not pretend to say when Israel was ripe to evolve or receive the Law, except by its being given. It recognizes that the necessary ripeness was then attained, discernible by God, even if indiscernible by human eyes.

According to the Critical view of development the Law could not have appeared while the people of Israel were in a stage of development unsuited, according to human judgment, to its evolution, or, at least, to its reception. The traditional view considers its actual promulgation conclusive as to the fitness of the time, and does not make the fitness of the people, according to human discernment, a condition of its promulgation. Israel, as pictured by Critics, could not have been in the fit state in the Wilderness to receive the Law, especially the Ceremonial Law, which would not therefore have been evolved or proclaimed there; and the theory of its first appearance in the reign of Josiah is thus, it is said, confirmed. In Josiah's time, and still more after the Exile, the people were more ripe for the acceptance of the Law, more fitted to understand, and therefore more prepared to obey it than they were in the Wilderness. Obedience—as is again assumed—must *follow* and cannot precede the intelligent acceptance of what claims obedience. And the mind must also be duly prepared for its intelligent acceptance—of which state of preparation the Critics claim to be qualified to judge. The Scripture order is the inverse of this evolutionary order; the Scriptures declare that obedience comes first, and that fuller understanding is reached by obedience. The order adopted by the entire body of Scripture, both of the Old and New Testament, is emphatically enunciated by Our Lord; the disciples after their acceptance of Him and by obedience to His teaching learned, slowly and painfully, the fuller meaning of the principles they had been taught to follow in practice. The Scribes of the Exile were, it is said, deeply imbued with the truth of the latter principle, viz., that discipline begins with obedience; and they, consequently, erroneously depicted the development of Israel on that basis, regardless—according to the Critical theory—of the actual existing records, if any,

¹ See Pusey on Daniel (1869), p. 468.

where those did not lend themselves to the philosophy of history to which they were wedded! The Critics act in the very same way; they reconstruct the history according to their theory, equally regardless of the records, only their theory is the opposite of that ascribed to the Scribes. Scientific methods and the advance of scepticism lead them to adopt the theory that the religious development of the Israelites, as of all other races, has proceeded upon certain lines, common to them all. And they now depict the religious development of Israel on that basis, regardless of the actual facts, as recorded, so far as these do not fit into their theory. They depict this development as proceeding upon lines analogous to those of the development of kindred and neighbouring races.

The Higher Criticism rests very largely—it would hardly be too much to say, mainly—upon this analogy, which it assumes to exist between the people of Israel and other races, especially the surrounding and kindred nations. It is only upon the assumption of such analogy that Moses can be effectually dislodged.

It is said, as has been already noticed, that ripeness to receive the Law was a condition of its development or reception, and consequently, of its imposition by God. It is a specious suggestion, very apt to find acceptance, because it makes the development more “natural”; and we always think first of what is more familiar to us, and especially of what is human and natural. “That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural.”¹ If the training and development of Israel were effected by influences such as affected the kindred or surrounding races, the analogy might be applicable, although it would still be subject to many qualifications. But the training and development of Israel did not, if the history is to be trusted, follow the merely natural course, but was throughout guided and controlled by God, with the purpose of creating a nation of a special character, markedly different from, and even radically antagonistic to, the kindred and surrounding races. Analogy can only apply, as already urged, where there are sufficient elements common to both the subjects compared, and only to the extent of such common elements. Israel

¹ I Cor. xv, 46.

according to the history stood to the heathen nations as opposite as light to darkness. What fellowship or analogy could there be between the two, especially in religion, which is the matter to which it is sought to apply the analogy? Israel was, according to the narrative, to be in deadly hostility to the other nations on this very ground; and, so far from having common elements of religion, the Israelites were actually directed to extirpate the races who are set up by Criticism as, to some extent, their *teachers* and *models*. But Criticism, in asserting that Israel, in some degree, duly formed itself upon the pattern of the surrounding nations, begs the question. The narrative says the direct opposite. It entirely excludes the critical theory that the religion of Israel was derived from any human source, whether in an original or "purified" form. It must first be shown that the narrative is untrue before the assumed analogy can be applied. The accepted history of the Jews shows that they were all along a "peculiar people," with institutions of Divine appointment and a revealed moral and religious law, which has no affinity with the purified folk-lore assumed by Criticism.

When Israelites asked, "How do these nations serve their gods, even so will I do likewise,"¹ they apostatized from Jehovah!

Those who do not accept Christianity cannot be expected to adopt any other point of view than the purely human one. But for those who do accept Christianity there must be a further question: What was, in the mind of Our Lord, the true course of Israel's development?

Criticism admits, and, indeed, insists, that Our Lord accepted the current belief of His time as to the Scriptures, which current belief included the belief in the development of Israel under special Divine guidance and control, as narrated in the Old Testament. Did He then merely give a passive assent to current convictions in so believing? It may as well be asked if He came to take His religion from the Scribes, to learn their views instead of revealing truth to them. The question if answered in the affirmative must necessarily be followed by the confession that Christ was like any other man. This is the inference which Criticism, consciously or unconsciously, is inviting us to draw!

¹ Deut. xii. 30.

That Christ contemplated that the Law, as then accepted, was withheld until late times is obviously absurd. Even the Ceremonial Law, with its legislation as to Ceremonial impurity, is expressly recognized by Him as prior to David's time, as is shown by His reference to its existence when David took the Shewbread. If then He did not merely passively adopt current views was He mistaken? Did He not know, or need to know, the true course of Israel's development? Did He come merely to leave undisturbed current ideas on matters involving spiritual truths. If so, did He indeed make a final and complete revelation of the Father? Critics cannot contend that the questions they raise are unimportant. They tell us sometimes that they are vital, and that their solution in the Critical sense is a boon for which we ought to be grateful. If they tell us that Christ attested Scripture as inspired, but that He did not know, or did not care, who were the authors or writers of it, or when or where it was written, or whether it is true or "historical" or fiction, matters which, according to Criticism, it is a Christian's duty to know, we cannot avoid the question, "Was He indeed the Incarnate Son, or but a man?"

Naturalistic Bases of Criticism.

It is said¹ that the "wide extension of scientific and historical knowledge" which has occurred in recent years, leading to a change in the methods and categories of men's thoughts, "has not only caused general unsettlement of religious belief, but also calls for a readjustment of those beliefs in some respects to the new views thus developed."

It may be that adjustment of men's ideas to the permanent truths of religion is necessary; but those permanent truths cannot be adjusted to the fluctuating ideas of men. Nor can facts be adjusted to men's ideas, although ideas can and should be adjusted to facts. Criticism appears to result in adjusting permanent truths—facts—to ideas, and not ideas to permanent truths or facts.

When the earth came to be regarded as a spheroid rotating on its own axis and revolving round the sun, any ideas which prevailed inconsistent with those new facts, and which appeared to be sanctioned by Scripture, might properly be

¹ See Dr. Gore's speech at Oxford on November 13, 1904 (*The Guardian*, November 23, 1904, p. 1961).

examined, in order to see how far they really were sanctioned by Divine Revelation. If they appeared to be inferences drawn by the human mind from the Scriptures they might be wrong, "incrustations," as it is said, upon the Revelation. Such inferences might be (a) legitimate inferences from the text but still wrong, because there were errors on the part of the human instrument of the writer, the messenger; such errors, consequently, not being part of the message, the Revelation; or (b) such inferences might be illegitimate inferences from the message or Revelation. In the case just mentioned there is no real difficulty, the apparent phenomena are referred to, and an explanation of them was unnecessary and superfluous. In past centuries the abundance of truth in the Scriptures sometimes led to the belief that there was no human element in them; that there was no distinction between the message and the words in which it was conveyed. "It was a childish ignorance." But what is to be said of the critical contention that the "external form and composition of the message are 'entirely human' "?¹ That is the root-fallacy of Criticism—that the human channel through which the Divine message comes is not affected by the message; and that, consequently, the outward form and composition of the message can be judged by the analogy of purely human utterances, e.g., by canons of criticism and other analogies drawn from purely human sources, largely pagan.

The purpose of Revelation cannot be *assumed* to be a purpose of revealing truth obtainable without it, unless, indeed, knowledge of such truth was deemed, at the time, essential for the apprehension of the Divine Will. Man was endowed with Freewill and certain faculties; Divine Power does not supersede either, unless the Divine purpose so requires it. The order of the Creation or appearance of the creatures in Genesis may not be essential for the apprehension of the Divine purpose, and so not be part of the Revelation. The modern apprehension of the pervading operation of law in the universe may bring with it a deeper sense of the Divine influence, and the recognition of a manifestation of God in the material world, but does not affect the Scripture Revelation in any essential point, unless the control of God over the universe is irreconcilable with such

¹ Ryle, "Holy Scripture and Criticism," p. 34.

operation. It may enable us to see that something, which we once thought pure revealed truth—came, in the course of its passage through a human mind, and of its delivery by a human messenger, to be mixed with some human element, and that, consequently, there might be a mixture of immaterial error. In any case the treasure of unrevealed truth is in earthen vessels, except in the perfect humanity of Our Lord.

The Revelation, the Divine message, was largely conveyed through human minds which framed its expression in terms of current human thought and in current human language. Our Lord Himself used human language and expressed truth in terms of current human thought. He spoke of the sun as rising and setting, evidently speaking of what was apparent, and adopting, as we may believe, the ordinary ideas and language of men, in order to interpose no needless obstacle to their understanding and reception of the Divine truth which He intended to convey; such an obstacle might be created by mixing with that Divine truth a correction of their ideas as to matters which did not really affect that truth. We should act thus in the case of children. And if it is permissible to examine the ideas associated with the Revelation in order to see whether they are really part of it, the new knowledge or ideas might properly be taken into account in considering whether there was an "incrustation by men's minds" upon the Revelation. This fresh fact, or apparent fact, would, if sufficiently proved, assist the inquirer in seeing—what he had not before realized—that the idea he had accepted as part of the Revelation was not of such a character as to affect the Revelation, and could not, therefore, be regarded as an essential part of it; although, while without that help, the human mind had not realized its independence. The apparent error is then seen to be no part of the Divine Revelation, and the human error, if any, which had been mistaken for a necessary part of it, is corrected. The infallibility of the Revelation is not impaired. For instance, the *order* of Creation in the first chapter of Genesis, already referred to, may not be essential to the Revelation. In this instance, however, the statements could not have been based on human knowledge, for no human eye could have witnessed the events related. But, on the other hand, the fresh element to be considered—the scientific theory of development—is incapable of verification, for the same reason that no human knowledge can take us

back, with certainty, to the origin of the earth. That scientific theory rests upon the *assumption* that the same laws governed the formation of the earth as have since prevailed—an assumption which cannot be verified, and is contradicted by the story, which pictures special Divine handling.

When we turn to history, however, we enter upon a widely different region. History cannot claim to approach scientific certainty. And obviously an authentic utterance by God can only be displaced, as Huxley admits, by evidence which would displace God Himself.

Now we have in the Scriptures what purports to be a Divine Revelation, a Divine history, showing the inmost and essential truth of the matters contained in it. It is a Revelation made through human channels; it is nowhere said that these human channels have been lifted altogether above human infirmities. But it is emphatically declared or implied, in every part of it, that the human channels were influenced by the Spirit of God to convey, each in due measure, the message of God to man. The mere fact that the human instruments *believed* themselves to be messengers of God furnishes the highest conceivable guarantee—short of the truth of their belief—for the utmost truth of which human nature is capable, except under the direct guidance of God. Their histories must, therefore, as mere human histories, stand above all other human histories not similarly guaranteed. If accepted as really inspired they cannot be displaced by any uninspired history.

To what purpose, then, is it that the extension of historical knowledge is put forward as a ground of revision? Can it displace the histories we have accepted, whether they are inspired, or only written under a full conviction of such Inspiration? In either case no human history of a different character can be on an equality with them, much less rank above them. Criticism, especially "Conservative" Criticism, which maintains that the inspiration of Scripture is not impaired by its conclusions, must admit that even a sincere consciousness of Inspiration must create a like sense of responsibility for truth!

Even without Inspiration or the consciousness of it, those who presented the Scriptures to the nation as a true record of the dealings of Jehovah with His people, a record of the "intimacy"¹ of Israel with its God, of the relation of a

¹ See Dr. Scott Holland in "Lux Mundi" 10th edition p. 43.

Divine Father with His son, must have been so deeply impressed with the responsibility of so sacred a duty, that there is a guarantee of the record being true to the best of their ability and belief. Some critics, however, maintain that the records were re-written, as often as it seemed desirable, in order to present a fresh and "readjusted" view of the history. But Conservative critics—who "pre-suppose"¹ Inspiration in the record as it now stands—can hardly adopt this theory. And surely Ezra the Scribe, when he compiled and produced as "the Law of Moses, the man of God," the present Pentateuch, must have been deeply conscious of his responsibility for the truth of his representation. Criticism, indeed, contends that there is much compilation in this record as it now stands, and that there is no evidence of Inspiration, or of consciousness of Inspiration on the part of the compilers, and claims that modern critics are as well qualified to judge of the matters in issue as such uninspired compilers. But the fact of compilation has to be proved. And whatever may be the sense of responsibility of critics, it is not the same as that of compilers of sacred records. Nor have they the original materials before them which were before the supposed compilers, who, moreover, even on the critical view, were mainly occupied in combining those original materials. The question of the value of the Scriptures, as compared with ordinary human history, depends partly on the sense of responsibility felt by the authors of the supposed "Sources," and partly on that felt by the compiler. The critic ought to feel a deep sense of responsibility in ignoring the sense of responsibility of the authors and compilers, if these were compilers, as supposed; but his work cannot be placed on a level with theirs.

A compiler may compile his own compositions, with some addition of other materials. Moses may have been the compiler, as well as the author of the bulk of the Pentateuch; even modern authors do not compose the whole of a work at one sitting, but by degrees, collecting and adjusting the various parts afterwards; compiling, in other words, their own compositions. Again, the destructive conclusions of Criticism are mainly based upon certain supposed features of what are regarded as original component parts of the compilation. The existence of a compiler, however, is by no

¹ Driver, "Introduction" (1897), preface, p. xiii.

means proved in the case of the Old Testament; he is called into existence by the exigencies of Critical theory. But he is quite harmless, except for his extraordinary and inexplicable habit of blundering, of projecting events back to past ages, and of joining together what is said to be obviously incongruous, and which could hardly be supposed by a sane person to be otherwise. The matters which rendered the assumption of a compiler necessary or possible are matters found in the substance of the supposed original documents, which are said to display features characteristic, according to the analogy of entirely human compositions, of compilation, of the work of different authors, of authors of different dates, writing under entirely different circumstances from those appearing from the documents. It is, indeed, contended that these features, disclosing the supposed compilation, are the work of other compilers, who "worked over" and altered the supposed original documents in conformity with the ideas of their own age, which ideas were largely baseless. But this is the point in issue, and cannot be *assumed* as true in order to establish compilation. The theory of such alteration, moreover, rests, as is obvious, upon further *assumptions*, e.g., that the compilers wrongly *assumed* that the institutions and practice, existing in their own later time, must have existed in the earlier time depicted; that this view was peculiar to their own time; and that they did not scruple to "work over" the ancient records in order to give effect to those ideas.

The work as completed lies before us; the Tradition warrants the belief that it substantially represents the true facts, whether it is merely a collection of original sources, now lost, or of such sources with some modifications or additions which do not affect its substantial truth. Criticism proposes to show, by treating it "like any other book," that it inverts the entire course of events, and is substantially false, owing, at best, to false ideas entertained by the supposed compilers, who have, it is said, remodelled the record in accordance with their mistaken ideas.

The Critics say that treating the record like any other "record," they can discover to a sufficient extent what the original "Sources" were, and can then reconstruct the record by eliminating the supposed influence of the alleged erroneous ideas, and that the result is to invert the course of events as they appear in the record, as it now stands; that they can thus put themselves in the same position as that

of the supposed compilers, freed from the prepossessions of those compilers. Obviously this is assumption throughout—the assumption that the record *is* like any other record being the root of the whole theory in the first place; then that the record has been remoulded at a later date, when mistaken ideas as to the course of events had established themselves; next, that the compilers either had not the original sources or the true facts before them, or that they ignored or rejected them; and, lastly, that they were able to pass off their own erroneous ideas as the true facts, and to establish a tradition that the true course of events was the inverse of their course as now described in Scripture. The Critics can, according to their own theory, only get at the sources by assuming that what is now before us is like other human documents. The theory therefore fails, unless this assumption is true, apart from any other unsoundness.

Inspiration and Responsibility for Truth.

The claim made above that the writers of the Old Testament are more trustworthy than any other writers or other witnesses not so inspired is confirmed by the fact that Our Lord stamped their work as true and as the voice of God. In calling attention to the responsibility for truth which rests upon those who take part in producing a record of the relation of Jehovah with His chosen people, it is not suggested that the liability to error is altogether absent, so long as human instruments are employed, except in a case, if such there be, in which the human element is rendered passive or otherwise prevented by Divine influence from committing such error. In other cases error *may* occur through the fault or infirmity of the human element employed; but in no case can it be *assumed* that ordinary human testimony is on an equality with testimony under Divine Control.

Criticism, which, in effect, reduces all sacred phenomena to the same level, and gives no perceptible effect to Inspiration, nor recognizes uniqueness as a ground of distinction, is far from impartial. It gives a prompt preference to ordinary and foreign, and often hostile evidence over the testimony of Scripture, even as to the history of Israel. It eagerly hunts for foreign inscriptions and documents, which are taken at their face value, while Scriptural statements are ruthlessly dissected and rejected.

Moses and Hammurabi.

There is a Mosaic Code, held by Critics to be about 1,000 years later than Moses. Although in the Scripture narrative there is abundant and detailed evidence of the place and time of the delivery of the Mosaic Code to Moses himself in the Wilderness, Criticism rejects this testimony in favour of late dates, from about a century before Josiah's reign to the Exile or later.

There is also a code of Hammurabi. The date of Hammurabi is fixed by the allowed mention of him, as Amraphel, in Genesis xiv, 1, that discredited authority for the date of its own history. No further evidence is required for the date of this code.

In the elaborate, but conjectural, Critical theory it is suggested that laws made centuries later would easily, indeed almost inevitably, come to be ascribed to the most famous or the most ancient legislator, even if he only contributed an insignificant proportion of the entire code, such as is allowed to have been supplied by Moses to the Law bearing his name. Criticism greatly reduces the share of Moses in it, but still persists in giving him the undiminished reputation for its authorship. Nothing is heard of this principle in the case of Hammurabi. So far as his code can be used to affect the Mosaic Code no further question is asked, even by the most "conservative" Critic.

In passing it may be pointed out that those who attributed the Law to the Wilderness period could not have "felt," as we are told we must needs do, the theological distance, or any other difference between these stages.

The place at which this, the Hammurabi Inscription, was found may have been such as to warrant an inference—which can, of course, not be a conclusive inference—that the *stèle* had been publicly exhibited at Susa. The place of Hammurabi in his line is apparently shown by local history. That is evidence on which the Inscription may legitimately be received at its face value, as might also the Pentateuch, subject, of course, to disproof; but as there is no other evidence, the risk of disproof, in any respect, is very slight. Critics show no anxiety to fill up the vacant space surrounding Hammurabi's place in history, which might possibly disclose that, although the name of Hammurabi appears in connection with a code, he has as little to do with it as Moses is alleged to have had with the Law bearing his name. It

might show that he, at most, merely originated or enacted an almost insignificant nucleus of it, and that it reached its present form centuries later. This or any other ancient document might thus fare as the Mosaic Code has fared at the hands of Criticism through its *damnosa hereditas* of a comparatively full and detailed history, which—although accepted as true during all the ages which can be questioned as to its truth by means of history—has now to stand convicted of falsehood in the presence of another Code, which is free from any such stigma, solely, it may be, by its happy immunity from a surviving history.

It is evident that the discovery of truth is not promoted by pitting such foreign documents against the Jewish Scriptures; the *primâ facie* credentials of such foreign documents are indeed—as are also those of the Law of Moses—quite sufficient to entitle them to credit until impeached by proper evidence; but, considering what may be concealed in the silence of history to impair that credit, they cannot have sufficient weight to affect injuriously the credit of a history like the Pentateuch.

A statement inscribed on stone, or other durable material, acquires thereby no greater claim to credit than a writing. A statement so preserved has, perhaps, more chance of publicity in its own locality, but less of wide diffusion. It may, however, long survive in its original state, if spared by weather and other destroyers, including mischievous defacers; but a statement, inscribed on stone or iron, may equally “lie like an epitaph.” An inscription, even of ancient appearance has, in any case, no greater claim to credit than the Pentateuch. The Pentateuch, even on the Critical theory, is an authentic and ancient document, in part, at least, of the Mosaic age. It is a history which those who wrote it, whoever they were, sincerely believed to be true; can as much be proved of monuments such as the Moabite stone and many others, of pagan tablets and many other documents? Even coins, which deservedly receive almost absolute credence, are sometimes misleading; for instance, the royal style on English coins included the claim to France down to the 19th century, although France was finally lost to England in Queen Mary’s reign¹ Again,

¹ Hallam, “Middle Ages,” 12th edition, 1860, vol. i, p. 83.

the Arch of Honorius¹ at Rome was erected to commemorate the entire subjugation of the Goths, which was claimed by an inscription upon it; yet the Goths were so far from being entirely subjugated that, later in the same Emperor's reign, they captured the city, but left the Arch with its inscription intact, contenting themselves with that practical contradiction. The Arch, with its inscription still intact, survived till the 14th century.

The Bible like any other Book.

To those who do not believe in any religion all the sacred books of the world are, perhaps, ordinary human productions, which are mistaken, by the believers in the religions to which the books relate, for Divine utterances. Those who find no belief in revelation find all books to have a common basis in being all entirely human. Believers in any one of the religions to which the books relate will strenuously deny that the sacred books of other religions have any claim to be Divine, or to be equally Divine with their own, but will, with equal strenuousness, assert that their own sacred books are Divine revelations. To *assume*, therefore, that a sacred book of any religion is of human origin, and, to that extent, like all other books, or even like all other sacred books, is simply to decide in advance that all such books are—as the unbeliever in all religion believes—entirely human. To adopt this principle at the outset of Criticism is, therefore, obviously begging the *fundamental* question, whether any such book is divinely inspired. The Hindu will not allow that the Vedas, &c., are human productions; much less will he take such a principle as axiomatic, and as the basis of Criticism. Similarly the Mahommedan will not allow such an assumption as to the Koran, and so with other sacred books.

But Criticism does not confine itself to such assumptions. It further assumes that these supposed sacred books are to be judged by the same standards as all other books; in other words, that all books and writings of all races, times and languages are not only human, but can be tested by a common standard.

This common human character of all literature, including

¹ Gibbon, "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," vol. iii, p. 448, note, Bohn's edition, 1854.

the Jewish Scriptures, is *assumed*, as already noticed, and is not discovered by any test, unless it is proved by the fact that men wrote the words appearing in the books in question. Criticism merely pretends to discover what, in fact, it assumes, viz., that the Scriptures are all "entirely human." It is the further assumption that all such works have not only human elements, as written by men, but that they can also be tested by a common standard of comparison, due, as is assumed, to a like growth and development which gives a common character as to form and composition, and this alone is of practical use in criticizing them in detail. This preposterous axiom Criticism makes, in practice, its fundamental working assumption, thus, in effect, denying that every document, even if entirely human, must be judged by what it purports or professes to be, and cannot in advance be adjudged to be other than it purports or professes to be, or so adjudged at all without convincing proof.

Words are symbols of thought; a writer uses the words as symbols of his own thought, usually intelligible to those whom he addresses, because the symbols are commonly those in general use for a similar purpose. Still, in order to understand an author fully, it is necessary for the reader to place himself at the author's point of view, and to discover, as best he can, the meaning which the author intended to convey. Criticism insists, rightly, on discovering the circumstances under which the author wrote; but when the author claims to have written under unique conditions, or, under Divine direction, to have used not merely his own words, thoughts, or ideas, but the words, thoughts and ideas put into his mind and mouth by God, Criticism presumes to say that it knows that God did nothing of the kind; but that the writer wrote, like any other man, a book which is like any other book. What we have to do in reading a book is to accompany the author, to take his guidance, in endeavouring to follow his thought; and unless the author discloses in the course of the work that the work is not what it purports or professes to be, such a conclusion must be founded on convincing evidence extrinsic to the work in question.

Fundamental Axiom of Criticism.

"The presence of a separable human element" both in Scripture and in the development of Israel is the essential

and fundamental assumption and axiom of modern Biblical Criticism. Thus Criticism treats the Bible as a "literature" analogous in many respects to ordinary literature. It treats the development of the Jewish race as also analogous in material respects to that of other races in that they are all human; and, in particular, that Israel has in its development much in common with the development of the kindred and neighbouring races. It professes, by the application of analogies drawn from other literatures and other developments, to make the Bible disclose that its history of the development of Israel inverts the true order of that development, the startling result being that what the narrative, as it stands from first to last, says took place in the Wilderness, Criticism declares did not take place until about the time of Josiah or the Exile. This result could not be reached by simple examination of the narrative itself, which cannot be made thus to contradict itself. It is, in fact, avowedly reached only by the application of "entirely human" analogies and by the use of assumptions, which are, as will be seen, unfounded. By an assumed analogy to ordinary literature it is inferred that the narrative was the work of several authors of different periods. Partly by analogy with the development of other races or tribes, and partly by the application of other entirely human analogies, the Ceremonial Law is fixed as Exilic. The startling nature of the results excites suspicion of the method adopted, and the unsoundness of the method is seen when it is realized that there can be no true analogy between ordinary literature and records written under Divine guidance, or a sense of Divine guidance, or between ordinary national development and development under such guidance, or a sense of it.

Criticism repudiates the influence of the Divine Spirit upon the "outward form," &c., of the Scriptures. Some Critics altogether repudiate its influence and its inspiration. "Conservative Critics" do not altogether repudiate inspiration. All critics alike, whether advanced or conservative, by adopting the assumption that entirely human analogies are applicable to the record, and the development of Israel, base their conclusions (it is submitted) on radically unsound foundations. In the critical treatment of Scripture the human elements are boldly pushed to the front, the Divine elements are conceded an undefined and precarious footing in the background. The contrast and antithesis to the age-long belief is complete.

The human agents in the history do not claim to be exempt from human passions and infirmities. They tell us candidly of their own imperfections—how Jonah tried to escape from his distasteful mission; how Jeremiah murmured and repined; how the Psalmist almost said the same as the atheist; how all of them required the influence of the Divine Spirit to enable and compel them to deliver the Divine message and to co-operate with the Divine Will. The critics assume that the outward form of that message was, nevertheless, left entirely to the impulse of the writers; that they wrote history, poetry, fable, myth, &c., like other men; the learned and accomplished like other learned and accomplished men, and the simple and unlearned like other simple and unlearned men, of other races, and of other religions—or of no religion—of different training and with different aims. Even the simple and unlearned are, however, assumed to have complied, in their measure, with canons derived from other literatures. “Abruptness,” “want of apparent connexion,” “confusion,” “discrepancy,” &c., are assumed to raise the same inferences as in other literatures—which other literatures, however, are very various in these respects. The Spirit is assumed to have been indifferent to these matters, although the Scriptures lay marked and singular stress upon the “Name” and the “Word” as summing up the thought, and even as revealing the Divine Nature, to an extent startling to more human intelligence.

The adoption by Criticism of similar assumptions in the various branches of its inquiry is defended on such grounds as the progress of critical “science,” the discoveries of Comparative Religion, archaeological discoveries in other countries inhabited by other races, differing in religion and civilization. Certain common features are said to be found in other religions, in the history of other races, in their literature also. Minds imbued with the prevalence of law are ripe for including in the same category the Jewish and other religions and their history; it is a “relief”¹ to them to find that the natural order is universal and all including. And they reproachfully mourn that they should be so backward as to hesitate to take the necessary leap, and find relief

¹ See Dr. J. Armitage Robinson’s “Some Thoughts on Inspiration” (1905), p. 8.

with them in assuming that the Jewish religion is also natural, or, at least, that its form and expression are entirely human.

But the claim of the Jewish development and history, undoubtedly adopted by Christ, is that it is not "natural," in the sense of being like any other, that it is special and unique in all respects. When believers are called upon to discard this belief, it must be proved that this traditional claim is unfounded. Proof cannot be dispensed with when men are called upon in the name of Science to accept a new theory. Science cannot tolerate such acceptance. There is no pretence of proof that the Scriptures are not true records of the history of Israel, and speculation cannot take the place of proof.

The assumption that the Old Testament is like any other book, or that it is a literature like any other literature, is absurd, unless all books or literatures are alike. The Old Testament claims to be, at lowest, unique. This claim cannot be hustled out of the way by such an assumption, which begs a fundamental question. Scripture employs human language, and was written by men, and to that extent is like other books or literatures.

It must be, and is, denied by Criticism that the Old Testament is unique as regards its "literary characteristics." This conclusion involves a judgment that the influences under which it purports to have been written did not affect those characteristics. Those influences included Inspiration, and a consciousness of Inspiration. The Old Testament is an account of a development under the special guidance and direction of God, and this account purports to be written under the same guidance and direction, and in part, at least, at the time by Moses. Criticism claims that the bulk of it and of the actual events are much later. That claim has to be proved. If, in spite of such displacement of events, and of their time and place, and, consequently, of their surroundings, it is still supposed, by some critics, to be, in some sense, inspired, the question would still arise, whether inspiration in any sense, or a consciousness of it, however mistaken, would not or might not suffice to produce literary characteristics, at lowest unique.

It is asserted, as if it were a proved fact, that the mode of expression, in this record, of the course of the development as well as of the truths disclosed in it were left entirely to the writers. There is no evidence of this in the record. It

cannot be unimportant in what way the message disclosed in the dealings of Jehovah with Israel was expressed. According to Criticism, the history has been inverted, through the choice of the authors of the records, so as to represent the Law as the first stage of the development of the nation of Israel, while it was actually the last; and all the appliances of Criticism have been used to tear the true facts out of a mass of fable and misrepresentation. If it was the Divine purpose to cause the truth to reach the hearts of men, can the messengers have been left to put it in any setting which commended itself to them, and even in a fictitious setting, and to represent the truth as having been revealed in the actual dealings of Jehovah with His people, although such dealings, as they are recorded, never took place?

If Criticism fancies that it can discover how far the influence of Inspiration extends—as it must be able to do in order to say that any part of the human instruments, or of their work, is unaffected by it—it need not cause surprise that the human element is constantly pushed forward, while the character of the influence undergoes constant dilution, and its extent, progressive restriction, until it dwindles to little, if any, more than a mere vague illumination and exaltation of the “human faculties,” and its product, through these faculties, shrivels to a mere kernel of truth enclosed in a tough husk of human error, so as to be released only with almost desperate effort. Ultimately the pervading human influence squeezes out the restricted inspiration, and the religion itself becomes “one of the religions of the world, no more, no less.”

Inhospitality to the supernatural is a marked feature of modern Critical thought. As in the prophet the union of Divine and human tends to disappear, so in Our Lord Himself, the supreme emphasis has come to be laid upon the human element, and the Divine has almost disappeared; He is indeed “emptied” of it by Criticism!

“Entirely Human” Analogies.

The dislocating conclusions of Criticism are clearly due to the method followed, which ignores any difference between the Scriptures and any other “entirely human” records.

These conclusions have been sufficiently shown to be unproved, even upon critical assumptions as to the right method of dealing with the Scriptures.

In the present discussion no assumption is made. It has

been contended, indeed, that the Scriptures claim to be the work of inspired men, but the validity of that claim has not been made the foundation of any conclusion as to the direct influence of Inspiration upon the record; although it is a claim admitted by some critics, who say that inspiration is "presupposed" in their criticism. It is not, however, allowed by them to exercise any influence upon the "entirely human" outward form and composition, with which Criticism is mainly occupied.

No account is taken by Criticism of the consciousness of inspiration, or of a sacred duty specially laid by Jehovah upon the men employed in any capacity in bringing these documents into existence; although, on the most ordinary principles, this consciousness must, if felt, materially affect the product. The exclusion of inspiration, or even of any consciousness of it, would not, however, place the Scriptures in the same category as ordinary literature, or make them subject to the test of the same canons; for they are, at lowest, religious records, products of the religious spirit, even if that spirit, and its products, are regarded as products of the human mind, instead of being the record of an express revelation to it. It cannot be *assumed* that the writers of the records of this development of the religious spirit would pursue the same course as writers of ordinary history, since they would have different aims, recognize different responsibilities, their paramount aim being to record the complex facts of a religious development, and not the facts of a secular history; in short, to record facts in their religious aspect and setting, and not in the secular or "historical" aspect or setting. Criticism decides that the Scriptures are not "historical," that is that they do not record facts of the same kind, or in the same way as a secular history would, that they regard the facts and events from the religious point of view, and record the religious aspect of them, but it insists, nevertheless, on judging of their truth and value by the same canons as are supposed to be applicable to ordinary literature and history; and condemns them as untrustworthy on that basis; and, moreover, proceeds to reconstruct the history as Criticism insists it ought to have been framed, and as if it were intended to be ordinary history.¹

¹ When Dr. Driver ("Introduction," preface p. viii) speaks of conclusions "upon any neutral field of investigation, similar to the conclusions of Criticism being accepted without hesitation," he, in effect, assumes that Scripture ought to be regarded as such "a neutral field."

Criticism is a process of comparison. The basis of comparison is a common standard, similarity, common elements. A work cannot be interpreted by assuming it to be like one of a different character. Difference of character may be used to show what the work *is not*. It is only similarity of character which can throw light on what the work compared *is*. This similarity may be a similarity of thought or expression or both. Comparison on such grounds is necessarily limited in scope, and uncertain in its results. No two minds work exactly alike; and the attempt to discover the true working of one mind by comparing it with the working of another mind must fail as soon as the two minds diverge, and the comparison is, therefore, limited in scope, unless the entire working of both minds is exactly alike. And the conclusions arrived at by such comparison cannot be certain, because we cannot discover the real character of another man's mind or thought, nor even, perhaps, of our own mind or thought.

In criticizing Scripture we must not start by denying its own claims. If on examination the books show that they are not what they claim to be—that is, in other words, that the work examined can be induced to confess that its author has made false claims—then they can be dealt with accordingly. This confession must not, however, be extended by distortion of its utterances. Criticism cannot pretend that Scripture makes any such confession. But it seeks to evade the difficulty by itself, without pretence of proof, and *a priori* assigning the limits of Inspiration; and having thus reduced Scripture to the entirely human plane, it, again without a vestige of evidence, imputes to the Exilic and post-Exilic authors of our present Old Testament history the drastic distortion and falsification of the real history, which they succeeded in palming off on their contemporaries, and on all after-generations. All in perfect good faith!

CHAPTER IV.

ATTITUDE OF BELIEF TOWARDS CRITICISM.

THE right attitude of Belief towards the Higher Criticism, as well as towards Science, was assumed, not long ago, to be an attitude of uncompromising hostility, not perhaps as discerning as might have been expected. Without dwelling upon details it may be said that orthodoxy met the early attacks upon it by declaring that Divine Revelation, contained in an infallible record, had spoken on the subject, and that such declarations were conclusive. And believers were warned not even to listen to the adversary.

Little attempt was, however, made to satisfy believers (who were at that time well content to follow the warning counsel) that they would be justified in doing so, except by reminding them that the Bible was an inspired record—verbally or substantially—and that the Church (for her children, at any rate) was its authorized interpreter.

That attitude seems now to have been altogether abandoned, and is discredited and repudiated as Obscurantism; the teachers of religion, of all sorts, being now loud in their repudiation of the attitude formerly reckoned orthodox; and they seem now bent on teaching, and claim acceptance of the heresy of a few years ago, as the new orthodoxy; and show the same intolerant, if not the same unintelligent zeal as the old orthodoxy. The "open mind" is now peremptorily insisted on for the reception of the new ideas, and as peremptorily refused to the old ideas. A mind "open" to legitimate evidence is indeed always necessary; but this frame of mind is little esteemed in practice. Impartial judges cannot, however, be satisfied to follow this sudden revolution, on the authority of such guides. Nor can any sound judgment accept the implied principle that the believer either can or ought to approach the new doctrine with any other kind of "open mind" than a mind open to conviction by legitimate proof. In fact, neither believer nor unbeliever can do so; the unbeliever may be willing to be convinced, but his mind is not usually "open" in any other sense; it is shut to belief, until sufficient grounds are shown to induce him to

believe. It should not be shut to proper proof, whatever the true effect of such proof may be.

In what frame of mind, then, should the believer approach the question? Of course—if it is possible—he can choose to put aside belief, and approach the question as if he had no conviction on the subject to be examined. But ought he to do so? The answer to that question involves a closer consideration of the nature and grounds of his belief.

He has received, through his spiritual ancestors during a long series of centuries, the faith in Christ which flashed direct from our Lord into the hearts of His first disciples. They did not receive it, however, without caring whether it was true or false. With a right instinct, they recognized that it must convince them by its own power, and could not be proved by reason alone, although it might be shown to be false. "We have found the Messiah," was the utterance of the heart; it did not rest on the understanding alone, nor was it climbed up to by reasoning. But it did not ignore evidence. "Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?"¹ The Messianic prophecies named Bethlehem. But the answer is again the answer of heart to heart, "Come and see." Conviction came from seeing Him, even if the prophets should have to be deemed mistaken. The disciples accepted the son of the obscure Nazarene carpenter as the Messiah. They felt the flash of conviction. But it did not remain only a flash, they lived with Christ; still, even to the last, "some doubted"; they doubted even the evidence of their senses. But His character and His power overcame doubt, and the battle of faith ended in victory for Christ. Perhaps none of them learnt perfectly the lesson of faith in Him as the Incarnate Son until after the outpouring of Pentecost, and some were doubtless even then backward. But the Holy Spirit guided them, gradually it may be, into the Truth, individually or, at least, collectively. This faith, and the history of it, have been handed down from generation to generation; and the Church, an undying organism, has been entrusted with it, and guarantees at least its substantial truth.

This faith has never been shielded from intellectual question. Even amongst the first disciples there were fluctuations of feeling and of belief. Assailed by all classes of

¹ St. John, i, 46.

Jews, Christ Himself appealed to the Scriptures of the Old Testament. The Jews were invited to search the Scriptures, and were assured that they testified of Him. These Scriptures are doubtless the Old Testament as we have it now.

The first preachers of the Gospel appealed similarly to these Scriptures, as they were taught by their Master to do. In His teaching after the Resurrection he expounded to the two disciples, on the Emmaus road, the prophecies relating to Himself, "beginning at Moses and all the Prophets"; in each successive generation of Jews and Christians these Scriptures have been exposed to scrutiny, alike by friend and foe. These Scriptures have been handed down by the Church as part of her Canon. They are received by the Church and her members as they were received by Our Lord and His Apostles.

Evidently individual members of the Church are not called upon, generation after generation, to examine afresh their claim to be what they purport to be; although they may be justified in considering any fresh facts showing them to be other than they purport to be, or may even be bound to do so; but they are not bound, nor are they justified in examining them afresh as documents which have not been accepted already, or as to which they have an "open mind," in the sense of having no belief as to their character. They have a belief, on ample grounds, as to their character, based not indeed upon an examination of their claims on their merits, but based upon the authority of Our Lord and His Church. This belief can only be displaced by something better and surer than the grounds upon which it rests. It stands upon the same grounds as faith in Christ. In all spiritual questions He is the Truth, the standard, the test of truth. He cannot err. The believer cannot fear that any knowledge can show Him to have erred in spiritual matters, in matters of faith; all that is in conflict with His Mind in spiritual things is erroneous. Consequently, the believer cannot adopt the point of view of the unbeliever; come to the examination of the character of the Old Testament, as the unbeliever can, as one of many more or less similar productions of the religious spirit, and presumably on the same level with them; Christ and His Church have plainly stamped the Old Testament as substantially an unique and Divine Revelation to Israel; and as a witness that the history and development of Israel were under special guidance by God. The unbeliever, similarly, cannot be required to adopt the

believer's point of view; he has to be convinced that the Scriptures *are* of Divine origin, or contain Divine revelation. The Christian has to be convinced that they are not Divine. Each must be convinced by appropriate evidence; by something better and surer than what he accepted at the outset as grounds for his attitude.

If this view of the necessary attitude of the respective parties to such a discussion is correct, the representatives of the Church are not authorised to accept such an axiom as "the Bible like any other book." To the believer it cannot be like any other book. In some shape, to some extent, it has received the stamp of the Truth, as no other book or document has. The development of Israel has been stamped by the Truth as conducted under the special guidance of God. It cannot be *assumed*, or accepted as true without cogent proof, that the development of Israel was similar or analogous to that of other nations. The believer, in short, cannot accept the naturalistic basis, as common to the course of the history of Israel and that of other nations, without convincing proof. He cannot allow himself to be "unequally yoked" with the unbeliever. The believer has no need or call to enter upon any fresh enquiry as to the character of the Old Testament. He is, and should be, content to accept it as Christ and the Church have accepted it. He knows that in doing so he is founded upon a Rock; and that nothing can shake him, except the loss of that foundation. It is for him to rest in confidence and security until something better and surer than that which he relies upon is produced. Speculation cannot displace belief. He awaits better and surer *facts* than those he has accepted before his belief can be even challenged. Huxley says¹ "If the Gospels truly report that which an incarnation of the God of Truth communicated to the world, then it is surely absurd to attend to any other evidence touching matters about which he made any clear statement, or the truth of which is distinctly implied by his words." The believer is satisfied that the Scriptures of the Old Testament were stamped by Christ and His Apostles as a substantially true record of the dealings of God with Israel in preparation for Himself, and point throughout to Him.

The unbeliever is, of course, in quite a different position. He may, possibly, have a strong repugnance to belief; but

¹ "Essays," vol. iv, p. 250, "Lights of the Church and Science."

there is nothing similar to the positive conviction of the believer to require or induce him to demand any special proof. He may, moreover, contend that such questions as Science and Criticism deal with are not spiritual questions, that they are within the scope of purely human reason. There is nothing to call upon the believer to deny the possibility of a certain immaterial mixture of human error in the Scriptures. Imperfection, not in knowledge only, undoubtedly marked the channels and instrument of Revelation, of all classes—except Christ—apostles, prophets, &c. What can and must be claimed is that the Divine message delivered to them was perfect and true, not that it was in all cases perfectly delivered by them. Christ alone perfectly revealed the Father. All other revelation must be tested by the Revelation made by Him—by the Truth. Human error in Scripture, nevertheless, requires proof, speculation does not establish it. Again, even as to alleged human errors, the believer is not only fully justified but bound to require, before admitting their existence, something surer and better than he had already accepted. And he cannot, even in such matters, admit the principle of analogy to ordinary human experience or evidence; to him they are parts of a Divine Revelation, and, at lowest, unique, although separable when shown by proper proof to be erroneous.

If this is the right attitude for the believer as to spiritual truth and human admixture, it covers the whole field. And, obviously, it is true that no belief, however wrong, can be displaced except by something surer and better than that which supported the belief. This, it is submitted, must be the test of all such proof.

In ordinary life we sometimes find a character which stands out as trustworthy in most departments of human experience—marked by *truth*, which is, indeed, a gift of God. We sometimes place supreme reliance in all matters on the opinions and judgments of such persons. Tested by experience we find their words come true. To shake our belief in them—as to any matter on which they speak intentionally—we require something better and surer than that which supported our belief, and this may be hard or impossible to find. The belief and trust of the Christian in his Lord far transcends such belief. Greater than belief in any extraordinarily gifted man is the belief in the Divine channels and messengers. They cannot be *assumed* by the believer to be on the level of ordinary men, they must be convincingly

shown to be so. The believer must regard their selection as Divine channels and messengers as, of itself, taking them out of the ordinary conditions of human life, and as marking or bestowing a capacity for receiving and conveying truth not common to them and other men. It is, therefore, and rightly, hard, if not impossible, for him to believe that other evidence is or can be surer or better than theirs. A scientific man or a scholar may have, and often has, complete faith in a distinguished man of his own class. We do not ask him to begin an enquiry into the validity of such faith by surrendering it, on which faith, perhaps, most of his beliefs are at bottom based. We only ask him to admit liability to err in his guide, as merely human, if we can offer sufficiently cogent proof. The believer is, nevertheless, summoned by Criticism to surrender the Tradition as to the Discipline of Israel, which he accepts as stamped by Christ as true, on the authority of scholars, Hebraists, archaeologists, and unbelievers.

Criticism is unable to produce any facts which are better or surer than the grounds upon which the belief they seek to displace was based; it hardly pretends to produce such facts. It is based mainly, if not wholly, upon speculation. Historical criticism eagerly hunts for Babylonian, Assyrian and other ancient records, which, unvouched except by their existence and their place of discovery, are, if favourable to its cause, at once accepted as more cogent than the Scripture records; or it appeals to the history of other religions, no better vouched, in any case, than the Scripture History. The world is ransacked for analogies, which are applied—in defiance of the Scripture claim to be inspired and, at lowest, unique—to contradict the Scripture History. These are some of the methods of Historical Criticism. Literary Criticism, again, is bent on making the Scripture History disclose self-contradictions. It also, like Historical Criticism, disregards the claim of the Old Testament to be the work of men conscious of their responsibility or inspiration; and applies the analogy of other literatures, with which Scripture has nothing substantial in common. Such methods are only applicable, if at all, to ordinary literature. The result, in the case of Scripture, is the substitution of a history constructed by the critics in the place of that handed down to us; this is achieved by arbitrarily dislocating and altering the Scripture narrative, and clumsily piecing it together again, to fit, as far as possible, the scheme of the Critics,

which scheme is itself designed to exhibit a naturalistic view of Israel's national and religious life; and so to bring the chosen people into line with their heathen neighbours. The question is thus begged from the outset. Starting with the assumption that what they have to deal with is "entirely human," and applying that assumption throughout, they inevitably dislocate the history and the development.

We are, however, invited to believe that the new history thus—by a process of distortion and dislocation—forced upon these sacred books gives more "reality" to the history, and is in fact a vast improvement. To bring down the Divine character of the narrative to the human level, which is the greater reality claimed, is not alluring to those who cherish the Divine element in it. But, in any case, such reality is only gained by substituting speculation for proof, fiction for truth—an impossible price for it!

The Attitude of the Believer and the Critic.

The attitude of the believer differs from that of the Critic, as has been already remarked, as widely as their frames of mind. The believer in the Tradition is already satisfied. To change his belief into doubt or disbelief it is necessary to displace that belief entirely or partially. That can, of course, only be done by showing him that it is wrong; and he can be shown that his belief is wrong only by something surer, more trustworthy than that upon which his belief rests. The believer necessarily requires that something better attested, surer, more trustworthy than the grounds of his belief should be produced before he changes his belief; he requires that what is produced should appear, on the face of it, to be of such a character before he even takes it into consideration.

The unbeliever may have readily accepted certain evidence as displacing and dispensing with Divine revelation. He does not trace the development or its record to a Divine source as the believer does. The believer cannot meet the Critic or the sceptic upon common ground, because he does not share their ideas, nor they his.

For instance, when language is found in Scripture which speaks of events as past which were, in fact, future to the supposed speaker, the Critic has no difficulty about the matter. He may conclude that the supposed speaker cannot be the real speaker, or that the text is at fault, or that the date of the supposed speaker is wrong. To the believer another solution

may present itself. He may see in it a revelation through the words, Divinely guided, of the Divine nature in which past, present and future are but different aspects of one eternal Will. The question does not turn, for him, upon literary usages, upon what an ordinary writer would mean. It is not, indeed, forbidden to examine the language with such aids as history and literature can legitimately afford; but if the result is to show that, regarded as merely human utterances, there is error, the believer and the Critic may have to part company and travel in opposite directions; the believer seeing in the utterance a word of God, while the Critic finds only contradiction or error. Moreover, the Critic need not shrink from finding contradiction or error; to him the document is to be examined as a human document. The believer must exhaust every legitimate means of reconciling discrepancies, which may be only discrepancies in appearance but not in reality, otherwise he surrenders his belief at the summons of what may be a mere surface discrepancy; and he can, in no case, surrender his belief either on such grounds, or on any grounds which ignore without disproof the Divine influence on the writings. To surrender a belief at such a summons would be to proclaim that it was a mere surface belief without any deeper foundations, and, practically, to beg the question in dispute. The sceptic no doubt begs the question in the sense that he assumes human agency until it is shown to be Divine; but it is the believer's business to convince him, if possible, not to imitate him.

Both believer and sceptic must necessarily start from their own respective standpoints; and the sceptic has certainly no right to call upon the believer to abandon his belief without proof.

The Issues.

It will, it is hoped, be clear, from the preceding discussion, that Criticism deals with the Old Testament development and its history as human products. Even Conservative Criticism allows to the Inspiration, which it professes to "presuppose,"¹ only some vague illumination and exaltation of the human faculties of the writers, which is supposed to guide them in the "choice and disposition" and² use of the materials which they might find in existence, but which were not

¹ Driver, "Introduction," preface, p. xiii.

² *Ibid.*, p. x.

otherwise supplied to them. These materials might require to have grossly false elements eliminated, apparently by the gradual enlightenment of those who had accepted them in their impure state, but who had gradually dropped out their impurities, and lost all recollection of the source of what was ultimately retained; and then—when nothing impure was left—were permitted or guided, “for want of anything better,” to embody the “purified” residue in their Scriptures as true. This natural, if futile, process the believer cannot accept as true, without sufficient evidence. The development of Israel, on the same view of the Divine guidance, is also pictured as on naturalistic lines. The believer, accepting the Scripture story as true, is convinced that the development and its record were throughout, in all respects, under special Divine guidance and control.

The matter of prime and crucial importance is the course of the development itself. In that development the wills of men were inseparable factors, which constantly thwarted the Divine influence. Similarly human infirmity was not entirely eliminated from the production of the record. If, as the believer is convinced, it was the Divine purpose to train Israel as a peculiar people for Himself, and to cause a sufficiently and substantially true record of such training to be produced, he cannot believe that such purpose failed of substantial fulfilment, however men may have thwarted or failed to co-operate with such purposes. He is convinced that the development which the Tradition describes actually took place. Critics deny that it did take place. They insist that the Tradition has inverted it; it is for them to prove this. They seek to do so by attacking the Tradition. The overthrow of the Tradition, however, would not prove that the development did not take place as the Tradition asserts; it would only leave us without the evidence we now have of it. This would not suit Criticism, which, as already noticed, requires Tradition—the only evidence available—to contradict its own unvarying statement, which it incessantly and stubbornly reiterates, that the entire Law was given in the Wilderness, which is the main matter in issue.

At the back of the issue as to the course of Israel's development stands the ultimate issue—Did Jehovah create Israel, or did Israel out of their own minds create Jehovah?

Those who believe in a living God can with difficulty avoid the conclusion that He must exercise *some* direct control over the Universe; and this is the first step towards acceptance

of the Scripture Tradition, that He alone guided and controlled the nation, and gave them such a training as is depicted in that Tradition.

Character of the Bible.

The Bible is a collection of various writings, comprising Law, History, Poetry, and moral and spiritual precepts and declarations. It includes the utterances of various persons at various times, extending over a long period. These utterances, through various human channels, all claim explicitly or implicitly to flow in substance from a Divine author, Who is declared in it to be the Supreme and only God. It is obvious that such a work cannot be brought into comparison, as to its substance, with any other book, not of the same character, except by repudiating its claims.

When we come to study the Scriptures we find various statements and indications, as to the influences under which they were written, all such influences being ultimately traced to the Spirit of God. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says that God spoke in old time "to the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners," and "at the end of the days" spoke "unto us in His Son, Whom He appointed heir of all things, through Whom also He made the worlds" (Heb. i, 1). Again, S. Peter (1 Peter i, 10) speaks of the prophets searching diligently concerning the salvation of souls, as to "the manner of time" which "the spirit of Christ which was in them did point unto, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glories that should follow them"; and that it was revealed to them that they were ministering, not unto themselves only, but also to future generations, and were preaching the Gospel which the Holy Ghost had since declared. And again (in 2 Peter i, 19), he speaks of the word of prophecy as having been confirmed, or made "more sure" by the Gospel, like a light in the darkness; and declares (vv. 20, 21) that no prophecy ever came by the will of man, but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost, and (2 Peter ii, 1-16) he dwells upon the various degrees in which men responded to or resisted the movement of the Spirit; becoming, in some cases, false prophets; or, like Balaam, who sought to pervert the revelations made to him to his own worldly profit, but was overruled, and constrained, against his will, to declare the mind of God. (See also Is. xxix, 10.)

Thus all prophecy and all prophetic and inspired history have as their ultimate aim to reveal the mind of God, the full revelation being made in Christ, the Word, the full expression of the Father's Will. The various human instruments of Revelation received in various measures the revelations of the Spirit, as appears in the case of Moses and the elders who were selected to assist him (Numbers xi, 25-29; see also Numbers xii, 5-8) God speaking to Moses face to face, while the elders received the Spirit in a more restricted measure.

The mind of God embraces the future, as well as the past. His messages to man are mainly concerned with the present and future. He reveals to men the outcome of their actions. He challenges the idols to display a similar power, and to show them possessed of at least life. (See Is. xli, 21; xlii, 9; xliii, 9, 19; xliv, 7; xlv, 11, 19; xlvi, 9; and xlvii, 6). The fall of Babylon is predicted (Is. xxi, 9); as the carrying away to Babylon had been (Is. xxxix, 5). See xxviii, 3, as to Ephraim xiv, 3, as to Judah xiv, 14. (Compare Ezek. ix, 1; xii, 3; and xxiv, 15, 21, and Jeremiah and other prophets.)

The mind of God was declared in many ways; in parable, figure, and symbol, as well as in words (see Is. vii, 14), Immanuel; and (viii, 1) Maher-shalal-hash-baz); with purposed obscurity (Is. vi, 9, Ezek. xx, 3, 49) as well as plainly.

Inferences drawn by comparison of one book or thing with another must rest upon something common to both. Two books may claim a common ground, the comparison can only be made when that common ground is established, and its extent known. Comparison must also be limited to the extent of that common ground.

There is, in fact, no admitted common ground in the case of the Bible and *any* other book; its claims are unique. Even in the histories the writer works from the same unique point of view. His narrative, whether in the earlier histories or the later, relates and interprets facts with the same purpose, of exhibiting the Divine action. The claim, therefore, to treat the Bible like every other book, or even like any other book, is, in fact, a claim to ignore at the very outset all its distinctive claims, and thus to beg the question of its Divine or unique character. Those who adopt this cry, however, are by no means satisfied with deciding in their own favour the question of its claims to be inspired or even unique. They mean by their cry, apparently, that the Bible shall not be treated any *better* than any other book; not that it shall not be treated *worse* than any or every other book.

If an ordinary work made statements as to its own origin or authorship, with which its contents did not, perhaps, on the surface, entirely correspond, reconciliation would, if possible, be found in interpretation. If the work was an ancient one, such reconciliation would be sought until no possibility of finding it remained. Presumptions are made in favour of ancient documents, even in Courts of Law; subject, of course, to disproof. None of these claims or privileges are granted to the Bible. Reconciliation is sternly refused and denounced, while ambiguities are tortured into discrepancies, and discrepancies into contradictions.

A discrepancy is, in some instances, made to involve the rejection, not only of the discrepant part, but of the whole of the section or content in which it is found, as in the case of the titles of the Psalms. And another author, of different date, is freely substituted for the apparent author, on no better grounds than that it is probably, or might possibly be his work.

Again, in ordinary history, definite statements are *prima facie* of more weight than indefinite or less definite ones. No statement more definite could be found than those relating to the giving of the Law and the Wilderness period dealt with in the Pentateuch, or the titles of the Psalms; but although confirmed by Tradition, they are rejected without any sufficient evidence. In short, while assuming that the work is entirely human Criticism denies to it all ordinary allowances, and treats it as if every word ought to be infallibly correct. The supposed contradiction of Scripture by itself, stands, of course, in a different position. Such apparent discrepancies as are not merely trifling or superficial are still, in most cases, unreal, and are forced upon the Scripture writers by the Critics; they have always been as visible as at present, and are of little importance; and are, in any case, accounted for by human infirmity, and in no way justify the "lifting out" of whole sections of Scripture, as the Pentateuch is shifted from the Wilderness to the time of Josiah and the Exile.

CHAPTER V.

TRADITION.

It has already been urged in this discussion that belief can only be displaced by better and surer evidence than that upon which it is founded; and that the evidence produced by Criticism is not better or surer, or even as good as that on which the belief in the Scripture Tradition is founded, that is, on the statements of the record including the ancient Tradition.

The critics show little appreciation of the character of different kinds of evidence. Evidence obviously may be of various qualities, and of various degrees of weight. There is little attempt by Criticism to weigh or appraise evidence. The aim seems rather to be to undermine belief by suggesting doubt, or by a tacit assumption that the evidence on which belief is founded must at once be displaced as soon as it is confronted with conflicting evidence, or even if it is met by mere suggestions of the possibility or probability of error. The Scriptures form part of a Tradition which may be the testimony of eye-witnesses, and is accepted as such for Mosaic times. Tradition may, no doubt, be of varying degrees of value. The Scripture Tradition, however, as has been already indicated, has, for believers, every possible element of trustworthiness, and every possible guarantee of truth. It has been moulded under the strongest sense of responsibility conceivable, the highest obligation to truth, guarded with the most powerful motives for its safe custody and faithful handing down; and, tested by the scrutiny which it must have received, generation after generation, it has won age-long acceptance. These are tests and safeguards which no other tradition can show, even putting aside the Divine character which it claims, and which has always been attributed to it. It is, in fact, impossible to displace it by any evidence of a different character. We see, however, the stupefying spectacle of its silent displacement, even by its authorized guardians, without any sufficient evidence to impeach its trustworthi-

ness. For, even supposing errors had been found in it, those alleged are of an insignificant character; and, at most, prove it to have human elements, from which it nowhere claims to be entirely free. That does not prove that even the human elements are not more trustworthy than "entirely human" testimony—of which, indeed, there is little or none to impeach it—and, of course, does not show that they are less trustworthy. How then can it be displaced by suggestion, conjecture, theory; or even by Babylonian, Assyrian, Egyptian or other evidence—were such in existence—oral, documentary, or monumental? Even a counter-tradition would not be sufficient; for a counter-tradition could only arise if the facts it claimed to have preserved had been rejected by the accepted Tradition; as otherwise the accepted Tradition would have embodied those facts, and would thus have so far dispensed with the counter-tradition. Criticism, however, while offering conjecture and speculation, but no proof, as sufficient evidence of its own case, has the assurance to demand contemporary proof of this unapproachable Tradition. The same accepted Tradition which embodies the historical facts of Christian as well as Jewish history, also carries down the doctrines.

Contemporary Evidence.

Contemporary evidence is said to be essential for "first-class historical authority"; meaning apparently the evidence of eye-witnesses, which is, of course, the best evidence of ordinary events, and is necessarily contemporary. We are "contemporary" with the entire population of the world at any given moment, but our knowledge of the events happening to the bulk of them is of secondary authority. Criticism demands this qualification of contemporaneousness for a recorded history beginning before the Creation, as to much of which Adam himself could not testify. And Criticism claims for itself that its feelings, opinions, conjectures, and speculations are sufficient to support its own case, and to discredit and contradict that record, without any fresh evidence, contemporary or not.

The absolute impracticability of furnishing such evidence in the case of ancient documents, at a distance in time beyond a generation or two after the events, has led Courts of Law to accept ancient documents, of immeasurably less antiquity, on their own testimony. The Courts of Law

require merely external evidence of the proper custody of such documents, when they are of a private character. This belated attack on the Tradition can hardly be taken seriously.

Tradition and Doctrine.

The accepted Tradition which embodies the historical facts of the Jewish and Christian developments also carries down the doctrines of the faith. Yet we find official guardians of the faith assenting to a separation between them, even in matters touching the faith. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the record is not guaranteed against such human error as is not material to faith, it cannot be questioned that its inspiration, if it exists, must, at least, mean that the faith itself is divinely guarded from error. How is it then that scribes or prophets in the Exilic period were permitted—either by God or men—to give us, not the true facts of the Mosaic period, nor their true significance, but a picture drawn from their own consciousness, and moulded upon the ideas of the day?—a history of the supposed events palmed off—one cannot avoid seeing—as the true history, and implicitly believed, till quite recently, to be the true and substantially exact history? Is this a story to be accepted, without any real evidence, as displacing such a history as that of the Pentateuch, such displacement involving, as it does, the practical exclusion of the special Divine guidance which the history insists upon as the cardinal feature of the entire life of Israel, and not least in Mosaic times? The history, as it stands after centuries of scrutiny, is rejected as not conclusively proved, and instead of it we are invited to accept a romance, entirely devoid of evidence, and wholly untested by time.

Criticism itself, by relying upon those parts of the Tradition which can—as it thinks—be invoked in support of its theories, attests its partial truth. Testing the history by itself alone, without any sure independent knowledge of the facts can, at most, only discredit it, and cannot elicit the true facts. If those who moulded the Tradition were not in a position to know the facts, there is no hope of discovering them. The honesty of the writers of the Priestly document, who, it is alleged, so radically mistook and misrepresented the history, is generously admitted, and indeed emphasized, at the expense of their intelligence, by the Critics. This generosity is, it is true, more profitable to the Critics than to the unconscious

recipients of it, for it enables the Critics to appropriate the good fruits of that honesty, which have ripened into their present theory, while leaving to their adversaries only those blasted in the Critical view by error.

Criticism—far from disputing that, when Ezra, at the call of the people, brought the Book of the Law to read to them, he and the people regarded it as having, in substance, been given to God through Moses—not only emphasizes the fact that it was already in full force, and had been to some extent in force, at latest, from the time of Joshua, but also contends that it was due to its being in actual use at the time that Ezra was led to include the Priestly document in that Book as part of the Law given in the Wilderness. All the explicit evidence asserts emphatically that the whole Law was, in substance, there given. Nevertheless, without any fresh evidence, Criticism brushes aside all this explicit evidence, and confidently asserts that the Priestly document was then produced, for the first time, by Ezra. It is as if a Judge brushed aside the persistent statements of all the witnesses, admitted to be honest and sincere in what they asserted, and found that the contrary was proved.

Different Kinds of Tradition.

Traditions are of various kinds, and of various degrees of value. Some, as already suggested, may be described as vital or organic; that is to say, they carry down to future generations facts or principles upon which bodies of men continually act. Such bodies may be of various constitutions, e.g., races, nations, churches, classes, societies, corporations, &c. The facts or principles carried down by a tradition may be such as are either continuously or intermittently acted upon by such bodies in their ordinary life as races, nations, &c. These are Organic traditions, living elements or factors, more or less essential to the life of the bodies acting upon them. They are vital, if essential to that life. They preserve continuity and complete the personality of the body; which can have neither continuity nor personality without memory of their past history. Other traditions may be unconnected with the permanent interests of men, or with the permanent existence or life of bodies of men; they may perhaps carry down matters of great theoretical interest, although not of permanent practical importance; and may control or influence action slightly, or not at all, occasionally, but not continuously or permanently. For

instance, the tradition that Romulus and Remus were suckled by a wolf would be of interest to Rome as a matter of curiosity, but did not, apparently, become a factor in its life. It might maintain a consciousness of a unique origin of the Roman race, and might support a sense of its superior functions or rank, and so far partake of the nature of an organic tradition; but it would not enter into the daily life of the people as a factor in their ordinary action, and so requiring to be, like a binding law or obligation, constantly kept in mind. A vital or organic tradition, explicitly or implicitly, imposes some obligation, and cannot be allowed to slip out of memory, or out of operation; it must be constantly insisted upon, and can never be allowed to fall into neglect or discredit. It would hardly be of vital importance whether a myth or legend was strictly or literally true. The action of the State or of individual citizens might be little affected, if at all, by the belief in it. So far as action was affected, or continuously or permanently influenced by it, the tradition would partake of the vital or organic character, and would be more or less perfectly organic, according as it was more or less permanent and pervading in its influence upon action.

A vital or organic tradition, embodying facts vital to the permanent life and action of an organism, such as a race, nation, &c., would evidently be of importance to the organism in proportion as it was permanently vital to its life and action. It would naturally be carefully guarded from falsification or alteration. Evidently religious traditions would be cherished and guarded in a very high degree.

Traditions, however, may ultimately rest upon foundations of varying strength. The tradition as to the founders of Rome, for instance, must rest upon the credibility of those, few in number, no doubt, who first discovered the sucklings. They might be unsatisfactory observers, or untrustworthy reporters. Their conclusion as to the maternal care of the wolf might be drawn from inference, from finding the babes in or near the wolf's lair or den. The witnesses may not even have seen the wolf, much less have seen her suckling the infants. The whole story may have rested ultimately upon the report of one person, or even upon a report at second hand.

Vital Character of the Scripture Tradition.

A tradition such as that of the Jews as to their early history, and especially as to the origin of the Law, was,

however, of supreme and vital importance. The Law governed all their national and religious life, since the Law controlled the whole of that life; and appeal to its precepts must have been continual and universal in Israel. Its authority must have undergone constant scrutiny and test, until it had become absolutely established beyond the possibility of question or doubt. To take only the one or two simple but cardinal facts carried down by it, such as statements that Moses wrote and published the Law, and wrote the Pentateuch, these must have been generally known to the people. Although the fact of writing the Pentateuch might be directly known only to a few, or even possibly only to Moses himself, his doing so would be no secret. Moses could not hesitate to avow it. The fitness of his recording the events in the Wilderness was obvious; the people might be well assured by confidence in him that he did so. The fact of its publication must certainly be known to many. The events connected with the publication of the Law at Mount Sinai must, as expressly stated, have been witnessed by the congregation.

The reduction of the Law to writing could not have been a secret. On all these matters the people were qualified to form opinions and to judge as to the truth of the history. It was through some, or all of the people, that the facts were to be preserved in memory, and handed down, as well as the writings. What they handed down became to future generations what it had been to those who handed them down, the foundation of their religion, and of their national life. The Tradition was always open to scrutiny; and it cannot be doubted that it was scrutinized from generation to generation. Other materials may also have been handed down, by which the Tradition could be tested.

As the written Tradition established itself, the materials which it embodied would gradually tend to be considered superfluous. As the Tradition successfully passed the scrutiny of generation after generation, those materials might be allowed to decay and disappear. If they were still preserved, it would probably be for the purpose of attacking the Tradition—in which case they might still figure as something in the nature of a counter-tradition. Ultimately the Tradition might so establish itself that not only did the materials supporting the Tradition become superfluous, but also that materials at variance with it were no longer preserved, because the counter-tradition had itself succumbed.

A Tradition which has thus maintained its ground until *all* evidence, in support of it or at variance with it, has perished, must be of the strongest kind. And an Organic Tradition, such as the Jewish Tradition, which has endured the utmost strain—as pervading and controlling national and domestic life—and has survived all opposition, is the strongest and most vigorous kind of tradition.

If these views are correct, the fact that a tradition, traced back for many centuries, cannot be traced, by other evidence, to its source, cannot be regarded as weakening, but rather as strengthening its claim to be true. It must be remembered that a tradition does not contemplate the preservation of the evidence upon which it is founded; it rather contemplates and provides for the disappearance of that evidence, in a separate shape, in the course of time. That evidence is already embodied in the tradition, in order that it may be permanent, and be ready to be carried down by the Tradition which embodies it, as the Scripture Tradition does, in spite of the vicissitudes which may happen to the evidence in a separate shape. When all the evidence on which the Tradition was based has disappeared, and the Tradition still survives, and no longer needs the support of the evidence upon which it was based, it is at its maturity, full-grown, and has reached its full strength, especially if all counter-evidence has also vanished and can no longer contradict or confront it. It has outlived all opposition, and successfully passed all tests. The Scripture Tradition is in this supreme position. It cannot be successfully assailed by any evidence, for there is none of equal value. Hence Criticism is driven to attempt to weaken its position by conjecture, suggestion, opinions of scholars, &c.

The marked neglect of Tradition displayed in the Critical controversy, even by those who might be expected to uphold it to the utmost, must be due to want of appreciation of its true nature, inducing a suspicion that traditions which cannot be traced back to their source are weak traditions, instead of, as here submitted, the strongest of all traditions, since such a tradition has attained a position in which it can rely entirely on its own strength and needs no further support from its original evidence. When a tradition can be traced back to its source it must be younger than a similar tradition which cannot be so traced back, and which is therefore liable to be confronted with contemporary evidence; a tradition in the presence of contemporary evidence becomes, so far as

the surviving contemporary evidence extends, to some extent, superfluous. Consequently the Old Testament Tradition, which has seen all its evidence disappear, has so firmly established itself that it can dispense with the evidence on which it was founded. That which has not outlived its own evidence is younger, it has not endured the full strain that brings it to maturity as a strong full-grown fully tested tradition, which no longer needs any support. Tradition does not propose to submit itself to Criticism after it has attained its full strength. And fresh facts are required for an assault upon it.

Disparagement of the Scripture Tradition.

Criticism declares that the Scripture Tradition falsifies the history of the actual events. Amongst other errors, it is said to place in the Wilderness the events related to the giving of the Law contained in the so-called Priestly document (P); while their true place is after the Exile, and the circumstances were entirely different, with the result that the bulk of the Law is thus made to have been given in the Wilderness instead of after the Exile. According to Criticism, the Wilderness Tradition could not have embodied the so-called Jehovistic or Elohist documents, because they were not in existence till long after. Thus Criticism would not admit that the daily life of Israel was governed upon any principles or precepts founded upon the events or laws contained in those alleged documents until long after the Wilderness period. Similarly, according to Criticism, nothing based on Deuteronomy can have come into the true tradition, or governed the daily life of Israel, until the finding of the Book of the Law in Josiah's reign. And, again, although the alleged Priestly document contains a record of many events before the Exile, and itself places the whole Law in the Wilderness, yet the document itself, as now found by Criticism, was, it is alleged, not in existence before the Exile. The daily life of Israel was thus unaffected by this part of the Tradition before the Exile; and the Tradition, thus split up, has had as many different periods of operation and testing as there are parts. There is, however, no evidence that the Jehovistic and Elohist documents, or Deuteronomy, were not preceded by similar traditions or even documents. With respect to the Priestly document, Criticism contends, but cannot prove, that there was nothing precisely corresponding to it before the Exile.

But did the Jews, from the time when the Priestly document was produced, repudiate the Scriptures, so far as then completed? Emphatically not. Their whole life was based on them, and governed by them, till the end. And the Priestly document everywhere emphatically asserts, what Criticism denies, that the whole Law was given in the Wilderness. Criticism claims to have proved that this is not true; this claim will be examined later. At present it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that on the crucial issue—whether the Law was given in the Wilderness—the Priestly Code itself declares that it was given there. The Tradition, therefore, according to the evidence, would include, as it does, the events so recorded as happening in the Wilderness and the Law as given there, and those events are traced back by its evidence to the time of Moses, and the believer accepts the Tradition and cannot be justified in surrendering such belief without convincing proof.

Uniqueness of the Scripture Tradition.

The Scripture Tradition is, obviously, more than mere evidence. It is an organic factor in the national religious life of Israel. Without some vital, organic tradition, successive generations are not members of a permanent body but are disconnected, without cohesion, communion, or solidarity. Tradition is a vital organ of the corporate body. It is not merely a statement, a piece of evidence, but it is also a channel of communication, as well as an essential bond safeguarding the unity and the due relation of the members of the body—provided the body lives and acts upon it. In the case of Israel this condition was fulfilled in a supreme degree. We have yet to find that the same can be said of those civilizations which have perished, whose traditions are, however, eagerly preferred to the Jewish Tradition. The Christian Church lives also upon the Jewish Tradition, as interpreted by Christ, to this day.¹ As a mere piece of evidence the Jewish Tradition can hardly have a competitor, as a strand in the organic bond of the Christian Church it cannot be displaced, at any rate for Christians, by any other tradition.

The Tradition of the Church not only forms a bond between its members, but also between the Church and

¹ Robertson, "Early History of Israel," second edition, p. 134.

its Divine Head. Vital relations with its Head are maintained through it. It is through it that knowledge of its Head is communicated to generation after generation. If this is a true view, the Jewish and Christian Traditions are not only unique in their origin, but also in their functions; and in the supreme guarantees they offer of their truth. Without assuming the validity of their claims to credit as Divinely guarded records, the belief of the bodies guarding them in such Divine character is, it is submitted, sufficient to support the conclusion that they would be so scrupulously guarded, by human care, as to place them in a category far above other traditions, and to render incredible the incessant tampering with them which Criticism assumes—a tampering apparently incredible in any case; since its object can only have been to convince the people that institutions of later date were in fact earlier, a purpose impossible to achieve if the institutions were known or believed to be later; and useless if they were already believed to be earlier, as they were, in fact, believed to be.

Testimony of Christ to the Tradition.

Criticism of the modern type sets aside the substance of the Tradition as a mere piece of historical evidence insufficiently attested, and always treats the order, date, and circumstances of the events recorded as primarily of no greater authority, even for Christians, than those recorded in any other tradition. It is said, that Our Lord did not make any authoritative statement affecting matters of human knowledge, such as the authorship of the books named as the books of Moses, or of a Psalm named as of David, or as to other “literary” questions. As to such matters, it is said that He derived His own knowledge from human sources, and could not, and did not, claim to decide such questions. And Dr. Sanday goes so far, apparently, as to declare that he would not feel bound to accept such a decision if it had been given, which, he thinks, is happily not the case.¹ But the issue is not as to “literary” questions. The Scripture narrative, as we have it, and as Our Lord accepted it, describes the development of Israel as Divinely guided in a certain course, and as different from that of any of the surrounding nations; and places the giving of the entire

¹ “Bampton Lectures” (1891), p. 414.

substance of the Law contained in the Pentateuch in the Wilderness. Our Lord does not treat the order of development as immaterial. He does not recognize and stamp, as of Divine origin, laws and institutions of which the origin and occasion were unknown, and still to be settled by literary or historical criticism. To the Jews of His day, as well as to their forefathers, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and others were not myths, but men specially chosen by God to be the founders and leaders of a holy nation. The Levitical Law was believed to have been, in substance, enacted in the Wilderness. Our Lord says¹ the Law forbade David's use of the Shewbread for himself and his followers. He says² Abraham rejoiced to see His day and He saw it. Criticism does not allow that there was any such law as to the Shewbread in David's time; and as to Abraham, it tends to regard him as a myth. Is it sufficient for a Christian to say: "The Jews believed these things and Christ merely took human knowledge as He found it and used it to impart spiritual truth?" If the law of the Shewbread was later than David, or if Abraham never existed, a true lesson could hardly be drawn from false facts! A lesson of some sort may be put into the form of fiction as such; but a lesson from fiction mistaken for fact fails altogether. The Christian cannot satisfy himself with the superficial evasive plea that the date of the law of the Shewbread or the question as to the real existence of Abraham are matters of human knowledge. They are, indeed, matters of human knowledge, but are also vital facts, used by Our Lord as undoubted facts, and are accepted by Him as found in the Tradition handed down. The use of them by Our Lord as actual facts gives them a special character. In any case, if the Christian can admit the possibility of error in them, he is certainly not justified in accepting anything short of conclusive proof as sufficient evidence of it.

Organic Character of the Scripture Tradition.

The Jewish Tradition is not, like some traditions, a faint echo or whisper wafted from a buried past; it is a living fact. The giving of the Law at Sinai, in that supreme manifestation of Jehovah to Israel, was, for the whole Jewish race,

¹ St. Matt. xii, 4.

² St. John, viii, 56.

the root, the living root of their life, national and individual, given to them as the rule of all their life by Jehovah Himself. It contained the Law which was administered to them, and enforced upon them, from whatever time it came into force! There never was or could be any doubt of the Divine authorship of this Law; or any room for speculation as to its origin. Laws among some other races have been attributed to some mythical or half-mythical sage or hero of the dim or dead past. If Moses was dead, he was neither forgotten nor dim. And Jehovah lived always! Every act of daily life was under His governance, and was controlled by the Law given at Sinai. There was neither need nor occasion to seek for an author of it. The Tradition which enshrined this Law must have been pondered and cherished, tested and proved day by day, just as the Christian Tradition, of which it is a vital part, has been and is. For the Jew as for the Christian there was the same experience in this respect. From the time at which the Law came into full operation it was undoubtedly administered by the designated authorities as the Law given in the Wilderness. As the ages rolled on, and faith was threatened, now from one side and now from another—every generation having its own special strain, although from different quarters—the believer, although increasingly unable to produce or to find other proof of the original facts—owing to decay of evidence—was also, with corresponding increase of force, able to point to a living organism whose life was based upon those facts. Each generation must likewise have scrutinized the Tradition incessantly, under the strain of the special difficulties of each age. What proof can possibly approach in force proof of this kind? Its weight to the believer seems conclusive, not to be outweighed by anything less than contrary evidence of greater force, which cannot possibly be produced. To the unbeliever its weight is hardly less than to the believer even as a merely human history, claiming no more than ordinary human authority. No such history can offer equal guarantees of truth. To the believer, at any rate, it cannot be credible that his faith should be displaced in case the evidence—including the Tradition—forthcoming at a distance of centuries from the events in question, should appear to fall short of conclusive proof. The written evidence is, indeed, but a small part of the total evidence. The existence of the living organism, drawing its life from the very Source of life, that life nourished by the Tradition, outweighs overwhelmingly any evidence that can be produced against it.

Witness of the Jewish Church.

The existence from the first of an organized body, basing its existence and exercising its functions upon the footing of the truth of the Tradition, is, as has been here suggested—the main—and, by far, the most cogent proof of the truth of the facts from which it had its birth, and upon which its life has been all along sustained. That organism is here to-day—divided and maimed, but not dead. It still lives. Its divisions do not destroy or weaken, but rather strengthen the force of its historical witness; for, whatever its divisions during its chequered career, it has always witnessed to the substantial truth of its fundamental facts, and of the written and oral Tradition.

The Tradition as to Moses is, moreover, in the main, of so simple a character that no difficulty could be felt in handing it down intact. It is simply that in the Wilderness he delivered and recorded, or caused to be recorded, a body of Law, both moral and ceremonial, which had ever since been recognized as the Divine Law, and which was recognized by every generation as in existence and of binding force. There was no difficulty in remembering these simple statements; and the Laws, which purport to have been thus given, were believed to be always at hand, even although mislaid for a time still not altogether forgotten, and in actual operation in every after-generation, even if imperfectly obeyed. What better evidence could there be of remote events?

In ordinary societies, customary rights are recognized as sufficiently proved by long use. And, in our own law, the exercise of a right for a limited and comparatively short period suffices, if uncontradicted, to establish the right and its legal origin. And would anyone venture, even after only a few generations, to question the date of origin of a law or custom for which Tradition assigned a date, even if the Tradition could not be traced back to its source? If the law or custom had been in operation only for a comparatively short time, it would be presumed, on grounds of probability, to go back as far as it could, without inconsistency, be placed.

In the present day the new results of Science have unquestionably produced a feeling in many minds that the Scriptures are incredible, that such things as they relate could not have happened; and that, even if they did happen,

they must somehow have happened in the regular order of Nature, although the known order may not include them. In all periods of human life the tendency to fall back upon what we can see and touch as the only realities is almost irresistible—it is the pull of the earth upon us. It must have come in one form or another upon men in every age, and must have led them to scrutinize sceptically the Scripture narratives, and to be inclined to cry out for fresh and better evidence; the evidence existing at any time, meanwhile, tending always to decay and disappear, and to become constantly detached more and more from its surroundings. But they have always been able to fall back upon the overwhelmingly weighty and cogent fact that the organism which brought down the faith to their day had also brought down the assurance that the facts upon which it is based are true; and that these facts have incessantly borne the strain of similar questions, generation after generation, and age after age, the strength of this testimony increasing in proportion as the lapse of time destroyed or weakened other testimony.

It may be useful here to notice a point on which Criticism places much reliance, namely, that Tradition represents only the belief of its authors. It is upon this fact that Criticism largely relies in presence of the necessity for making the Priestly document falsify itself, and confess that the Law was not given in the Wilderness. The Priestly writer, it is said, wrote what he believed, but he was misled, as appears from statements in that same document.

This Critical theory will come into consideration later. It is, however, desirable to point out here that this dependence of Tradition upon belief does not affect what has been said as to the degrees of value in traditions due to the greater or less sense of responsibility for truth felt by their authors. All traditions, like all testimony, speak according to the beliefs of their framers, but that fact does not affect their *relative* trustworthiness. If it is suggested that it makes all traditions valueless, the reply must be that it makes them, if merely human, fallible, but valuable according to the trustworthiness of character of their authors, to their opportunities of knowledge, and to their capacity for using them aright. These are, indeed, factors in all trustworthiness. The acceptance of the Scripture Tradition in all ages stamps them as of irreproachable authority, apart from their still higher claim as divinely inspired or controlled.

Tradition as Evidence only.

Tradition, regarded merely as evidence, is some record or statement handed down from ancient times. Such evidence recorded in a document, whether on parchment, stone, or clay, or other material, is only superior to an oral tradition in the assurance it may afford of its substance being long available in its original condition. What is inscribed, however, on more durable materials is not necessarily more durable than other inscriptions. That assurance must be found in its history, whether we find it still oral or already recorded in writing. The Tradition embodied in Scripture claims superior credit over other traditions. It claims to be distinguished by truth, essential truth, not mere verbal accuracy only. Do any of the Babylonian, Assyrian, or other traditions even claim as much? It claims to have been recorded and preserved under Divine guidance. It has been acted upon continuously down to the present day as what it professes to be. The ancient Assyrian, Babylonian, Egyptian empires have all passed away—they have no permanence. Their traditions have long ceased to be acted upon, or have even been dead. The Scripture record is a living organic rule and guide to-day.

Tradition of some kind is the only available external evidence of the history of Israel; whether Jewish evidence of Jewish history is to be trusted, or Assyrian, Babylonian, Egyptian, or other traditions are to be preferred before it, as they seem to be preferred by Criticism, as a matter of course, and without being vouched by any other authority than themselves.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PENTATEUCH.

THE assumption so confidently and even dogmatically enunciated, that the outward form and composition of Scripture are "entirely human" is, doubtless, readily accepted by some who regard the historical parts of Scripture as akin to ordinary human history, and who hardly have in mind that they are parts of a record of a connected series of events which were obviously believed by the writers to have occurred under special Divine guidance and control. The writers could hardly have thought themselves at liberty to give the record of them any form but such as should be pleasing to the Divine Will. There were, indeed, some matters as to which they might feel that they were left to exercise their human faculties, but still under the same Divine assistance, guidance and control; so that their work in those respects might be the best of which they were capable. Their sense of responsibility as to these matters would therefore not be lessened or lowered, but might, indeed, be increased and heightened. Matters such as the actual observed facts, dates, numbers, names and other details, such as movements from place to place, genealogies, &c., the particulars which are found in the so-called Priestly section, may come within this category. But they could never have imagined that the record of events or matters more closely connected with the Divine intercourse with Israel, displaying more clearly the Divine guidance and control, could be left to their unaided faculties to record, much less to their choice or whim. Is it conceivable that a choice as to the use of the Divine Names, for instance, could have been supposed to be left to them? Must they not have felt a most solemn and tremendous responsibility for the fitness and appropriateness of these Names? When we come to the Prophets the responsibility must have reached a climax. Could they have delivered as messages from Jehovah, with that almost appalling assertion, "Thus saith Jehovah," thoughts of their own, or words of their own,

however much "exaltation" they were conscious of? Criticism, by assuming a handling of Scripture so entirely human, begs the question of its Divine character.

We do not know in what way the Prophets received their inspiration or instructions. We must, however, recognize that they were absolutely assured that they declared the Mind and Will of Jehovah in words which He had put into their mouths. Some critics contend, however, that their inspiration consisted largely, if not entirely, in a deep conviction of a righteous and holy God governing the world, coupled with a felt stimulus to the exercise of keen observation. Under such influences they might conceivably have put their thoughts into a shape of their own choice, but they must have been wanting in integrity, if they represented their own conclusions to be the indisputable declarations of Jehovah.

To some minds this theory of the prophetic utterances is recommended by the view, now, perhaps, more widely accepted than formerly, that the prophecies have largely failed of fulfilment, as might be expected of predictions by human sagacity, "writing history in advance," according to a phrase (now obnoxious) of Bishop Butler. But when God declares to His people, or to mankind at large, that persistence in disobedience to His Will will bring destruction, and obedience blessedness, He still leaves them to choose their course; and by their course their destruction or blessedness will be determined. If the desert does not blossom as the rose, is it the promise of Jehovah which has failed? If He trains by illusion in ordinary human life, so also in His special training. And before we talk of failure in Him, we must be sure that those to whom He spoke fulfilled the conditions to be satisfied by them. The Wilderness was glad in the hearts of the restored faithful. They did not complain that His promise failed!

Character of the Pentateuch.

It is said that the Pentateuch discloses, upon critical examination, that it contains sections which are distinguished by the use of different Divine Names, as well as by different characteristics of thought, diction and style; such as conclusively show that it is the work of more than one author. These various sections, indeed, are declared by Criticism to be the work of several authors.

Two of these sections are said to be distinguished by the use of the names for God of Jehovah and Elohim respectively.¹ These Names are said to have their own distinctive meanings. Jehovah is said to be the Name applied to the Deity in His special relation to Israel, and Elohim to be applied to Him in His general providence in the world. It is, however, contended² that these Names are not consistently applied in the Pentateuch, in accordance with their distinctive significations. It seems to follow that, if both authors used both Names, the use of the Names cannot show distinct authorship, since in that case only one author is *required* to write the whole.

A theory is also propounded and largely accepted that these sections mark different stages in the composition of the work, and in the development of the national life. A cursory examination of the Pentateuch, as we now have it, shows, it is said, even in the English translation, certain features, such as (1) that there is in the narrative a separable section containing much detail as to religious matters, institutions, laws and practices (called by Critics, P), the recording of which is apparently a prominent object of its author; (2) that there are other separable sections (called J and E, or, when combined, J E) of a more ordinary kind, all, however, having a religious object, or, at least, a religious element or tinge; (3) that these two sets of narratives P and J E are written in different styles and employ different phraseology; the one (P) formal or legal in style and phraseology, the other (J E), and particularly (J), of a more popular character; the sections, it is said, sometimes differ also in representation. These features of the Pentateuch have, of course, always been as visible as they are now. They must, indeed, have been more obvious to the Jews than they can be, especially in a translation, to us. If the Jews laid stress upon this difference in the use of Divine Names, in diction, style, &c., the questions to which they are calculated to give rise might be expected to occur to them. If they did not see in these differences proof or sign of a plurality of authors, must it not have been because their experience satisfied them that such plurality of authorship was not the origin of them?

¹ See G. A. Smith, "Modern Criticism," pp. 34, 35.

² Driver, "Introduction," sixth edition, p. 130. See Green's "Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch," pp. 101-105.

The persistence of the same style throughout the whole of the sections assigned to each source seems to show that the style suits the matter—at least in the writer's opinion. Differences of representation, of substance, are also alleged; involving, as Criticism maintains, discrepancy, and even contradiction in fact, and material differences in the religious point of view. The difference of representation alleged arises, however, so far as it exists, almost entirely out of the distortion caused by tearing asunder what is an organic whole.¹ As the text stands, however, the supposed difference of points of view seems no more than a difference of aspects, as will be noticed later.

The Jews, however, seem never to have wavered in their belief that the history, as it stands, is true. The generation which was contemporary with the events knew the truth. Criticism adds nothing to the materials which the Jews had before them; nor do the theories now maintained rest upon any fresh facts. It is simply a case of an attempted reversal of a conviction of the Jewish race as to its own history, attempted by foreigners, many centuries later, and upon no fresh facts. This consideration, it is submitted, is quite sufficient to dispose of the Critical contention. The case against that contention does not, however, rest here. Not only is there an entire absence of Jewish dissent or cavi, but there is also the positive witness of a persistent, unvarying and organic Tradition that the record is a unity, substantially Mosaic, and supremely true, such persistence being maintained in spite of the alleged palpable evidence, said to appear on its face, that it is not a unity, or Mosaic, or true.

It is on this "palpable" evidence that Criticism bases its theory that the Pentateuch is composite; the Jews, on the other hand, always maintaining that, not only did one man, Moses, practically record the whole, but that the whole of the Law was received in the Wilderness from Jehovah Himself, and not developed or enacted (as alleged by Criticism) in at least three stages during a period extending from some uncertain date before Josiah's reign to the Return from the Exile. Criticism, however, altogether ignores the

¹ For a detailed discussion of this subject see Dr. W. H. Green's works on "Genesis" and on "The Higher Criticism and the Pentateuch" (Richard D. Dickinson, 89, Farringdon Street, London).

Tradition and the belief of so many centuries, and practically treats the Pentateuch as a book without a history, and a book whose statements carry little, if any, weight, and which should be disregarded in considering the actual course of Jewish history.

The problem of Criticism as to the origin of the various supposed sections cannot now in any case be solved, except by inference and conjecture. There is no evidence now available, except the Tradition itself (including, of course, Scripture), to show how these supposed distinctive Names, vocabularies, styles, &c., came to be used, or to show how the work took its present shape, much less to show what was its original shape, or how it came to take that shape.

Under such circumstances the only possible view, one would have supposed, would be that, as the features relied on are said to appear on the surface of the work, those who first accepted it as in the main, at least, the work of Moses, must have been satisfied—notwithstanding the alleged signs of composite authorship—that it was the work of one author, Moses. Without fresh facts it is difficult to see how Criticism can get behind that conclusion. Moreover, the book has been scrutinized with microscopic care for many centuries, without receiving any further light on this point; but it has been reserved for the latter part of the nineteenth century to discover or establish, as is confidently claimed, that the phenomena in question are due to successive and widely separated stages of evolution of the Law!

The existence of these stages has also been equally visible from the beginning. If this theory—that different sections are due to different authors and stages—is correct, there must have been many authors and stages, more or less distinct, in that evolution; for many different hands are now said to be plainly visible in the work. Three stages were at one time sufficient to satisfy Criticism; but the number of hands at work seems to increase with every fresh examination of the book. The works of the prophets also have been found composite, and, indeed, most of the Old Testament.

Moses has almost vanished from the high office which he fills in the Pentateuch, but there is no express evidence to contradict the Tradition as to the events in which he is there so prominent. Evidence to contradict it effectively would need to be of unusual weight. What is produced by Criticism consists of indirect, supposed indications of more than one hand at work, including (1) alleged differences,

already noticed, in the use of the Divine Names, differences of diction, style, doublets, &c.—these are all on the surface; (2) inferences from later books, supposed to show ignorance of the Ceremonial Law until long after the time of Moses, which inferences largely rest upon the silence of the books of Samuel and Kings—together with some utterances of prophets, as interpreted by the Critics; (3) the appearance of the Book of the Law in Josiah's reign, said, in the history, to have been mislaid, but held by Criticism to have first come into existence about 100 years earlier and then first published; and (4) the production of the complete Pentateuch almost as we have it now, not earlier (it is said) than the time of Ezra.

With regard to the various differences appearing on the surface, we know that they were not attributed, by the Jews, to difference of authorship. One may be permitted to believe that the Jews knew more about their own language and modes of expression, &c., than the nineteenth century Western critics. They did not doubt the claims made by the book itself in any respect, but strenuously maintained its authenticity, inspiration and truth.

Does then the appearance of such differences suffice to contradict the statements of the book itself, and the unvarying and ancient Tradition? In the narrative Jehovah speaks to Moses and Aaron. As to some of the history Moses is expressly said to have kept a record,¹ as he was best qualified to do, being alone in possession of all the facts. Aaron may also have kept a record. Others may, under their superintendence, have made entries in the records of Moses, or of Aaron, if Aaron kept one; or they may have kept other records under such superintendence. It would be natural that the Priestly record should be kept under Aaron's superintendence. There is not a particle of evidence to show that some such records were not kept, and, if they were kept, that would sufficiently account for the variations alleged, so far as they exist.

Moses would not, on that account, be any less the author of the Book, since the whole would be subject to his control. In any case the existence of various authors in no way supports the late date assigned to the work. Various sources may have been used by Moses, just as well as by

¹ Exodus, xxiv, 4, xvii, 14.

some other Editor. But even supposing, for the sake of argument, that there were various sources, not of Mosaic date, there is still no sufficient evidence to fix the dates of the various sections. Similarity to Exilic writing is no proof of contemporaneous authorship,¹ at any rate, without proof that the features relied on as similar, were peculiar to the Exilic period, which can only be proved by ignoring the claim of the Pentateuch—the date of whose characteristics is in question—to be of earlier date, and so begging the question.

Even if we get rid of the Mosaic date, there is no indication on the face of the narrative, thus purged, of any other date, and there is no external evidence upon the point; still less can we determine whether the various sections mark successive stages of development, or when the document took shape. In any case it took its present shape after the entire Law was delivered, and there is nothing to contradict the express statement of the narrative, that the entire Law was enacted in the Wilderness. It could not be shown, by analogy to other races, even on human lines, that such a development could not have been completed in the Wilderness, as the Tradition affirms that it was, unless we assume, again without sufficient evidence (1) that the development of Israel's life followed the pattern of that of such races instead of being—as the Tradition declares—moulded by Jehovah to show forth His glory to the world; and (2) that the course of the development of Israel corresponded throughout to that of the other races, in its beginning, and in all its steps and stages, both in time and place, and so in the result.

Criticism attempts to assign a date for the Ceremonial Law by speculation as to the course of the development, and by inferences from the text or from its silence, mainly from its silence. But the text as a whole, and especially in its most emphatic and dominant utterances, flatly contradicts their speculations, inferences and conclusion, and everywhere proclaims that the entire Law was given in the Wilderness. It seems clear that, at least, the assumptions just mentioned are essential for any inference as to the development of Israel by analogy to that of other races. Even if these would suffice they cannot be accepted.

The Pentateuch probably embodies amongst its laws and

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 138.

institutions Divinely selected parts of the customs previously prevailing, with Divine sanction or allowance; so that there may well be laws and institutions appropriate to different stages existing side by side, without such coincidence indicating any corresponding stages in the Pentateuchal legislation, or the record of it; and without in any way favouring the theory that it was not all, in substance, framed at one time, or in the Wilderness.

The appearance of the work, as it now stands, seems quite insufficient ground for accepting, even for a moment, the conjectures of Criticism as to the evolution of Israel, or of the Law; and certainly can have no pretence to furnish the slightest proof of them. Nevertheless that theory is assumed to be sufficiently proved, and the religion of Israel thus becomes "one of the religions of the world, no more and no less."

The Divine Names.

Starting with the assumption that the composition of the Old Testament is entirely human, Criticism is rapidly reducing the substance also of Israel's history to the same entirely human level; and the ultimate conclusion cannot be evaded, that the Messiah, pointed to throughout, is equally human, emptied of everything that transcends humanity. The adoption of so unwarrantable and violent a limitation of inspiration may be accounted for, but cannot be justified by the reaction which has occurred against the extreme view of Inspiration, which emphasized the influence of the Divine so as to limit to the utmost, or even to eliminate, any human element in Scripture, so as to make every word of Scripture the direct utterance of God. But it might still have been remembered that the Old Testament claimed to be an account of the course of a race and nation separated in Abraham from the rest of the world to exhibit to all the world—to itself primarily—a revelation of God, as specially controlling and guiding the race of Israel to fulfil His purpose. And when, in their history, there were found matters which, to merely human minds, presented difficulties, it might have been recollected—as it had always been recognized—that they could not be judged by "entirely human" standards and analogies, even if the writers had been left uncontrolled or unaided as to its outward form and composition. In tracing the course of Israel's history, however, the pre-supposition adopted almost inevitably led to the Divine

influence dropping out of consideration; so that the events themselves came also to be regarded as entirely human, and the inspiration of the historians, and even of the prophets, to be, at highest, only a quickening and exalting of their faculties, which, however, left them entirely human in the performance of their functions.

We meet with the feature of different Divine Names in the Pentateuch, and this has been made the basis of its disintegration. The use of these different Divine Names is assumed to show difference of authorship; apparently because it is supposed that, in human works of various kinds, this would be a correct inference, although it can hardly be imagined that Critics have found it to be so in actual instances, in which the inference was verified by actual facts, such instances, moreover, existing in such numbers as to prove the rule to be as supposed. But it is not thought necessary even to consider what writers, in circumstances such as those of the writer or writers of the Pentateuch—with *their* view of Inspiration, not that of the Critics—would have done. This is not surprising, considering the almost infallible discernment claimed by Criticism.

We have no means of knowing why variation in the Divine Names was made. We are indeed ignorant of the meaning or significance of these Names, except, perhaps, as to their etymological derivation. There is no proof that they are not used as equivalent or as appropriate. We learn that the Name Jehovah¹ was disclosed by Himself to the Israelites in Egypt, on a momentous occasion, as a Name by which he would be thenceforth known to them specially, but there is no further indication of its proper use. It seems, therefore, impossible to decide what is the appropriate use of these Names, although this must have been known at the time. It is, consequently, impossible to decide whether they are appropriately or inappropriately used in the Pentateuch; but they can hardly have been used inappropriately without their unsuitability being discovered during so many ages. But it is obvious that, if they are appropriately used, no question as to why they are used can arise; for in such a case they are so used because they are appropriate.

The Divine Names are said to recur with concomitant

¹ Exodus, vi, 3.

peculiarities. Can that recurrence prove more than that the Names with their respective "concomitants" were supposed to be appropriate, and were so used intentionally and not accidentally? The issue under discussion is whether they prove a plurality of writers, whether one writer could not just as well have used the Divine Names with their respective concomitants as two or more writers, if they are appropriately used; or whether more than one writer is needed to blunder into inappropriateness? And the ultimate question is whether the Tradition, that one man (Moses) wrote it all, can be displaced by such speculation.

The total absence of evidence as to the reason of the actual use of the Divine Names, while the Tradition affirms unity of authorship, has not deterred the Critics from dogmatizing, and, though recognizing nothing but entirely human influences as affecting the conclusions to be reached, they peremptorily insist that the Pentateuch is composite, and that the varied use of the Divine Names indicates the work of different authors. It is not even pretended that there is any evidence for this conclusion except that on the surface, which has, consequently, been always visible; yet, so far from recognizing this fact, partition is now discovered to be inevitable.

One Divine Name is seldom exclusively used in any of the sections discovered by Criticism; and the *peculiar* character of the "concomitants" is much impaired by their appearance in sections to which, according to the theory, they are foreign, and where they get in the way of their creators, even after a most drastic purging. But it is evident that these supposed peculiarities must stand on the same footing as the Names themselves, not less visible, not more striking, not more characteristic than the Names are. They can, when they all concur, which is not often, prove no more than that more than one writer *might* have been at work, but not that one writer *could not* have done it all, which is the thing to be proved. Criticism must still employ its most precious "appliance"¹ of begging the question, and making "it *may* be so" equivalent to "it *is* so."

The Pentateuch itself shows unity in diversity both in place and time, its successive books covering a wide range

¹ See Dr. Sanday on "Inspiration," p. 240.

in both; and yet they were believed to be largely, if not entirely, the work of one writer, and of one mind. Criticism, suspecting this claim to be false, fancied it saw the way to prove it to be so, namely, by using the discovery of what seemed almost a guilty secret, the more subtly concealed by being boldly displayed, the secret of the use of the Divine Names.

If the various sections of the Pentateuch, marked by different Divine Names, were as plainly separated as the five books themselves, no countenance would be given to the theory of different authorship, still less to any theory of widely different dates of the sections—except as the orderly sequence of a continuous history; and least of all would it lend support to discontinuity of the events, recorded as continuous, which can only be torn asunder by contradicting the evidence instead of applying it. But it is just this separation of events, stated by the narrative to have been continuous from first to last, and to have happened, as to the Law, entirely in the Wilderness, which it is essential for Criticism to effect, but which cannot be done without contradicting the evidence, not at one point only, or in the Pentateuch only, but all through the Old Testament, which never falters in its witness that the giving of the Law, as recorded in the Pentateuch, happened in the Wilderness. To support this contradiction is vital for Criticism. It is in vain that Criticism seeks to withdraw attention from its settled purpose by declaring that these are questions of date and authorship, while it seeks, by these devices, to invert the history; and to detach the events from the recognized control of Jehovah, and from the recognized channels of His revelation, and so to bring a supernatural development down to the human level, to which, by the presupposed human character of the record, the history had been at the start reduced.

The Plagues.

The account of the Plagues in Exodus is said to present a case of Doublets, or parallel narratives combined with more or less success; but which, in spite of the compiler's art, are said to show, in their present shape, "a series of systematic differences relating to four distinct points, viz. :—

- "(1) The terms of the command addressed to Moses;
- "(2) The demand made of Pharaoh;

- “(3) The description of the Plague; and
- “(4) The formula expressive of Pharaoh’s obstinacy;

“and further, that these differences agree with corresponding differences in the parts of the preceding narrative, Exodus iii, 1; vi, 1, which have been assigned (on independent grounds) to P and J E respectively.”¹

The story, which is familiar to everyone, deals with a considerable variety of topics, which are mingled in one continuous narrative; all the events touched upon in it being, according to its statements, within the personal knowledge of Moses and Aaron, who took active parts in them. The account we have in Exodus has always been attributed in substance to Moses himself. Aaron’s knowledge of the incidents would also be direct, and, of course, he may have written part of it. There are commands by Jehovah; communications to Pharaoh; signs performed before him and before the magicians, which were disregarded by him; plagues inflicted in consequence, but withdrawn on his appearing sufficiently impressed; and, finally, his persistence in his own course, until the climax was reached in the death of the Firstborn of Egypt. There might be more than one style employed in narrating incidents of so varied a kind. That we find elements more precise and formal, as well as more popular ones, need cause no surprise. But it is this which enables Criticism to claim that there were two or more writers who contributed to the narrative, neither of them contemporary, one, namely (P) being as late as the Exile or after it. It is not contended that the language or style of these supposed “Sources” is inappropriate to the matter; but it is said that the same language and style recur throughout the Pentateuch (as well as beyond it). Such recurrence would, of course, be found in the Pentateuch if, as Tradition asserts, it was all recorded by one man, Moses, or under his superintendence. And there would be nothing surprising in subsequent writers imitating the same style, or in Moses initiating a style suitable for use, as to similar subjects, by subsequent writers. Criticism indeed supposes that a “School” of priestly writers and editors carried on the Priestly record throughout the Old Testament and adopted the same style.

¹ Driver, “Introduction,” p. 25.

It is said, however, that the partition of the Plague narrative founded upon "literary criteria" is "remarkably supported by corresponding differences in the representation."¹ The "literary criteria" are alluded to by Dr. Driver in describing the character of the J element. He says² "The narrative generally is written in a more picturesque and varied style than that of P; there are frequent descriptive touches, and the dialogue is abundant." And several phrases are quoted as marking J as one Source, such as "Let my people go"; "Pharaoh's heart was heavy" (in J), as contrasted with "made strong" (in P); "*refuseth* to let the people go"; "serpent"; "Thus saith Jehovah," said regularly to Pharaoh; "border"; "Thou, thy people and thy servants"; "God of the Hebrews"; "to entreat"; "such as hath not been," &c.; "to sever" and statements as to the end or object or circumstances of the Plagues—all in J.

These criteria do not seem very definite; and there is a good deal of formality in many of them. The "dialogue," said to be "abundant" (in J) must include that with Jehovah, for that with Pharaoh seems to be closely limited to message and reply, in both cases with little variation. There is, moreover, little of the full narrative allotted to P.

This P section (condensed) is as follows (references being to the Revised Version):—

Water turned into blood.—Jehovah said "Say unto Aaron : Take thy rod, and stretch out thy hand over the waters," &c., to turn them into blood; and Moses and Aaron "did so, as the Lord commanded."³ "And the blood was throughout all the land of Egypt." The magicians did the same, and "Pharaoh's heart was strong" and "he hearkened not."

Frogs.—Aaron at Jehovah's command through Moses ("Say unto Aaron") with his rod calls up frogs; the magicians doing the same."⁴

Lice.—The narrative goes on: "When Pharaoh saw that there was respite he hardened ('made heavy,' R.V. margin) his heart (this is J), and hearkened not unto them; as the Lord had spoken."⁵

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 24.

³ Exodus, vii, 19—22.

⁴ *Ibid.*, viii, 5—7.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

⁵ *Ibid.*, viii, 15—19.

Then comes the turning of dust into lice, which the magicians failed to do, and said "This is the finger of God." But Pharaoh's heart was "strong."

Boils and Blains.—"The Lord said unto Moses and unto Aaron: Take to you handfuls of ashes of the furnace, and let Moses and Aaron sprinkle it toward the heaven" (to produce boils), against which the magicians¹ could not stand. "The Lord said unto Moses, Pharaoh will not hearken unto you," and He "hardened" (made strong) Pharaoh's heart, and he did not let the Children of Israel go.²

The entire Plague section (condensed) is as follows: (the shares of P and E noticed, and the references to J given in the margin).

PLAGUES.

(1) Water
turned into
blood.

Exodus, vii,
14-18 (J).

"And the Lord said unto Moses, Pharaoh's heart is stubborn ('heavy,' margin), he refuseth to let the people go. Get thee unto Pharaoh in the morning, lo, he goeth out unto the water: and thou shalt stand by the river's brink to meet him; and the rod which was turned into a serpent shalt thou take in thine hand. And thou shalt say unto him, the Lord (Jehovah) the God (Elohim) of the Hebrews, hath sent me unto thee, saying, Let my people go, that they may serve me in the Wilderness: and, behold, hitherto thou hast not hearkened. Thus saith the Lord (Jehovah): Behold, I will smite with the rod that is in mine hand upon the waters which are in the river, and they shall be turned into blood. And the fish that is in the river shall die, and the river shall stink; and the Egyptians shall loathe to drink water from the river."

Then comes in P to give the directions (vii, 19-20a) for the actual turning to blood, which is described by E (vii, 20b-21a, to "river" in the sentence "and the fish that was in the river died"). P resumes (vii, 21b-22) to say that the blood was throughout all the land, that the

¹ Exodus ix, 8-12.

² *Ibid.*, xi, 9, 10.

Magicians "did in like manner," and that Pharaoh's heart was hardened.

Exodus, vii,
23 (J). J reappears and states "And Pharaoh turned and went into his house, neither did he lay even this to heart." Then after E had interposed to state that the Egyptians had to dig for water (vii, 24).

Exodus, vii,
25, viii, 1—
4 (J). J closes the account of this Plague by the statement that seven days elapsed before a fresh threat, of a plague of frogs, was made to Pharaoh.

(2) Frogs. P next intervenes (viii, 5-7) to state the directions to be given by Moses to Aaron for calling up the frogs, and their appearance in consequence, the Magicians doing the same.

Exodus, viii,
8-15, (J). J, with a particularity characteristic of P, tells of Pharaoh's promising to let the people go, and of the frogs being removed at Moses' "entreaty."

(3) Lice. The plague of lice (viii, 15b-19) is wholly given to P.

(4) Flies. The plague of flies is wholly given to J. "God" (Elohim) in "Lord our God" in vv. 26, 27 and "Lord your God" in v. 28.

(5) Murrain. Ex., ix, 1-7, (J) The plague of murrain is wholly given to J.

(6) Boils and Blains. The plague of boils and blains (ix, 8-12) is wholly given to P.

(7) Hail. Plague of hail is threatened. This is recorded by J, while the infliction of the Plague (Ex. ix, 22-23a) is due to E.

Exodus, 23b
(J). "And the Lord rained hail upon the land of Egypt."

"So there was hail and fire mingled with the hail very grievous" (ix, 24a) E.

Exodus, ix,
24 b-34 (J) Effects of hail, Pharaoh's appeal to Moses and Aaron, the removal of the plague, and the hardening of Pharaoh's heart.

"And the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, and he did not let the children of Israel go" (ix, 35). From E.

(8) Locusts. The plague of locusts threatened. Pharaoh's servants expostulated with him. "God" (Elohim) in v. 7 in "Lord their God" in a "J" section.

Pharaoh offers to let them go, but refuses to allow them to take their children (x, 8-13a). From E.

Exodus x,
13^b (J). "And when it was morning the east wind brought the locusts."

"And the locusts went up over all the land of Egypt, and rested in all the borders of Egypt; very grievous were they" (x, 14a). From E.

Exodus, x,
14^b—19 (J). The great destructiveness of the locusts. Pharaoh again appears to Moses and Aaron, and the plague is removed.

"God" occurs in vv. 16 and 17 in the words "Lord your God."

(9) **Darkness.** The plague of darkness. Pharaoh offers to let them go with their children, but refuses to allow them to take their cattle. Moses insists upon taking the cattle. "But the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, and he would not let them go" (x, 20-27). From E.

Exodus, x,
28—29 (J). Pharaoh dismisses Moses, saying "For the day thou seest my face thou shalt die." Moses answers, "I will see thy face again no more."

(10) **First-born.** The last plague. The destruction of the first-born (xi, 1-3). E.

Exodus, xi,
4—8 (J). The destruction of the first-born is threatened. "And Moses went out from Pharaoh in hot anger."

Pharaoh is obstinate (xi, 9, 10). From P.

All that is allotted to P is a share of four of the Plagues: (1) Water turned into blood; (2) frogs; (3) lice; (4) boils and blains; of the latter two plagues practically the whole. P can hardly be considered even "tolerably complete."

Part of the accounts of two of the plagues, viz. (1) the waters turned to blood, (2) the frogs is given to J, who, however, is made to omit the two plagues (1) of lice, and (2) of boils and blains.

The allotment is adjusted so as to give the more graphic details to J, and any dry details to P, and so, of course, these are found in those respective allotments. The Name test is obviously in the way.

Why P and J should have inserted or omitted the plagues as they have done is not obvious, and is not explained.

We are apparently, by this analysis, invited to contemplate a post-exilic editor, perhaps the author of P himself, with these supposed "Sources" before him, recalling an old-fashioned compositor, selecting from each the portions above indicated, and rejecting the rest. The Priestly document

must be supposed to be complete, in substance, when this welding together came to be attempted; it is, however, strange that it should have still remained to be done.

In this account of the Plagues, all of it—except, perhaps, one word, “died,” in ch. vii, 21a, which does not seem to be claimed by any of the “sources” (thus leaving the sentence, “And all the fish that was in the river,” without a verb)—belongs to the supposed “sources.” Unless the editor is P himself, he scrupulously abstains from intruding anything of his own, except, perhaps, the word “died,” just mentioned. He carries his scruples so far as to indent upon J to supply the words, “And when it was morning the east wind brought the locusts,” in ch. x, 13b, in the middle of an E section. Yet he is not so embarrassed with scruples as to shrink from clipping his heterogeneous “Sources” so as to make them appear to be a homogeneous unity. The various “Sources” extracted from this unity do not, of course, pretend to be anything but fragments. They do not appear to exhibit the “characteristics” by which, according to Criticism itself, they might justify their titles. P and E should never use the Name “Jehovah,” but always “Elohim.” They never use “Elohim,” except when the magicians say, “This is the finger of God,” viii, 19,¹ J, who should never use “Elohim,” uses it several times.

The other alleged “characteristics” are promoted from their subordinate “concomitant” position to rank in the absence of the distinctive Divine Names, as leading “characteristics,” on making their opportune appearance in this otherwise destitute section; they are now enrolled as active members of the ragged army, or mob, of Critical “characteristics” with “heavy,” “strong,” &c., as badges.

No verification of the Critical Position is possible here or elsewhere. The existence of “Sources,” “Editions,” &c., rests upon the opinion of scholars, drawing inferences on human analogies from undisclosed and equally unverifiable materials; and these opinions are offered as authority sufficient to displace the positive evidence of Tradition that Moses wrote the bulk of the Pentateuch, even if he did not, with his own hand, write this very section.

Let us now consider the grounds of representation, which so “remarkably support the literary criteria.” They are as

¹ The name “Elohim” here is presumably their own God, not Jehovah.

follows: The first ground is (1) "The terms of the command addressed to Moses." "In P Aaron co-operates with Moses undoubtedly."¹ But in the other parts of the narrative also Aaron co-operates. While in vii, 7, 12 (P) Jehovah says that Aaron is to be Moses' prophet in relation to Pharaoh, and to speak to Pharaoh. In iv, 15, 16 (J) Aaron is made Moses' "mouth,"² as it is expressed in v. 16. Dr. Driver seems to contend that Aaron was (in J) only to speak to *the people*, and to leave Moses to shift for himself before Pharaoh: and that it is only the priestly narrative which drags in Aaron before Pharaoh, although it cannot be denied that (in J) Pharaoh repeatedly appeals for intercession to Aaron as well as to Moses. The elders of the people themselves were also to go with Aaron to demand release from Pharaoh (iii, 18, J). But according to Dr. Driver, when Aaron went with Moses to Pharaoh he was "silent."³ This is apparently inferred, merely from the fact that the narrative does not actually specify that Aaron spoke. Even P, with his preciseness and formality, does not find it necessary to say that Aaron, who had been constituted Moses' mouth, really acted as spokesman, when he was present for that and for no other purpose; but if P's object was, as Dr. Driver seems to suspect, to magnify Aaron, he did not reckon with the astuteness of the modern Critic, when he so far curbed his natural diffuseness.

The second ground is (2)⁴ "No demand is ever made of Pharaoh (in P), the plagues being viewed rather as signs or proofs of power than as having the practical object of securing Israel's release."

It is strange support for a partition that it produces an absurd result. It cannot, however, be justly charged against even this emasculated product of Criticism (P) that the plagues were a sort of purposeless show, with no practical object, for if xi, 10 is P's, he there alludes to the object as that of inducing Pharaoh to let Israel go.

The third ground is (3)⁵ That in P the description of the plague is brief; "the success or failure of the Egyptian magicians (who are mentioned only in this narrative) is noted."

The fourth ground is (4) That Pharaoh's heart (in P) is

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 25. ² *Ibid.* ³ *Ibid.*, Note x. ⁴ *Ibid.* ⁵ *Ibid.*

hardened, "stony," and the closing formula is, "And he hearkened not unto them, as Jehovah had spoken"; while in J Pharaoh's heart is "heavy."

These are the differences in the representation which "remarkably" support the "literary criteria," and clinch the difference of authorship.

No inappropriateness of language or style to matter is alleged. Real conflict of representation is hardly alleged; none is, at any rate, shown. It seems to be suggested that the silence of J as to Aaron's function being to speak to Pharaoh—as well as to the people—amounts to a conflict. It must be a conflict which the compiler did not observe. There is, however, no conflict. In Ex. iv, 15 (J) Aaron is made Moses' spokesman, the object being to send them first to the people, and then for Moses and Aaron to proceed, with the elders of the people, to Pharaoh (iii, 16, 18, J). The mention of Aaron as spokesman to "the people" in iv. 16 (J) is obviously made because that was the immediate work to be done; the mention of "the people" only does not seem to be made for the purpose of limiting Aaron's spokesman-ship to that of addressing the people, when it was as much or more required for approaching Pharaoh.

Any conflict which exists in this narrative, when it is split up, equally exists in the undivided narrative, if the alleged sources are embodied unaltered—and if altered in the transfer the supposed sources are not attested by the full narrative. To prove opposing statements to be the work of different authors, they must be irreconcilable. For a narrative which is consistent on one interpretation, but can be made inconsistent by another interpretation, cannot be split up on an inference of plural authorship. Here there is nothing really conflicting, even when the narrative is split up; and in the so-called "Sources," as well as in the narrative as a whole, it is perfectly clear, that Aaron was to speak for Moses, when required by him, both to Pharaoh and to the people. After Aaron had spoken to the people (iv, 30) the people believed; and then Moses and Aaron went to Pharaoh, "and said unto Pharaoh, Let my people go," &c. (v. i. J). And when Moses afterwards pleaded his "uncircumcised lips," in order to excuse himself from speaking to Pharaoh, Aaron was associated with him (vi, 12, 13 P). It cannot therefore be shown that there is *any* conflict in this respect in the narrative.

But suppose a conflict to exist, is a plurality of authors the necessary, or the proper inference from it, unless there is much more than a mere conflict, even an irreconcilable conflict? And, if there is evidence as to the authorship, is it displaced by such a conflict? Is not the proper inference this—that one of the conflicting statements is wrong, or, it may be, that both are wrong? Even that inference cannot be drawn if the statements are irreconcilable. The inference as to plurality of authors is surely only legitimate when special grounds are clearly proved, *demanding* such an inference. Criticism pictures the compiler as keeping several rolls before him and picking out a word from one, a sentence from another, a section from a third. This is a spectacle rarely witnessed; the nearest approach to it is the compositor of former days picking out his types. Here no special grounds inferring plurality appear; the alleged conflict is itself only produced by a strained interpretation of the appointment of Aaron as spokesman, which treats the mention of “the people” to whom Aaron was to speak (in Ex. iv, 16) as confining his functions to that of speaking to the people, and excluding his speaking to Pharaoh, in opposition to the previous general commission given to him in Ex. iv, 15, as to the plain general meaning of the narrative. Unless the compiler by his combined narrative sought to give his sources some particular colour, the combined narrative would show what, in his judgment, was the true effect of the “sources” he used.

The other alleged grounds can hardly be seriously claimed as adding anything to the force of the “literary criteria.” The utmost that can be claimed with regard to these is, that *if* there is a plurality of authors proved, these alleged differences are consistent with differences of authorship. “No demand” made of Pharaoh in one part of the narrative¹ is met by ample evidence of demands elsewhere; brief descriptions are supplemented by fuller, and Pharaoh’s heart is sometimes “heavy” and sometimes “stony.” The omissions are, moreover, created by allotting the mention of the matter said to be omitted to some other “source,” while the existence of different sources is in issue.

The only result of this analysis and partition, as made by

¹ See *ante*, p. 106.

Criticism, is to distinguish the narrative; and this is only of use to enable Criticism to "lift out" the various sections and to remove them to later periods. Thus the "Priestly Code," including the Ceremonial Law, is lifted out from the Mosaic period, and set down again in the Exilic period, thus changing the position and character of the Law by this transference in time and place from a Law given direct by God at Sinai to one slowly evolved in the course of Israel's experience. The believer may be forced to accept this, but it can only be by cogent convincing proof. As he studies the Pentateuch he may observe the use of the Divine Names, and the differences, such as they are, in representation, &c. He is told that scholars hold that these differences indicate different authors; he may be told that they have been found to indicate plurality of authorship in ordinary human literature of other countries; he can see for himself that there is some variety of style and matter recurring in much of the Scripture, and that a story framed by collecting the various sets of fragments marked by a particular Divine Name, &c., will hardly impress him as "tolerably complete." Even if the evidence went so far as to prove that the respective narratives thus formed differed in character to such an extent as to show that they formed parts of separate and inconsistent narratives, such as scholars hold indicate different authors, the inquirer will naturally ask how this is reconcilable with the Mosaic authorship. His question may, perhaps, be met, as it frequently is, by a taunting remark that his faith should not rest upon Moses' authorship of the Pentateuch. Silenced for the moment, he proceeds to test the theory. He will again require to know what evidence there is of the existence and action of the supposed compilers, and of the existence of the supposed "Sources," except such as can be found in the present narrative, or legitimately inferred from it, and duly verified by other materials. He will learn that there is none. He may, however, be induced to consider the case for partition, and examine the narrative of the Plagues, which we have just considered. He will find that the Name test is absolutely fatal to its creators. Jehovah is used throughout, with the addition in a few instances of Elohim, but still in direct defiance of the theory. If he inquires into the other "characteristics" he will be offered a poor quibble or two about the difference between the supposed "Sources" which can only be discovered by constituting the "Sources," according to Critical opinion, as

a means of disclosing such differences, that is, by barefaced begging of the question. The theory, in fact, entirely breaks down, and the Mosaic Tradition is not displaced but confirmed.

Passover and Mazzoth.

In Ex. xii and xiii accounts are given of the institution of the Feasts of Passover and of Unleavened Bread; this latter Feast, called Mazzoth, was to follow immediately after the Passover; both these accounts are said to contain different representations of the origin and details of these Feasts, and to display corresponding "literary characteristics" which stamp them as belonging respectively to the supposed "Sources" P and JE. The distinction between the parts thus severed is said to be "sufficiently established upon literary grounds";¹ that is, upon the alleged differences of language and style; the style of P being dry, precise, &c., while that of JE is popular, flowing, graphic, and generally fresh and interesting.

The Divine Names, however, fail altogether as a distinctive test, "Lord" being used throughout, except in four instances (Ex. xiii, 17, 18, 19). "Lord" is used thirty-one times in ch. xii and xiii. In ch. xiv "Lord" is used throughout (seventeen times).

In the parts assigned to P and E in ch. xii-xiv "Lord" occurs twenty-one times, and "God" only four times, while the name "God" only ought here to be found.²

"The double treatment" is, it is said, "peculiarly evident" in Ex. xii, xiii.³

These accounts (condensed), in the order in which they are made by Criticism to stand in the present combined form (the "Sources" being indicated by the signs P and JE), are as follows: P (Ex. xii, 1-20), Jehovah—after saying (v. 2) "this month shall be the first month of the year to you"—commands Moses and Aaron to speak unto all the congregation and to say (v. 3), that on the 10th day of this month each household should take a lamb for the Passover,

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 29.

² In Exodus xii, *Lord* is used by J four times, P eleven times, E twice; in Exodus xiii by J thirteen times, P once, while E uses *God* four times; in Exodus xiv, *Lord* is used by J ten times, by P six times, and by E once.

³ Driver, "Introduction," p. 28.

and (v. 6) that the Feast is to continue till the 14th day of the month, when the lamb should be killed "at even" (that is, the end of the 14th day of the month). Directions are also given—sometimes using the second person and sometimes the third person of the persons to be addressed—as to the way in which the lamb is to be cooked and eaten; and for the sprinkling of the blood on the lintels and doorposts of their dwellings.

And, following the Passover, the Feast of Unleavened Bread is directed to be kept, with certain solemnities, for seven days from the 14th day of the month at even until the 21st day of the month at even.

JE (*Ex. xii, 21-27*).—Moses then called for all the elders of Israel, and told them to take lambs according to their households and kill the Passover. Also "to take a bunch of hyssop" with which to sprinkle the blood; and directing that none of them were to go out of their doors until the morning, because Jehovah would smite the Egyptians, and "pass over their doors." This was to be an ordinance for ever in the promised land; and they were to teach their children its meaning. "And the people bowed the head and worshipped" (*Ex. xii, 27*).

P (*Ex. xii, 28*).—"And the children of Israel went and did so; as the Lord had commanded Moses and Aaron, so did they."

JE (*Ex. xii, 29-36, 37b, 39, 42a*).—Smiting of the first-born of Egypt, and departure of Israel with their kneading-troughs of bread "before it was leavened" (*xii, 34, 39*). "It is a night to be much observed," &c. (*xii, 42a*).

P (*Ex. xii, 37a*).—"And the children of Israel journeyed from Rameses to Succoth" (*Ex. xii, 40, 41*). Israel had sojourned in Egypt 430 years when all the hosts of the Lord went out on the self-same day (*Ex. xii, 42b*). "This is that night of the Lord to be much observed of all the children of Israel throughout their generations" (said to be a gloss) (*Ex. xii, 43-50*). "And the Lord said unto Moses and Aaron, This is the ordinance of the Passover." Then follow directions as to who are to be considered qualified to partake of the Passover, concluding with "Thus did all the children of Israel, as the Lord commanded Moses and Aaron, so did they" (*Ex. xii, 51*). "On the self-same day the Lord brought them out by their hosts."

P (*Ex. xiii, 1, 2*).—"And the Lord spake unto Moses,

saying, 'Sanctify unto me all the firstborn . . . both of man and of beasts; it is mine.' "

JE (*Ex.* xiii, 3-10).—Moses, addressing the people on the subject of their deliverance from Egypt, which he exhorts them to keep in memory (mentioning the month as "Abib"), goes on to impress on the people the duty of observing the Feast of Unleavened Bread or Cakes; and of instructing their children in its meaning and origin; and then *JE* (xiii, 11-16) returns to the subject of setting apart the Firstborn and Firstlings, connecting that Ordinance with the slaughter of the Firstborn in Egypt.

The above summary does not, of course, enable the reader to appreciate the alleged distinctions of language and style said to appear "throughout" the respective "Sources" (marked P and *JE*). In the English version it is not obvious that the P sections are in any way distinguished from the *JE* sections. Of course, as dryness, preciseness, &c., are made tests of P, all those parts which are drier or more precise are, when possible, given to P.

Dr. Driver says¹ that "the conclusions which satisfy the common unbiased and unsophisticated reason of mankind prevail in the end." Applying this principle, would any ordinary mind suspect that the simple account above summarized, consisting of ordinances, exhortations, patriotic reflections, and a narrative of events, could not be the work of a single writer, but required the concurrence of at least three authors—four, if the glossator is included—besides a compiler or editor? Would it be an unbiased mind which refused or neglected to take into consideration, in judging of it, the fact that it is part of an unique work, or the fact that it is not "literature," or the question of the appropriateness of the style to the various topics? The return of the narrative, an Oriental narrative, to subjects already touched upon, even if apparently superfluous repetitions, would surely not suggest to an ordinary mind that two people were required to say the same thing twice over. Even in the P section we still find, after its scrupulous sifting, the phrase "the self-same day" occurring twice in similar connections in ch. xii, vv. 41 and 51.

Criticism, however, maintains that we have in this apparently continuous story two or more distinct accounts,

¹ "Introduction," preface, p. viii.

of dates centuries apart. It makes two distinct narratives run as shown above. In the account labelled P (Ex. xii, 1-20), Moses is directed to call upon the people to keep the Passover and Mazzoth (Unleavened Cakes).

There is no mention in P of Moses calling upon the people to do so. But in Ex. xii, 28, P says "The children of Israel did so, as the Lord had commanded Moses and Aaron, so did they." This verse is credited with the necessary characteristic marks of P—in very small compass apparently! And then (xii, 37a) P tells us that "The children of Israel journeyed from Rameses to Succoth"—no mention having yet been made in P (although there is mention in JE) of their leaving their houses, or of the slaughter of the Firstborn in Egypt. Here again the marks of P must be very closely packed!

The next stage of P's story (xii, 40, 41) gives the information that Israel had been sojourning in Egypt 430 years, when "all the hosts of the Lord 'went out' on the self-same day."

Then comes the "supplementary" section on the Passover (xii, 43-50, P) declaring that "no uncircumcised person" should partake of it—the Passover—followed (in xii, 51, P) by a repetition of the statement, "It came to pass the self-same day that 'the Lord brought them out of Egypt' by their hosts."

Finally, P (Ex. xiii, 1, 2) directs the sanctification of the Firstborn. There is produced by the manipulation of Criticism a disjointed collection of scraps, which is saddled upon P.

The JE portion is equally disjointed and scrappy (in Ex. xii, 21-27). Moses, whose instructions do not appear in this "Source," but appear in P, tells the people to draw out a lamb for each household, and kill the Passover; and to sprinkle the blood with a "bunch of hyssop." He warns them not to go out of their doors until the morning, because the Lord would smite the Egyptians and "pass over" their houses. This was to be an Ordinance for ever, and to be taught to their children. "And the people bowed the head and worshipped."

(JE, Ex. xii, 29-36, 37b-39).—Then comes the smiting of the Firstborn, and departure of Israel, with the dough "before it was leavened" in "their kneading troughs" (JE in xii, 34), to which reference is repeated in xii, 39 (JE): "It is a night to be much observed" (xii, 42a).

In JE (Ex. xiii, 3-10) Moses returns to the subject of their departure in the month Abib—the month not being specified in the other “Source,” and JE, in xiii, 5-7, emphasizes the duty of observing the Feast of Unleavened Bread, not previously stated in this “Source” to have been ordained. He also emphasizes the duty of teaching the observance of the Feast to their children (JE Ex. xiii, 11-16) which connects the surrender of Firstborn sons and Firstlings with the slaughter of the Firstborn of Egypt.

The unhappy compiler apparently does not succeed in “welding together” to the satisfaction of Criticism the supposed constituents of the narrative; he only gets credit for doing so when the Critics find it impossible to disjoin them. Of course, narratives of the simple, almost garrulous character of these ancient records of an Eastern people are very easily chopped up and remoulded into “tolerably complete fragments”; if chopped enough, the fragments can be made still more “complete.”

It will be observed that Criticism is in some difficulty when the narrative which is to be torn limb from limb has not a double set of limbs.¹ Thus the single mention of Jehovah’s direction to Moses (xii, 1-20) is allotted to P, while the next paragraph, which happens also to be the only mention of Moses’ address to the people—directing them to kill the Passover—goes to JE, so that one “Source” gets the Ordinance without its communication, and the other its indirect and partial communication without the full Ordinance.

Similarly, P tells us that the people did as the Lord commanded Moses and Aaron, although they had not (in P) been told what He had commanded. JE (xii, 27) only tells us that they “bowed the head and worshipped,” but says nothing about their following it up by obedience. The entire narrative, however, contains both statements in their natural sequence and in their fit places. Again P tells us,

¹ And it may seem that it has here missed a further chance for vivisection, for each of these narratives, as disjointed by criticism, has a double set of limbs: (a) P as to the departure from Egypt “on the self-same day” (xii, 41, and again xii, 51), and, (b) JE, as to the unleavened dough carried on the shoulders of the people (xii, 34, and again xii, 39). Here, it would seem, was an opportunity of allotting one statement to each “Source,” and of compensating the “Sources” for the painful necessity of giving such matters as were only once mentioned alternately to each “Source.”

with startling abruptness, that the people "journeyed from Rameses to Succoth" (xii, 37a), which, of course, they could not do without leaving their homes, of which he makes no mention, although that incident was of so dramatic a character. JE tells us that; but does not tell us where they went. Nor does he mention how long they had sojourned in Egypt, although it is one of the few things which interest P. However, P has the advantage, dear to his technical mind, of setting out in some detail (xii, 43-50) the regulations excluding foreigners and uncircumcised persons from partaking of the Passover. It must have been consideration for the susceptibilities of P that secured to him the privilege of saying twice over, that "on the self-same day" the people left Egypt, a precision which JE could, perhaps, not have imitated. He, JE, however, is in turn allowed the monopoly of the graphic touch as to the troughs of unleavened bread, twice mentioned.

Does it not strike the "unbiased," "unsophisticated" mind—to which Dr. Driver cheerfully appeals, and to which, cheerfully or reluctantly, Criticism must go to be judged—that all this is ludicrously artificial, mechanical and inappropriate, shocking to the devout mind, and amusing to the sceptic?

If Moses, for instance, compiled this account, can anyone say that he would have framed it otherwise than as it now stands, and, if so, in what respects it would have been different? Can anyone pretend to say that there is a word of this section of Exodus which Moses could not have written? And if part were shown not to be his, that would not prove that the rest of it, or the original, if different from what now appears, was not his.

The distinction between the "Sources" (P and JE) in Ex. ch. xii, xiii of this narrative, is said by Dr. Driver¹ to be "sufficiently established upon literary grounds" (not, apparently, including the Divine Names, which are entirely opposed to the theory), "but" (he continues) "a material justification of the analysis is to be found in the fact that xii, 21-27 cannot be the original sequel of xii, 1-13," P (which ordains the Passover, followed by Mazzoth), "because those verses (21-27) do not describe the *execution* of the commands received by Moses in verses 1-13. Moses does not repeat to the people, even in an abridged form, the

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 29 [26]

injunctions before received by him; but while several points of importance (e.g., the character of the lamb, and the manner in which it was to be eaten) are omitted, *fresh* points (the hyssop, the basin, none to leave the house) not mentioned before, are added. The inference is irresistible that xii, 21-27 is really part of a different account of the institution of the Passover, which stands to xii, 3-13 in the same relation that the regulations respecting Mazzoth in xiii, 3-10 stand to those in xii, 14-20 (Dillmann, p. 100). V. 25-27 is conceived entirely in the spirit of parts of xiii, 3-16 (see v. 5, 8, 10, 14f); it is probable, therefore, that both passages are of similar origin, and may be referred either to J . . . or to the compiler of JE expanding materials derived from J." The passages just referred to (xii, 25-27, xiii, 3-16, especially xiii, 5, 8, 10, 14, 15) (particularly mentioned above) are exhortations to the Hebrews to keep the Feasts, and to teach their children the Ordinances. In the address of Moses to the people (xii, 21-27) he gives them the directions which were immediately required. They were to take the lamb on the 10th day of the month (v. 3). The people would have to select the lambs. It is true Moses does not, at the same time, specify the character of the lamb, nor, indeed, does he explain the meaning of "the Passover," which he had directed them to "kill" (xii, 6). Probably it was unnecessary to do so. His address sufficiently shows its significance. But they would have to provide themselves with hyssop and basins, and make such arrangements for the morrow that no one should require to leave the house; these things, therefore, are mentioned. The other directions might be given at another time. Are we—supposing the narrative to be a true one—to assume that it is exhaustive, and so to make it show that Moses neglected something he ought to have done? May we not—indeed, must we not—assume that he did what was necessary? There is no other account of what he said to the people as to the details of the Passover, except the regulations for the exclusion of foreigners and all uncircumcised persons, in xii, 43-49, which Moses is not stated to have been instructed to communicate to the people at that time; which, moreover, seem to look forward to their settlement in Canaan. Instead of treating this narrative in an impartial spirit—in the spirit in which we should treat "any other book"—we are, apparently, invited to imagine that another and different story existed, of the existence of which there is no evidence.

It is said that the inference is "irresistible," although generations without number have resisted it! If, moreover, the supposed different story and this passage (xii, 21-27) stand "in the same relation" to xii, 3-13 (the command to Moses to keep the Passover) as the regulations described by Moses for Mazzoth in xiii, 3-10, stand to the command to keep that Feast, there is no reason why—if symmetry required that both should appear—both should have been recorded in the case of Mazzoth, and only one in the case of the Passover. And in what respect is it to be assumed that the suppressed "account of the institution of the Passover" differed from the account in Ex. xii, 3-13? Or was the present account selected for insertion in our present version by J, or his ingenious compiler, in order to create a discrepancy and to prepare a stumbling-block such as Criticism professes to have discovered? As for the "spirit" in which the passages referred to are conceived, they are, in both sets, mainly emphatic exhortations to keep the Feasts, and to explain their significance to future generations. These have no tendency to support a partition of the narrative. It is not *resemblances* but *differences* which must be relied on in order to support Partition. The traditional Mosaic authorship *claims* resemblances all through the work. It claims one Divine Spirit inspiring Moses to write it all. If the authorship, or compilation, was that of Moses or of any single person, of course there would be no lack of resemblance of one part to another, both in spirit and in letter. The learned Critic seems to say that the alleged omissions and additions in Ex. xii, 21-27 raise an "irresistible" inference that there must have been a narrative having "the same relation to Ex. xii, 3-13 (the Ordinance of the Passover), as declared by Jehovah as Ex. xiii, 3-10 (Moses' declaration as to the feast of Unleavened Bread) has to Ex. xii, 14-20 (the Divine Ordinance of that Feast), and that Ex. xii, 21-27 is a part of that narrative: that is, apparently, that the supposed narrative, of which xii, 21-27 is a part, supplemented those verses (21-27) by the insertion of those matters omitted in them—"the character of the lamb, and the manner in which it was to be eaten"—all which, in plain language, amounts to no more than this, that the omitted particulars must not only have been mentioned by Moses to the people in their proper place, and at their proper time (as contended also above, if such mention was necessary), but also that there must have been some account of the matter in

which that mention was stated; but that such mention was not allowed to appear in the present narrative. And it is further held that this other supposed narrative must have been one by J or JE, apparently because xii, 21-27 and xiii, 3-10 have been decided by Criticism to belong to J or JE. That is to say, the "material justification" for the analysis assigning this passage to J or JE ultimately comes to rest on these passages in the present text having been held already, upon "literary grounds," to belong to that "Source." The "material justification" claimed thus really turns out to have added nothing to the proof supposed to have been already supplied by "literary characteristics."

CHAPTER VII.

THE DISCOVERY OF SOURCES.

DR. DRIVER says,¹ that the narrative of P and JE "exhibit throughout the marks" of P and JE respectively. The mark of P is the Name "Elohim." This, as Dr. Driver admits,² appears only four times in the entire section (Ex. xii-xiv), and then in E. He must, therefore, mean by the word "narrative" only a part of that entire section.

It is interesting to note that the use of the Name "Elohim" is already being dropped by P! The distinctive use of these Divine Names, if they have any distinctive application, was first suggested by their appearance in Genesis. It would be highly desirable that the identity of the covenanted God of Israel with the Creator of the Universe should be emphasized, and Moses, the instrument through whom the special relation of God with Israel was proclaimed, would fittingly emphasize that identity by using in the ancient history contained in Genesis, the Name revealed to him as the Name in which Jehovah condescended to enter into that relation, in order to emphasize the truth that in entering into a special relation with one nation no narrowing or limitation of the Divine Nature was involved. And the full assimilation of this truth, in the course of their training and discipline, would prepare Israel to recognize that when, in due time, God should become Incarnate in a human body, no limitation or narrowing of the Divine Nature was involved. But as Jehovah manifested Himself, in His covenanted relation with Israel, in the never-forgotten deliverance from bondage in Egypt, in the wonders then witnessed, in the giving of the Law at Sinai, and in all His dealings, as the Supreme and only God, there was, perhaps, less need to emphasize this truth by the use of the two Divine Names, and consequently the use of

¹ "Introduction," p. 28.

Ibid., p. 29.

Elohim became increasingly rare, as we find it becoming in the later books of the Pentateuch.

This critical argument seems to be part of the argument for Partition, and to run, in substance thus: The presence of different writers in the Pentateuch has been sufficiently established to be, at least, provisionally regarded as proved, and the characteristics of the "Sources" (P, J, E and JE) to be also provisionally established. Applying these results, based upon the judgment of critics, the Critic finds, as he anticipated, the marks of P and JE in the "literary characteristics" and, neglecting its provisional character, pronounces the Partition now established as to the narrative now in question. He notices a want of symmetry in the account of the Passover and of Unleavened Bread. He suspects that the gap he notices must have arisen from the omission of a part of the "Sources" to which the defect is assigned by the Critics, and promptly declares it probable that his suspicion is well-founded. And that is the "material justification" for the Partition of this narrative on "literary" grounds. Can it displace anything affirmed in the Tradition? There is still no proof of the existence of the alleged "Sources." Criticism may add it to its cumulative pile of judgment of scholars, which it treats as proofs. But there is no proof of any item; consequently they can lend none to one another. There is no necessary inference that more writers than one were employed; but, if more were needed besides Moses and Aaron, there were plenty of contemporaries of the events available. Why seek the aid of the imaginary J, P, &c.? And, in any case, nothing is "established," it is hardly alleged that there is here anything more than some "probability," on ordinary human experience, and consequently inapplicable to Scripture or even to unique phenomena.

In the account of the rebellion of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, Criticism finds the usual doublet derived from the two accustomed sources JE and P,¹ but discovers further in P's own work two different accounts. The narrative is found in Num. xvi and is in substance as follows, the double source in P being denoted by P₁ and P₂.—

P, Num. xvi,	1 (a) Korah, a Levite, with
JE, „ „	1 (b) Dathan and Abiram, of the tribe of
	Reuben, "took men";

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 63.

- JE, Num. xvi, 2 (a) And they rose up before Moses.
- P1, ,, ,, 2 (b) With certain of the children of Israel 250
princes of the congregation, called to the
assembly, men of renown.
- ,, ,, 3 "And they assembled" against Moses
and Aaron;
And accused both of them of taking too
much upon them;
"Seeing all the congregation are holy,
why do they lift themselves above the
assembly of the Lord?"
- ,, ,, 4 Moses "fell upon his face";
- ,, ,, 5, 6 "And he spake unto Korah and unto all
his company saying, In the morning the
Lord will show who are his, and who is
holy, and will cause him to come near
unto Him," &c., and he added
- ,, ,, 6 (a) This do;
- P2, ,, ,, 6 (b) Take you censers, Korah and all his com-
pany; and put fire therein, and put
incense upon them before the Lord to-
morrow; and it shall be that the man
whom the Lord doth choose, he
shall be holy; ye take too much upon
you, ye sons of Levi."
- ,, ,, 8-11 Moses addressed Korah, "Hear now, ye
sons of Levi, seemeth it but a small
thing unto you that the God of Israel
hath separated you from the congrega-
tion . . . to bring you near to Him-
self; to do the service of the tabernacle
of the Lord, and to stand before the con-
gregation to minister unto them, and
that He hath brought thee near, and all
thy brethren the sons of Levi with thee,
and seek ye the priesthood also? There-
fore thou and all thy company are
gathered together against the Lord; and
Aaron, what is he that ye murmur
against him?"
- JE, ,, ,, 12-15 "And Moses sent to call Dathan and
Abiram . . . and they said We will
not come up; is it a small thing that
thou hast brought us up out of a land

flowing with milk and honey, to kill us in the wilderness, but thou must needs make thyself also a prince over us?" And they reproached Moses with not having brought them into "a land flowing," &c. "Wilt thou put out the eyes of these men?" Moses was very wroth and appealed to the Lord not to respect their offering, protesting that he had not done them any wrong.

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| P2, Num. xvi, | 16 | Moses told Korah and all his congregation to "appear before the Lord, thou and they and Aaron to-morrow," with their censers, "250 censers," besides Korah's and Aaron's. |
| " " | 17 | |
| PI, " " | 18 | "And they took every man his censer," &c., "and stood at the door of the tent of meeting with Moses and Aaron. |
| " " | 19 | And Korah assembled all the congregation against them unto the door of the tent of meeting, and the glory of the Lord appeared unto all the congregation." |
| " " | 20-24 | Moses and Aaron were told to separate themselves "from this congregation, that I may consume them in a moment." They interceded for the people. Moses was told to warn the congregation to get up "from about the tabernacle of Korah, Dathan and Abiram." ¹ |
| JE, " " | 25-26 | Moses accordingly "rose up and went" to Dathan and Abiram, followed by the elders of Israel, and warned the people to "depart from the tents of these wicked men," &c. |
| PI, " " | 27 (a) | "So they gat them up from the tabernacle of Korah, Dathan and Abiram on every side." |

¹ In vv. 24-27 "It is highly probable," Dr. Driver says, "that the original reading was 'the tabernacle of Jehovah' (as xvii, 13)." "Introduction," p. 65. Notice "Jehovah" in P.

- JE, Num. xvi, (b) Dathan and Abiram came out with their families "and stood at the door of their tents."
- " 28-32 (a) Moses declared that it would be shown that the Lord had sent him, and that he had not acted of his own mind, if the earth opened and swallowed them up. "And the earth opened her mouth."
- PI, " 32 (b) It also swallowed up "all the men that appertained to Korah, and all their goods."
- JE, " 33-34 So they were all swallowed up. "And all Israel that were round about them fled," &c.
- PI, " 35 "Fire came forth from the Lord, and devoured the 250 men that offered the incense."
- P2, " 36-40 Moses was instructed to direct Eleazer to "have beaten plates, for a covering of the altar," made out of the censers "of these sinners," "for a sign" to the people, and for a "memorial that no stranger, which is not of the seed of Aaron, come near to burn incense before the Lord; that he be not as Korah, and as his company, as the Lord spake unto him by the hand of Moses." Eleazer did as he was directed.
- PI, " 41-50 The people murmured, and said to Moses and Aaron, "Ye have killed the people of the Lord." A plague was sent, which was stayed by the intercession of Moses and Aaron, Aaron making atonement for the people. The plague destroyed 14,700 people, "besides those that died about the matter of Korah."
- PI, Num. xvii, Aaron's rod budded; and so (v. 10) was kept "before the testimony."

It will be observed that the "Sources," when each is read consecutively, give the following results:—

JE's Narrative.

(xvi, 1b, 2a) JE tells us that Dathan and Abiram of the tribe of Reuben, took men, and they rose up before Moses, no reason for their action appearing at this stage.

(12-15) Moses sent to call them, but they refused to come, giving as their reason the deceptiveness of his promises, and his ambitious designs. Moses prayed Jehovah not to accept their offering—no offering having been alluded to in this Source.

(25, 26) Moses "rose up and went" to Dathan and Abiram, followed by the elders of Israel, and warned the congregation to "depart from the tents of these wicked men."

(27b) Dathan and Abiram came out with their families, and stood at the door of their tents, and (28-32a) Moses declared their doom, "And the earth opened her mouth" (32a), "So they were all swallowed up (33) And all Israel that were round about them fled," &c (34).

P's narrative tells us (1a, 2b) that Korah, a Levite, with 250 princes of the congregation,

(3) Assembled themselves together against Moses and against Aaron "accusing them of taking too much upon them, and of lifting themselves" above the assembly of the Lord, "who are, every one of them, holy."

(4) Moses fell upon his face, "and (5-6) told them that," in the morning, "the Lord would show who was His and holy, and would cause him to come near unto Him"; concluding with (6a), "This do," but giving no directions as to what they were to do.

(18) "And they took every man his censer," "and stood at the door of the tent of meeting with Moses and Aaron" (19), Korah assembling the congregation "against" them there—Moses and Aaron were told by Jehovah to separate themselves from this congregation; they entreated Him not to destroy the people. They were told to warn the people to "get up from about the tabernacle of the Lord"; ("the tabernacle of the Lord" being, as Criticism requires, substituted for the "tabernacle of Korah, Dathan and Abiram"), a warning which (27a) the people obeyed (32b); "and swallowed them up, and their households, and all the men that appertained unto Korah, and all their goods,"—verse 32a, which states that the "earth opened her mouth," has been given to JE, and is not available here to account for the disappearance of the household of Korah and all his company, and all their goods.¹

¹ Driver, "Introduction," pp. 63-64.

(35) Fire came forth from the Lord and destroyed the 250 men that offered the incense.

(41-50) The people murmured, accusing Moses and Aaron of "having killed the people of the Lord"; a plague followed, which was stayed at the intercession of Moses and Aaron.

According to P, Korah's party, without any challenge to do so, assembled with censers, of which no mention has been made; the congregation assembled in support of Korah—with what definite purpose does not appear—but, being warned, dispersed, apparently leaving Korah and his band at the tabernacle. This band was then summarily consumed by fire from the Lord.

P2's Narrative.

P2 is spoken of¹ as an expansion of P, "emphasizing a somewhat different point of view," but, apparently, by the same hand, no "literary" difference being suggested, the Divine Name is the same; Lord, i.e. (Jehovah) in all the "Sources," God (Elohim) is conspicuous by its entire absence.

P2 begins, rather abruptly, with (6b) "Take you censers, Korah and all his company," addressing them also as "sons of Levi"; they were told to appear with their censers "before the Lord to-morrow."

(8-11) Moses further addressed them as "sons of Levi," pointing out their sacred privileges, and saying "Seek ye the priesthood also?" This is treated as a claim "against the Lord"—Aaron being of no significance in the matter—"What is Aaron, that ye murmur against him?"

(16, 17) Moses said to Korah, "Be thou and all thy congregation before the Lord, thou and they and Aaron, to-morrow," with their censers, "250 censers, thou also and Aaron, each of you his censer."²

(36-40) The censers "of these sinners" were, by the direction of Jehovah, through Moses, collected and beaten into a brazen covering for the altar as a sign to the people, and a memorial that "no stranger, which is not of the seed of Aaron, come near to burn incense before the Lord, that he be not as Korah and as his company."

¹ Driver, "Introduction," pp. 64-65.

² It does not appear in this source what became of Korah's band of 250 men, the statement of their destruction by fire having been given to P.

The "somewhat different point of view" arises, it will be seen, solely out of the partition.

It is to be noticed that the narrative, whether as it now stands, or as split up, recognizes that the claim of Aaron was to a position of pre-eminence, for himself and for his tribe. His claim is in accordance with the Wilderness legislation, and so, likewise, is the position claimed for the tribe to which both Moses and Aaron belonged; and the entire scene is laid in the Wilderness. We find incense to Jehovah in use. Criticism cannot, of course, tolerate such an account! The "Sources," as well as the present narrative, thus presuppose the Wilderness legislation, which the "Sources" do not displace.

Dr. Driver says,¹ "Dathan and Abiram, Reubenites, give vent to their dissatisfaction with Moses, complaining (v. 14) that his promises had been unfulfilled, and resenting the authority (v. 13b) and judgeship (v. 15b), possessed by him; they, with their tents and households, are swallowed up by the earth (vv. 27-34). This is a rebellion of *laymen* against the *civil* authority claimed by Moses. The narrative is nearly complete, there being only some slight omissions at the beginning."

As to the narrative being "nearly complete," and to there being only "some slight omissions," it will be observed that there is here no statement at all of the grievances which caused their rebellion, but only of the reasons of their refusal to obey the summons of Moses. There is in the narrative (v. 2) a statement—assigned, of course, to another "Source" (P)—that their complaint was that both Moses and Aaron "took too much upon them," and "lifted themselves up above the congregation," who were all "holy." There is no valid ground for the inference that this "Source" (JE) contained no statement of the grievances put forward, and that their complaint was the same as the reasons alleged for refusing obedience when the complainants were summoned to meet Moses (vv. 13-15), a summons which was, appropriately enough, answered by pointing to his alleged untrustworthiness, based on his misleading of them, and to the design attributed to him of assuming an unwarranted domination, which they thus refused to recognize. The learned critic,

¹ "Introduction," pp. 63-64.

by treating their answer on this occasion as the statement of their grievances, really assumes, without any evidence, that they had not already stated their grievances, and that they then seized upon this opportunity to do so, which is, surely, on ordinary principles, absurd. And we are invited to substitute this conjecture for the statement in the text, thus allowing Criticism to fill up by conjecture the gap which it had itself created.

The narrative of JE, as already shown, tells us that Dathan and Abiram "took men" and "rose up before Moses" vv. 1(b), 2(a), but with what purpose is here left untold. Moses sent to call them, and they refused to come, alleging his failures to keep faith in the past, and his ambitious designs in the present, to show the untrustworthiness of his character (vv. 12-15). Then, after warning those about them to escape, Moses declares their doom, which overtakes them at once. The partition itself eliminates their connection with Korah's party, which the narrative, as it stands, insists upon, and eliminates also their attitude towards Aaron. So far from being "nearly complete," it is unintelligible. In any case, it is a most meagre scrap; a truncated figure, without a head, namely, the grievance which set them in motion!

As the narrative stands, these malcontents joined others who had kindred grounds of complaint, for no distinctions of layman or priest, civil or ecclesiastical oppression, appear in the complaint, which appropriately heads the story as to all the parties rebelling, and which was aimed at both Moses and Aaron. There is no suggestion that either branch of the combined body of complainants would have been satisfied with redress of grievances against Moses, or of grievances of a civil character, or that the others would have been content if Aaron—or if the ecclesiastical grievances—were got rid of. No distinction as to civil and ecclesiastical grievances is suggested. The domination of both Moses and Aaron in their respective spheres is assailed, and all the members of the combination alike seek to destroy both Moses and Aaron. The story, as it stands, is simple and consistent, and cannot be displaced by fantastic conjectures. It lends itself, indeed, to such futile attempts only because it is simple and artless.

With reference to the other alleged components of the narrative—distinguished above as P₁ and P₂—Dr. Driver

says as to P₁,¹ Korah, at the head of 250 princes of the congregation, not themselves all Levites,² opposes Moses and Aaron in the interests of the community at large, protesting against the restriction of priestly rights to the tribe of Levi, on the ground (v. 3) that *all* the congregation are holy. Invited by Moses to establish their claim by appearing with censers at the sanctuary, they are consumed by fire from Jehovah. With this representation agrees xvi, 41-50, xvii, the point of which is to confirm—not the exclusive rights of Aaron, as against the rest of the tribe of Levi, but the exclusive right to the priesthood possessed by Levi, against Israel generally (the opposition is clearly not between Aaron and the other Levites, but between Levi and the other tribes; the words in xvii, 12, also are spoken from the point of view of the people at large”).

There is no *invitation* to appear with censers. Moses said, “This do,” but then stopped—v. 7 (a)—so far as P₁ is concerned. The suggestion that the 250 were not all Levites can hardly be accepted on such a ground as that the daughters of Zelophehad could not have sought to strengthen their appeal by proclaiming, even if superfluously, their father’s loyalty under the circumstances. This contention ignores the fact that Korah’s action was not isolated, and ignores the participation of “all the congregation.” See xvi, 40-49.

There is ample reason for rejecting this artificial argument that Korah rose against the tribe of Levi, and not against Moses and Aaron alone; even if the 250 men were not all Levites, it makes Korah head a movement against his own tribe, and represents other Levites supporting him in such a movement!

The other “Source,”³ distinguished above as P₂, admittedly represents the movement as a movement of Levites against Aaron as High Priest. It was also aimed at Moses as leader of the people.

As already remarked, the partition of P into two conflicting accounts is not based upon the use of the Divine Names,

¹ “Introduction,” p. 64.

² This is assumed because, in addition to the generality of the expression “princes of the congregation,” the daughters of Zelophehad, of the tribe of Manasseh, in pleading for their right to share with their father’s brethren—their father having left no son—say that their father had nothing to do with the rising of Korah. Num. xxvii, 3. Driver, “Introduction,” p. 64, n.

³ Driver, “Introduction,” pp. 64-65.

or upon phraseology or "literary criteria." Both accounts are in P's style, and phraseology. It is interesting to find that, in spite of the increasing bulk attributed to P and his subordinates, the preference of the Name "Elohim" seems to have disappeared; while differences of style and phraseology are not required to justify partition, so long as the narrative, when split up, presents "different sides or points of view."¹ It seems that such accounts, although divergent, may well come from the same pen; only, perhaps, not in the same record, or at the same time.

Criticism in asserting, as it does, that an editor has, in so many cases, combined conflicting, or even contradictory accounts, recognizes that one hand only is needed to combine discrepant material; in the present instance, by contending that P₁ and P₂ are indistinguishable, and are, in fact, the work of the same writer, either the same writer originally or the same editor, it virtually allows that one original writer, such as Moses, might have combined two or more discrepant accounts in a continuous and fairly harmonious narrative. Moses could give, for instance, his view of the truth, gathered from his own recollection, after comparing it with the recollection of other competent witnesses, as of Aaron, amongst others—for there were various aspects of the events, and others may have seen, or remembered, some phase of the movement more distinctly, or from a different point of view. All this might happen, even on ordinary human lines, to which most critics confine themselves. Moses, moreover, had, as the Tradition asserts, Divine guidance, or, at least, the consciousness, true or mistaken, of Divine guidance in all that he did, wrote or said, involving an unique sense of responsibility, which would give peculiar weight to what he did, wrote or said. He, as the undoubted protagonist in the scene, could feel and know the character of the movement, whether it was directed against both Aaron and himself, or against only one of them, or against the entire tribe of Levi, and whether those whom he addressed as "sons of Levi" did all, in fact, belong to his own tribe; and would, in short, know the truth as to all the matters now disputed by Criticism. He would not need to write two seriously conflicting accounts, and then "weld" them together, with gaping fissures, to

¹ "Introduction," p. 65.

bewilder the devout, and delight the Critics. If he embodied accounts of the various aspects of the movements in the Tradition, as it stands, belated cavils cannot affect it! It is essential for Criticism that the narrative should be untrue!

If P had presented two different, and, indeed, contradictory points of view, why should a later editor have combined both of them with JE, as if they were all homogeneous? Could he not see the discrepancies? One can understand why a Criticism, which is bent upon disintegrating the Scriptures until their credit as truthful records is destroyed, should try to make out that the narrative is in incessant conflict with itself. It is incredible, however, that Editors, anxious to uphold the sacred writings as pre-eminently true, should systematically combine contradictory stories. In the the present case they have surpassed themselves, as they have combined two conflicting accounts by the same writer, evidently unconscious of their alleged incongruity!

Justification for the partition is also sought in the separate action of the parties, and in the separate communications with them by Moses. There is, however, nothing surprising or unusual in such separation. The combination was formed to oppose the pre-eminence of Moses and Aaron; but the two parties acted, with this common object, in ways which suited their respective characters, and the circumstances as they developed. The Levitical party accepted, but did not seek, as the critics must contend upon the P₁ section, a priestly test by the offering of incense. Dathan's party refused to come when summoned—for what purpose they were summoned does not appear from the disjointed "Sources." Their refusal was, however, well calculated to embarrass Moses and to distract his attention, and so to promote the object of the movement. The separate communications with the parties corresponded to their separate action and situation, and so did their separate fate, so far as it was separate.

The discordance alleged by Criticism is between

(1) An account of a civil movement against Moses;
 (2) An account of an ecclesiastical movement against the tribe of Levi; and

(3) An account of an ecclesiastical movement by Levites against the predominance of Aaron. It cannot be denied that these might all have occurred; or that, if they did all occur, it would be extremely probable that they would all occur at the same time, or in close proximity, and in relation

with one another. Aaron would be aimed at by both the ecclesiastical movements. And the authority of Moses would certainly be involved in an attack upon Aaron's predominance as high priest, and upon his headship of the tribe of Levi.

The two ecclesiastical movements are said by Criticism to have been separate, and to have been separately recorded, (P_1 and P_2), but both are assigned to the same priestly "Source" (P). According to the Critical theory the attacks upon Aaron as High Priest, and as representing the tribe of Levi, were punished in the same manner as the attack upon Moses by Dathan and Abiram. Moses seems to have been present at the spot when the earth opened her mouth. He could, therefore, have recorded the incident from his own knowledge. Aaron was apparently present at the sanctuary, and could have furnished the information as to the fire consuming the 250 men who offered incense.

According to the Critical theory there were two accounts of movements by Korah, one in which he himself, a Levite, was at the head of 250 princes of the congregation, not all Levites, assailing the priestly character of the tribe of Levi; and another in which Korah at the head of 250 Levites assailed the predominance of Aaron over the tribe. We are not told by Criticism whether these uprisings were distinct, or whether they are combined in the present narrative because they were regarded by the ultimate compiler as identical, or whether one or both of them were combined with Dathan's movement. In any case, such accounts of them, if they existed, must have been supposed by their authors to be statements of fact, and must have been accepted as true by their compiler, whoever he was. The present question is, Could Moses, with or without the assistance of Aaron, have written all or any of them? Obviously he could have supplied the facts stated to be within his own knowledge; and could also have received, from Aaron and others, information as to matters within their own knowledge; and could have combined these accounts with his own. None of them contradict the facts said to be within the knowledge of Moses. And if he was not aware of the supposed double movement by Korah, in each case at the head of 250 men, he may well have considered that the account, as it now stands, does not record any such plurality of movements. Even if, as much bewildered as the modern reader must be on Critical assumptions, he could not solve the

problem, he may, as the compiler is said to have done, have simply recorded the facts so far as he could ascertain them. In any case, he could have furnished the accounts of his own experience, and Aaron and others could have done the same. And there would be no necessity to wait until the Exile, or later, to combine the contemporary accounts. If the scribes of later days added to or altered the contemporary accounts—which must undoubtedly have come down to them, and probably in writing—why should not the confusion, if there is any, be charged to these unknown and comparatively irresponsible redactors, and not to the inspired leaders of the nation? On entirely human lines the above considerations are surely sound. And any compiler who had the full “Sources” before him could have combined them better than modern critics can now do.

The obvious fact is that, without any knowledge of the circumstances under which the account, as it stands, took its present shape, we are entirely in the dark as to the matter, and have no sufficient grounds for inferences as to the way in which the three supposed discordant accounts came to be combined, if they ever existed. Such knowledge would, most probably, explain the appearances, perhaps in a very simple way, which we should never have guessed. We cannot, however, infer from what is presented by the narrative, even with the critical dislocation and interpretation of it, that none of the three accounts was Mosaic, or a contemporary account. If the accounts are, as is suggested, hopelessly discordant, they do not justify the conclusion that none of them is true, or Mosaic; since the discordance may, as already observed, be due to later alterations or additions. Criticism, moreover, insists that later additions have been made; P having, according to the theory, supplemented his first story. Dr. Driver says¹ “Such a representation of their *common* action” as the narrative, as it stands, presents “is not probable, except upon the supposition of a combination of two narratives describing the course of it from different sides, or points of view.” The “alliance,” as he calls such a combination, is, as he admits, “in itself not incredible”; why, then, should it be incredible that one person should describe what is one combined movement? Must there be as many narratives, or more, as there are

¹ “Introduction,” p. 65.

parties, even if described from their various sides? If Moses and Aaron saw different sides or aspects of it, or looked at it from different "points of view," could not one of them write a narrative giving both sides or points of view? But if two people are necessary two people are available, Moses and Aaron. The partition is merely a desperate effort to dislocate the story, and then to detach the narrative, entirely or partially, from the Mosaic period, and to date the component parts centuries after and centuries apart. At the same time P is not only allowed but compelled to give two accounts of part of the transaction from different points of view. He also abandons his characteristic "Elohim" for "Jehovah" in doing so. No explanation of this singularity appears.

The mechanism of partition is very clearly visible. There are two parties, whose fate differs; there is consequently an opening for some difference of treatment. There is, however, still some difficulty in making the partition. Although there is the distinction between Levites and other tribes to start with, there is no "literary" distinction which enables the critic to sever the descriptions of the two—or three—parties, who are described as confederates, if not as actually united. There is, moreover, express connection between the parties in their fate, for it is stated that the "tabernacle of Korah, Dathan and Abiram" was swallowed up (xvi, 24, 27). This difficulty, however, is sought to be evaded in the usual way, by substituting¹ "Jehovah" for the unsuitable names of Korah, Dathan and Abiram. It is said that it is a novelty in prose, to use "tabernacle" of a *human* habitation, although the Septuagint also uses "tabernacle." Perhaps these malcontents set up a "tent of meeting" of their own. The structure "swallowed up" was not "the tabernacle of Jehovah." In any case, if a substitution is to be made, it would be more legitimate to substitute a more appropriate term for "tabernacle"—in harmony with the narrative—than to substitute "Jehovah" for "Korah, Dathan and Abiram" and so to falsify and stultify the narrative!

There is no evidence to show the objective existence of these three narratives; no apparent necessity for more than one; no clue to the purpose of P in writing or colouring two

¹ *Ante*, p. 124. Driver, "Introduction," p. 65.

accounts from different points of view; no hint of how they came to be all combined, or who combined them, or with what object; above all, nothing to displace the statements of the narrative, whether composite or not. There is the usual profusion of speculation, and the usual destitution of proof.

Numbers xvii is cited as showing that the contest described in Num. xvi is tribal. What is related in ch. xvii is that after the destruction of the rebels, by which Aaron had been shown to be indeed chosen of Jehovah, as against the rebels, his rod, representing the tribe, of which his headship had thus been attested, was made to blossom, to be a witness to the sacred character of the tribe itself, now purged of its rebellious character, as compared with the other tribes. This vindication seems very appropriate after a formidable rebellion, calculated to impair the claims of the tribe to which the assailed leaders belonged; claims which the revolt had failed to overthrow. It does not raise any inference that the issues involved in the controversy were other than those appearing in the narrative, as it stands.

It is difficult to understand how the original author or compiler of the narrative could have combined the accounts which Criticism finds so inconsistent. It is equally, or more difficult to see how the discordant accounts could have arisen, especially in an age when, as is now allowed, although formerly strenuously denied, writing was in common use; and when tradition was not left to rely upon oral transmission alone. The discordance, however, is not established; it depends in this, as in most cases, upon the critical tearing asunder, and the Critical interpretation.

Doublets.

The splitting up of an apparently continuous narrative into two, or more, discordant "Sources" does, indeed, as already remarked, facilitate the severance in date of the supposed component "Sources." It does not, however, preclude their being contemporary with the events recorded, or with each other. The support which is sought from the severance is still to seek, and can only be found in satisfactory evidence of the actual dates of the "Sources."

These "Sources" cannot be accepted as "nearly complete." They always lack something, usually something material, if not vital. In order to sever them, however, Criticism must put its own interpretation on the suspected

members of the original body, so as to find that they are discrepant or discordant, often hopelessly so; or, if not, Criticism must sternly refuse to allow them to be harmonized. What is the inference? Is it not that the method is hopelessly wrong? Can the destruction of the narrative be accepted as the vindication, the triumph of the method? Does it not condemn it as entirely fallacious? That which purported to be a contemporary narrative—at any rate, as to much of it—is made out to be a discredited collection of materials destitute of authority, and pronounced by Criticism to be “unhistorical,” less credible than ordinary history, not to speak of its “presupposed Inspiration,” so conspicuous by its absence.

It would, however, require something very different from this strange artificial treatment to displace belief in its substantial truth, to which, moreover, thirty centuries have given entire credit. If these imaginary “Sources” ever existed they could, at most, have formed a counter-tradition to that which has outlived them.

The alleged “parallel” stories just examined may give a sufficient idea of the method and results of Criticism in its attempt to partition the Pentateuch. The later Criticism aims at “lifting out” the legislation, placed by Tradition in the Wilderness, and setting it down at the Exile or later. The possibility of achieving this aim was suggested by the use of the Divine Names in Genesis, such use being there more striking than in the subsequent books, and more favourable to the suggestion that the use of the Divine Names was due to a preference of the respective Divine Names by different writers or compilers. Such distinctive use seems to die away in the subsequent books, and to give place to indiscriminate indications. Even if Genesis could be partitioned by the test of the Divine Names, and their alleged “concomitants,” the Critical purpose would be little advanced, as the Law had not then been given; and it is the Law—contained in the section labelled P—which has to be lifted out. We are not, therefore, concerned, for our purpose, with Genesis, which is separated in its contents from our account of the first of the Wilderness legislation by a long but uncertain period, the events with which Genesis closes being some 430 years before those in the early chapters of Exodus. Criticism seems to contemplate that the P section was mainly written or compiled, but not without the use of older sources, at or after the Exile.

Whether the preference of the Name "Elohim" was a peculiarity of Ezra or of some early writer or compiler of, *ex hypothesi*, a fragment of P, whose preference was shared, in a diminishing degree, by successive writers or compilers, does not appear. Obviously during the period between the Wilderness life and the Exile this strange preference must have been more or less artificially preserved—unless, as already suggested, the use was appropriate, and not arbitrary or capricious. The problem is rendered more than doubly difficult by the corresponding preference of the Name "Jehovah," attributed, on similar grounds, to J; E too had his preference for "Elohim"—which happened to coincide with that of P.

As the aim of the present discussion is to examine whether anything has been proved by Criticism which requires the surrender of the Traditional history, the partition of Genesis, if it could be effected, would only affect the issue by disposing the mind to receive with more favour the claim of Criticism to have carried the partition into the period of legislation, placed by the Tradition, in substance, entirely in the Wilderness.

We have seen the strange dislocation of the narrative produced by the manipulation of the Tradition by Criticism, without any fresh evidence and resting upon the opinion of Scholars, and presumably upon analogies with other histories, of other races, places and times, and of other religions and entirely unverified by facts. The question whether conclusions on such grounds, even if perfectly worked out, could displace the simple, natural Traditional account, which could be so easily handed down, that the entire Law was, in substance, given through Moses in the Wilderness, has already been, to some extent, dealt with. How far the Critical conclusions are from being convincingly worked out may be judged from the discussion of the Critical theory of Partition already sketched, and to be elaborated presently.¹ It seems plain that the Tradition is split into a tangle or jumble of fragments, which by the same process could be triturated into dust, more suitable for moulding into "nearly complete" narratives as the particles become more absolutely independent of each other, and so lend themselves more completely to Critical manipulation and "reconstruction."

¹ See p. 137

The legitimacy of the process is assumed without pretence of proof. Innumerable elements, "welded" together by a succession of editors, redactors, &c., of none of whom is there a pretence of proof, are offered to us as the basis of the present narrative, and are the materials for a reconstruction which, whenever attempted, hardly stops short of Destruction.

To surrender the Tradition to such futile assailants as the opinions, suggestions, and conjectures of scholars, could only show that the Tradition had not been seriously accepted. If the Tradition could be thus disintegrated and remoulded, the original framers of it must have had the entire mass, or heap, of materials before them, and could have framed it incomparably better than they have done.

Partition. The Critical Procedure.

The theory of the composite character of the Pentateuch is said to be confirmed by constant differences of style, accompanied by differences of representation, doublets, want of connection, awkwardness (which means apparently want of smoothness or fluency), inconsistency, &c.; but absence of these features does not protect the writings from partition.

The differences between JE and P are, indeed, said to be "palpable,"¹ unmistakable, and the points of juncture often plain and obvious. But JE itself is also said to produce the conviction of compositeness, even when its constituent parts cannot be separated on account of the absence of all or most of these distinctive marks. This judgment seems to render the tests almost superfluous! The opinion of the critic is to suffice!

The similarity of the narratives of J and E is held to be due to the similarity of subject.² The points of juncture are not plain or obvious, and, in some cases, cannot be discerned. Still they (J and E) are pronounced separate, although they are sometimes inseparable! All the "Sources" use both the Divine Names, yet the use of these Names is the primary basis of partition. Each "Source"³ uses, more or less, what is claimed as distinctive of the others, including their style; yet their severance is decreed. All the distinctive marks of a particular "Source"

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 116.

² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 99. See p. 81.

are seldom found together, yet sections are classed as belonging to a particular "Source" upon a partial fulfilment of the distinctive requirements; and the full characteristics of the "Source" appear to be collected from all the passages ultimately allotted to that "Source" and this aggregate of characteristics is then made to serve as a standard of the characteristics of the particular "Source," although each item of the "Source" had been already adjudged to that "Source" in advance, on the strength of its displaying some of the characteristics included from time to time in the characteristics required in the ambulatory standard, which, like a snowball, grows as it rolls along.

It is evident that the characteristics are a mere rope of sand. The items have been adjudged to a particular "Source" on the display by them of some features which are afterwards treated as contributing to form a standard, because the items of which the standard or aggregate of characteristics is made up have been already adjudged to belong to that "Source." The result reminds us of the optical illusion by which a point of light or colour rapidly revolving appears to form a complete and continuous circle!

Finally all these dribblets of the respective "Sources" form intermittent rills or meandering streamlets, the various parts of which, described in a prodigality of question-begging epithets, as "plain, unmistakable, irresistible," &c., must have been always as visible as now. The more emphatically they are declared to stare the reader in the face, and to refuse to be ignored, the more plain is it that they could never have escaped notice! The Tradition has, however, ignored or rejected the inferences peremptorily declared to arise from them. It is, indeed, modestly suggested¹ that former generations did not study the books so carefully, in some respects, as Critical students have done. If careful study is needed, the alleged phenomena cannot be so unmistakable after all. And it is only on unmistakable grounds that a partition of a work which purports and appears to be a unity can be supported.

The Treatment of Tradition.

According to Critical theory the "working over" of the various books, already noticed, occurred frequently at all

¹ Driver, "Introduction," preface, p. vii.

times, and up to a late date, a further and thorough "working over" taking place at the admission of the various books into the Canon. When the various books were admitted into the Canon, it cannot have been improper that they should have been carefully scrutinized, and corrected, if necessary. But proof is needed of the handling of them alleged by Criticism.

These various redactions were, it is said, influenced, if not controlled, by the ideas prevailing at the time; to which, according to Criticism, the records were made to conform. Criticism does not recognize any such force in the witness of the Tradition as would guarantee the preservation of the substantial identity of the books throughout this singular process. On the contrary, it maintains that at some uncertain date it inverted the history, placing in Mosaic times legislation and institutions coming into existence centuries later, and which the operators in the work of composition, redaction, &c., then saw around them. Evidently, on this theory, it is impossible to say that any particular feature of the completed work is characteristic of anybody but the editor, redactor, &c. The supposed "Sources," as now made to appear, can no longer be securely treated as original, still less as inspired. They must have undergone the same manipulation as the rest of the record. Every fresh division made by Criticism introduces a fresh author, with a fresh probability, or rather certainty, of manipulation by a plurality of hands, until all that is left of the history, or of the legislation, is what the ultimate editors chose to represent it to be. But for their imperfect success in effecting their design nothing definite would have been known with certainty of the genuine history or legislation except so far as it agreed with what they saw around them, or thought fit to adopt. What Criticism invites us to believe is that the traces of other systems, which did not fall in with current ideas, and which they were intent on burying, are, nevertheless, plainly and unmistakably visible, and in sufficient abundance to enable Criticism to disinter enough of the skeleton to justify it in reconstructing the buried organism! And it claims to fix authoritatively the "characteristics" of "Sources," without any apparent means of discriminating between the original writer and a line of operators bent upon moulding the original "Source" into conformity with ideas current from time to time. This

theory has a double edge, and turns against those who rely upon it.

The ancient view is as superior in simplicity as in credibility. The Tradition sufficiently attests the substantial identity of the Scriptures, as we have them, with the original records, even if it does not guarantee that they have not been subjected to immaterial additions or alterations. These modifications, if any, may possibly be human in a greater degree than the substance of the record. In all there may be a human element, in which there may be error; less error, however, than in entirely human works.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CRITICS AND MOSES.

Authorship of the Pentateuch.

IT is not essential to the traditional view that Moses should have written the whole or, indeed, any part of the Pentateuch, as we now have it; or that it should be the work of one man; or even that it should be of the Mosaic period. It is essential for Criticism—which claims to displace belief in the truth of the Tradition—to disprove it. To do this, Criticism must disconnect it from Moses, and from his time. Without such disproof the Tradition must stand, as the sufficient and only available evidence, supported, as it is, by the acceptance of Our Lord and of all ages. Disproof of it is a vital necessity for Criticism; which vainly tries to evade that necessity by clamouring that it is a mere matter of date and literary authorship that is in issue. If its Mosaic date, or its unity of authorship, is disproved, the dislocation, which Criticism has attempted, is conceivably possible, although as yet the attempt has failed. If Moses was not the author of the Book, the Tradition is not thereby discredited as to the truth of its contents. Criticism itself insists that such an accretion to the Tradition as that Moses was its author might “easily” creep into a genuine and true tradition; and even goes much further in claiming the support of such “accretions,” the cardinal point of its case being that the present work has inverted the true history through a *bonâ fide* mistake of its compilers as to the whole Law being given in the Wilderness, a mistake which came to be embodied in the Tradition, and is an “accretion” which falsified it.

Criticism cannot, however, *assume*, as it does, that such an accretion *did* happen, because it *might* happen. When it is necessary to prove tradition to be mistaken substantial facts must be proved, even if the possibility, or probability, of such a mistake were admitted, which is, of course, entirely denied. Possibility or probability cannot be made to do duty for proof.

Criticism cannot pretend to show that Moses wrote none of it. Proof, even that he wrote none of the work, as we have it now, proves nothing at all to the point, if the present work has undergone the "working over" alleged by Criticism; the question in that case would be what was contained in the original history. The tradition that the events narrated in the present account are true, and were substantially recorded and handed down by Moses, would still be the only and sufficient evidence; this could not be displaced by anything but surer and more trustworthy evidence contradicting the Tradition. The acceptance of the Tradition, although that is now alleged to be an inversion of the true course of events, sufficiently attests its substantial identity and truth.

As to the question of fact, how much, if anything, Moses put in writing on the events of his time, the early efforts of Criticism to rob him of any share in the written Tradition, have recoiled on its own self-confident head. It disposed of the question in its own oracular way by declaring that the art of writing was unknown to the Jews in the Wilderness, a decision of the same dogmatic character as that which we are now invited to accept as proof, or disproof, when evidence is lacking. This unlucky judgment has the great, if precarious, advantage of seeming to discredit the express statements in the Pentateuch that Moses was commanded to write part of what now (Ex. xvii, 14) appears in the Pentateuch, which he could not do, unless miraculously enabled. It has, however, to the humiliation of Criticism, proved to be an exception to its rule that its decrees dispense with proof; for it is now admitted that writing was in frequent, and, indeed, in almost common use in Canaan at that time. Moses had, moreover, experience of a wider culture than the rest of the Hebrews, and than most Egyptians. It has already been pointed out that Moses was uniquely fitted to write the bulk of the Pentateuch, as we now have it; much of which deals with facts originally known only to himself; and the rest would, even according to mere human experience, come under his supervision, even if he did not pen the whole of it. Criticism, therefore, fails to discredit the Tradition when it says that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, nor can it limit the actual share of Moses to anything short of the entire work, or exclude any part relating to events in his lifetime.

"The Book of the Law" found in the Temple is not

further described, except that it was "the Law of the Lord given by Moses" (2 Chr. xxxiv, 14), the Book of the Covenant (2 Kings, xxiii, 21). Whatever had been mislaid seems to have been found; and there is no sign of its being a new work, although its precepts had not always been generally observed. There is not sufficient evidence to prove that it was the entire Pentateuch. Criticism, which always claims that the statements of the Pentateuch must be proved afresh, cannot demand that those who accept the Tradition should require fresh proof; they are, on the contrary, awaiting *disproof* of the Tradition. They can, however welcome the evidence which Criticism admits as proof of the existence of something resembling Deuteronomy, while the Critical story of its origin, unsupported by proof as it is, fails to convince.

There are various supposed discrepancies which Criticism relies upon as showing that the Pentateuch, as we now have it, was not written in the Wilderness, although, as already remarked, a Mosaic date or authorship is not essential to the traditional view, which only requires the substantial truth to facts of the history of Mosaic times; it is, of course, not a matter of indifference whether it was written, or its materials collected, in the Wilderness, since Moses ended his life there.

It is said that there is positive evidence on its face that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses, or in the Wilderness at all.¹

It is by no means necessary, as already remarked, that Moses should have written the entire Pentateuch, or even that it should have been entirely written or compiled under the directions of Moses; or that, as it now stands, it should be all of one age. It does not appear that the Tradition so declares. The Jews, indeed, considered that all the Law and the Prophets lay in the Pentateuch "in germ";² and it is thus possible, although no satisfactory instance can be produced, that subsequent modifications—under Divine sanction—may have been incorporated with it. It is, however, certain that it embodied and regulated customs, institutions, practices, and principles more ancient than itself, as in the case of circumcision, which was, and is

¹ Robertson Smith, *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, pp. 325-327.

² *Ibid.*, p. 313.

shown in it to have been, "of the Fathers."¹ Where additions or modifications appear, there is no possible ground for differing from the Jews of old with regard to them. This generation cannot, without fresh evidence, pretend to know more than they knew, or to reject or accept in opposition to them.

When Laish is called "Dan" in Deut. xxxiv, 2, it is obvious that, apart from a revelation that it would be so called at a future time, it must have been so described after the name was given; and if that was not until after the death of Joshua, neither Moses nor Joshua could have written the passage as it stands. But there is no reason at all why the name when given should not have been substituted in the text for Laish.² Here there is no fresh fact to deal with. The Jews knew, at least as well as we do, all that is needed for a correct judgment. Similarly with regard to peculiarities of language;³ they are on the surface, and the Jews were at least as competent to form correct judgments as to their significance as we can be. They knew, as well or better than we can know, whether these peculiarities indicated different authorship. In all such cases some generation must have known the origin of them. Notwithstanding these features, they still held the Pentateuch to have originated with Moses, and to be largely assignable to him. There is no difficulty in reconciling peculiarities of language, or even a considerable diversity of authorship, with this conclusion.

But it is contended that some phrases of the present Pentateuch show distinctly that it was written in Canaan, and could not have been written in the Wilderness.⁴

Even if this were proved, it would not affect the original record, unless this present narrative is that record—which Criticism denies.

The use of the word "Negeb" is confidently relied upon as an undoubted instance in point. "Negeb" is said to mean "parched land," and to be, in "Hebrew, the proper name of the dry steppe district in the south of Judah."⁵

Now "in Hebrew" it is said "the common phrase for

¹ John vii, 22.

² Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 325.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

"westward" is "seaward," and for "southward" "towards the Negeb"; and it is urged that "these expressions for west and south could only be formed within Palestine. Yet they are used in the Pentateuch, not only in the narrative but in the Sinaitic ordinance for the tabernacle in the Wilderness (Exod. xxvii). But at Mount Sinai the sea did not lie to the west, and the Negeb was to the north. Moses could no more call the south side the Negeb side of the tabernacle than a Glasgow man could say that the sun set over Edinburgh. The answer attempted to this is that the Hebrews might have adopted these phrases in patriarchal times, and never given them up in the ensuing 430 years; but that is nonsense. When a man says "towards the sea" he means it. The Egyptian Arabs say "seaward" for "northward," and so the Israelites must have done when they were in Egypt.

One may agree that when a man says "towards the sea" he means it. The question here is, however, what words he uses to express that meaning. The Hebrew Patriarchs, after long residence in Canaan, certainly carried their language with them to Egypt. If "towards the Negeb" and "seaward" had then come to be equivalents in Canaan of "southward" and "westward" they would naturally continue to be so used, especially among themselves. When speaking to the Egyptians or Arabs they would no doubt endeavour to use language intelligible to them.

"Deccan," now a proper name, was originally, like "Negeb," used for "South," its actual meaning being "Sun" or "sunward"; the Sun would be "South" to people North of the Tropics, and "Deccan" thus became a proper name for "South." But it has come to be used by people at all points of the compass, and has thus become the "proper name" of an extensive plateau in the south of India, just as "Negeb" and "seaward" became "proper names" to people in Palestine and elsewhere.

The inference that the expression found its way into the language after the settlement in Canaan under Joshua is, therefore, a gratuitous assumption, if it is possible that the Patriarchs used it, and that their descendants retained it. Such an inference requires fuller knowledge.

Finally, there is no fresh fact brought forward; and the utmost that can be inferred is that the word "Negeb" might have been a later insertion in Canaan. All that is

now urged was at least equally obvious to the Jews; but did not convince them that the Pentateuch, or perhaps, even this passage, was not in use in the Wilderness. Even if it is a subsequent correction made to render the narrative intelligible in later times, it leaves the authorship of the rest of the Pentateuch untouched. If, as Criticism contends, the Pentateuch was written at a late period, and made to speak as if written in the Wilderness, the late authors must have overlooked the incongruity of using "Negeb" for "South," and nobody noticed the blunder.

Then it is said that the Pentateuch shows a much more exact topographical knowledge of Palestine than of the Wilderness. In the case of the Wilderness it is said that it only gives the names of places, while it gives details of Palestine corresponding to its condition in later times, e.g., Gen. xii, 8; xxxiii, 18; xxxv, 19, 20. Gen. xii, 8, speaks of Abram pitching his tent, "having Bethel on the West and Ai on the East"; Gen. xxxiii, 18, tells us that Jacob came "to the city of Shechem when he came from Padanaram, and encamped before the city." Gen. xxxv, 19, 20, relates that Rachel "was buried in Ephrath (the same is Bethlehem) and Jacob set up a pillar upon her grave; the same is the Pillar of Rachel's grave unto this day." Whatever view the Jews took of these passages we might contentedly accept; they cannot have escaped their attention.

The Pentateuch was read through in the Synagogue every three years.¹ The instances cited above are not very impressive; and the notes at the time of writing only show that they were made after, but do not show how long after, the occurrences mentioned. It can hardly be supposed that the writer of this history had no materials to guide him except personal knowledge, as the Criticism would seem to imply. That the details relating to Canaan were of much greater interest to later generations than those relating to the Wilderness is obvious, and may have contributed to "a want of local colour," such as "the story of an eye-witness is sure to possess" if he aims at it, and is qualified to attain it. It may, however, be that the Wilderness did not supply "local colour" very abundantly; and, in any case, the preservation of it was not particularly required in the history, which was naturally more occupied with the details of the permanent home of Israel.

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 173.

It can hardly be supposed that Moses, waiting in the Wilderness, could not be possessed of such rudimentary knowledge of Canaan as the instances above cited display. He had travelled a good deal himself, he had sent the spies into the country, and could, and probably did, obtain from travellers sufficient knowledge of the country and its people to enable him to write what he was credited with writing, and to add the tinge of local colour referred to.¹ And as to the incidents in the lives of the Patriarchs which are cited, they are presumably couched in the language those Patriarchs themselves would have used when they were in Canaan, and probably were so handed down from that time; together, perhaps, with the notes showing absence of change up to the time of writing, such as, "it is there to this day," &c. In any case, if Moses wrote the Pentateuch, he was a compiler as to this part of it; he was a compiler of a record for future use, and he may have left these passages as he found them, or have verified by report their correctness. The rest of the Pentateuch is unaffected if these notes, or even the entire passages cited, were later insertions.

Another objection is that the Pentateuch (Num. xxi, 14) cites the Book of the Wars of the Lord, which wars, the same critic considers, had hardly begun; as well as a poem referring to a victory over Sihon (Num. xxi, 27 sq.), "which took place at the very end of the forty years wandering."² The events, however, took place in Moses' lifetime, and these references might begin with the events. The Jews were not disturbed by these details, nor need we be, whatever view may be taken of them. They held that, whatever other materials might be incorporated into the Pentateuch, it always contained the Law as delivered to Moses, which was, at lowest, the core of all law and religion to the Jews. The Critics are compelled to admit that Moses laid the foundations of the ceremonial and sacrificial law—at any rate of that in Deuteronomy—as well as of the moral law,³ but still refuse to accept the only evidence of his work in the Wilderness.

¹ Better contemporary evidence—which is insisted on—there could hardly be.

² Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 327.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

Authorship of Deuteronomy.

DEUTERONOMY is said to be based upon J, but portions of J, which it is assumed, or inferred, were before the compiler, were not embodied in Deuteronomy, and are, consequently, now lost.¹ As the Critical theory requires or desires these supposed lost portions, they have to be restored by the imagination. It is the same process as is followed in order to complete the fragments of "Sources," which are themselves imaginary, by supposing each of them to have been once complete, although only a portion of each is preserved, the rest owing its existence only to the Critical imagination.

The Pentateuch claims to be a substantially true account of the events which it records. The Critics, however, maintain that when the Pentateuch states that "God spake to Moses" He did not, in most cases, speak thus to Moses, or in the time of Moses at all. It contends that some unknown writers at much later dates, not earlier than a century before Josiah's reign,² concocted the story of a revelation to Moses, of the nature of that in Deuteronomy, which was first published in Josiah's reign, when both king and people forthwith accepted it as the Divine law. We learn from the history, and Criticism cannot dispute the statement, that they were smitten with dismay and remorse at their supposed past unfaithfulness to that law, a state of mind quite unintelligible on the Critical theory that it was then produced for the first time, but perfectly natural if it originated, as it professed to do, in the Wilderness, and if, as the history declares, it had been lost to sight, and was then found in the Temple. The Critics also maintain that "the Book of the Law" then produced included only parts of Deuteronomy; because the references the narrative makes to institutions are held to be references to Deuteronomy alone. The value of this latter inference must obviously depend upon whether there was any necessity, or, at least, occasion for reference, in the story of its production, to other parts of the Pentateuch. The Critical view is founded on silence!

Now it is abundantly clear from the story of the production of the "Book of the Law," however interpreted, that both king and people were smitten with remorse and dismay

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 84.

² 2 Kings xxii, 8, 14; 2 Chronicles xxxiv, 8.

because they had disobeyed the newly produced Law. Their disobedience must, indeed, have been more or less unconscious, even if the Book had been only mislaid; but such a feeling as remorse or dismay could have had no conceivable place if the Book then produced contained laws of which they had never heard, and which they had no means of knowing or obeying, because they did not exist. It seems plain that, although they did not know the precise details of the Law, because it had been lost to sight—not, perhaps, without fault on their part, as they may have felt—yet it was known to exist, and they had some recollection and a general knowledge of it. The Critical theory, therefore, based, as it is, on no other evidences than inferences from an arbitrary interpretation of the history, adopted to suit it, collapses.

In order to give even a colour of plausibility to such a theory, it is necessary to show that somebody deliberately composed a fictitious history, placing the giving of the Law as occurring in the Wilderness through Moses, although nobody had ever heard that the law so produced had ever been given in the Wilderness, or to Moses, or at all; and even although everybody knew it never had been so given; and that, to the knowledge of them all, it was then produced for the first time. But that is not all. According to the Critics no law of the kind had been given in the Wilderness; and, in fact, the early law—given, according to the Critics, nobody knows where, or when—is said to have sanctioned the High Places; the prohibition of the High Places being first made in the new law then produced.¹ The existence of the High Places, therefore, was no breach of any previous law, whether given in the Wilderness or elsewhere. The king and people, however, expressed deep remorse for their allowance of the High Places (which had, according to the Critics, been sanctioned by Jehovah Himself), and proceeded to destroy them!

We have here a case similar, in one respect, to that made against the Davidic Psalms. Moses, who can hardly have been known as a lawgiver, according to the Critics, and who

¹ Ps. lxxviii, 60, says that Jehovah "forsook the tabernacle in Shiloh"—in Eli's time—because the people "grieved him with their hill-altars." And Jeremiah, speaking in the name of Jehovah, tells the people to go to Shiloh "where I put my name at the first, and see what I did to it for the wickedness of my people Israel." Jer. vii, 12-14 (Cp. Jer. xxvi, 6).

certainly, according to them, proclaimed there none but simple moral laws, such as "the Ten Words," is credited with a body of law of a varied character, known, moreover, to be then for the first time produced, and which, therefore, could not possibly have emanated from him in the Wilderness. David in the same way, who is hardly allowed to have composed a single Psalm, is credited with a whole collection of Psalms, most of which, as Criticism declares, proclaim, on the face of them, that they could not have been composed by him; but seem, according to the Critics, to have been studiously based upon situations in which he never could have been placed.

Pentateuch. Unknown before the Exile.

The contention that a large part of the Pentateuch is of late origin is mainly founded (1) on ignorance of its existence, supposed to be shown not only by the alleged silence of subsequent writers as to its contents, but also by a long course of important deviations, from both the letter and spirit of the Law, a course said to be unbroken down to the Exile, or, at any rate, down to the time of Josiah's Reformation, and (2) on the tone and actual declarations of Prophets, showing, besides similar ignorance, disapproval of, and even hostility to, principles and precepts contained in the Pentateuch.

The contention that such ignorance prevailed raises a question which the Critics ignore, viz., whether silence, and even failure to observe, may not have arisen from some cause other than ignorance. The experience of all generations has sufficiently shown that knowledge and corresponding practice are not indissolubly linked together. One might infer from the conduct of many Christians that they are not aware of the principles of the Gospel; and, from the conduct even of the best, ignorance of some principles regarded by others as vital might often be inferred. Indeed, it is common, especially in theological controversies, to find suggestions that an obnoxious view, which is the subject of attack, argues great ignorance of vital Christian principles. But when we find Samuel, who is said not to have been a priest, and yet to have performed priestly functions, and otherwise flagrantly violated the Levitical legislation, as interpreted by the Critics, it is considered an inevitable inference that he knew nothing of it! The possibility that he knew of it and interpreted it differently, or that he had some other

reason for the course he took, is silently ignored, and the question thus begged. And this mode of dealing with the matter appears still more extraordinary when it is remembered that, during many centuries, the Jews unquestionably regarded the Pentateuch as of Mosaic authorship, and yet regarded Samuel, David, and all the other eminent and pious Israelites who are said to have systematically ignored its existence, as undoubtedly inspired. The reasons why laws are ignored, or appear to be ignored, must be a matter for investigation. It cannot be *assumed* to be ignorance alone; ignorance is often obviously not the sole or true cause.¹

The Israelites might regard such deviations from the Law as immaterial, or authorized; but, if they were regarded as serious and blamable, the suggestion of ignorance would still need to be proved. The argument of the Critics assumes, however, that such ignorance is the most natural and probable explanation of the alleged failure to follow strictly the Levitical law as interpreted by the Critics. Such a conclusion really decides the question in dispute, and amounts to an assumption that there was no such Law in existence.

It is alleged that many breaches of the Levitical law were committed, not only by private individuals, but also by those charged with its administration, and that such breaches prove that no such law was in force, and consequently could not have been enacted in the Wilderness.

Now, although without more evidence than the Tradition supplies, it may now, very probably, be impossible to say why, if the charges are true, Samuel and others acted as they did, there may be other solutions of the problem which are, at least, as probable as that of there being no such law in existence. And the Jews were, all along, plainly satisfied with some other solution. Modern Critics add nothing to the facts; and they must be very decidedly less qualified to appreciate the true bearings of the known facts than the Jews themselves. The supposed late editors, who are

¹ The history of the Ornaments Rubric in the Book of Common Prayer is an instructive analogy. This rubric, which regulates all the furniture and ceremonial of the Church, became a dead letter practically from the time of its enactment in 1548 until the time of the Tractarian Revival three hundred years later. Yet there is no doubt that it has been printed continuously in the Prayer Book during all that time.

alleged to have "worked over" the Historical books, as well as other books, missed the alleged obvious inference, or did not attempt to meet it, although persistently reiterating that the entire Law was enacted in the Wilderness.

A primitive people, claiming to have any religion, could surely not be without some law of sacrifice and priesthood. Some law, of custom or usage, regulating ritual and ceremonial must have been, as Tradition asserts, in existence in the Wilderness. Additions may possibly have been made in later times. The method of Jehovah's dealings with His people displayed a large measure of condescension and accommodation to their imperfect ideas and habits; and one would have supposed that a "judicious Criticism," which is so abundantly and obtrusively satisfied with its own superiority, would have recognized that the law which was to be enforced might display the same characteristics. The Ceremonial Law might need to be enforced with discrimination; the Ten Commandments, for instance, are peremptory in their requirements. They were not, however, always obeyed, even by pious men. It may be said in reply that, at any rate, their authority was recognized. Even that would not be easy of proof, on Critical principles, from the Historical Books of the Bible. It would not be easy to show in early Jewish history any more distinct recognition of the Moral Law, as enacted, than of the Ceremonial Law. Many deviations from it occur; and they do not meet with the emphatic disapproval that they seem to deserve. Moreover, such disapproval as is expressed is not, apparently, based on the Commandments. Nathan, in condemning David, does not refer to either the sixth or the seventh Commandment. Some Critics, indeed, seem inclined, on similar grounds, to declare that much of the Moral Law was of later origin. These laws, whether moral or ceremonial, were not proclaimed as a mere rigid code, which was to be interpreted and administered by subordinate ministers, guided by their own unaided faculties. Jehovah Himself remained, according to the narrative, the present and active administrator of His own laws, through His appointed representatives. The laws themselves were set forth as a revelation of His will for His people; but they were, from beginning to end, only very imperfectly enforced or obeyed. At a late stage in Jewish history the Ceremonial Law may have been more strictly observed than it had been in earlier times. The people may, by hard discipline, have been

brought so far, although a stricter observance of the Ceremonial Law seems to have corresponded with a considerable falling off in obedience to more essential moral laws. The tendency to substitute observance of the Ceremonial code for fulfilment of the Moral code always beset the Jews, as it also besets all races and generations of men. Was not this what the prophets deplored and denounced, viz., the tendency to substitute obedience to the Ceremonial Law for obedience to the Moral Law, instead of adding moral to ceremonial obedience? "These ought ye to have done and not to leave the other undone."

The Ceremonial Law, however difficult its observance might be, was nevertheless intrinsically less difficult to fulfil than the Moral Law. It was, however, only ancillary to the moral and spiritual law. The prophets insisted upon this essential characteristic of it with an emphasis which was amply justified, but which should not mislead us into supposing that the Ceremonial Law was not obligatory. Viewed in this light the emphasis laid on the moral and spiritual law by the prophets does not in any way conflict with the binding force of the Ceremonial Law, but merely shows the true relations of the two—that the Ceremonial Law was part of that discipline which was to be, as St. Paul says, the Schoolmaster to bring the Jews to the moral and spiritual law, and thus to lead them to Christ.

Criticism maintains that no law as to sacrifice existed before the Exile. "Worship by sacrifice and all that belongs to it is no part of the Divine Torah to Israel."¹ And it contends, of course, that the Levitical Law of sacrifice did not exist.² The belief of the Jews to the contrary was a delusion—a delusion so persistent that the authors of the Levitical Law were led, or driven, to antedate it, and to place its enactment in the Wilderness.³

But for the insurmountable prepossession of the Jews in favour of so early a date, it would have been hardly possible to place the birth or infancy of the ritual law in surroundings which, according to the Critics, are so unnatural. That a law of sacrifice was given in the Wilderness was clearly the rooted belief of the people. This is shown by the narrative of the finding of the Book of Law; and no facts unknown

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 303.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 294-295.

³ See Lev. i, 1, and cp. Neh. ix.

to the Jews are produced, or can be produced, by Criticism to prove the contrary theory.

It was not recognized by the Jews that no law of Sacrifice existed, even after the prophets had, according to the Critics, most plainly and emphatically proclaimed the fact. They still persisted that such a law existed, and had its origin in the Wilderness. The prophets do not denounce this belief as a persistent error, which ought to have disappeared in the face of such declarations as that of Jeremiah (vii, 22) and others.¹

Jeremiah proclaims the word of Jehovah, "I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices." This is apparently regarded by Criticism, though it was not so regarded by those to whom it was addressed, as a Divine statement as to historical fact. It implies, however, that the Jews held sacrifice to be obligatory, and to have been included within the scope of the Mosaic legislation. We are usually invited to regard statements as to matters of human knowledge as not within the scope of Divine oracles; and, even when Our Lord speaks of the 110th Psalm as a Divine revelation through David, such a declaration is put aside, so far as it states historical fact, as irrelevant. In the present case it is in truth a most unjustifiable strain on the oracle to treat it as a statement of historical fact, to the effect that sacrifice had not been ordained in the Wilderness; for it is apparent from the context that it is part of an impassioned appeal to the people to place sacrifice in its true relation to obedience, an appeal not then made for the first time, but continually repeated and as constantly disregarded. Jehovah says, in effect, "Whatever directions I gave as to sacrifice were given in order to call forth and strengthen obedience, and were otherwise of no value." This appeal had been constantly made to them. Sacrifice was the channel and symbol of that communion with Jehovah, and of that complete dedication to His will, which was the aim of all their discipline. Samuel had given no less emphasis than Jeremiah to this relation of sacrifice to obedience when he said to Saul, "Behold! to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of ram" (1 Sam. xv, 22).

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 274.

When the Israelites left Egypt they are said to have pleaded that they were bound to sacrifice to Jehovah, and that they must take their flocks and herds with them for that purpose (Ex. x, 26). If the narrative is to be trusted, they had when they left Egypt no complete sacrificial law—"We know not with what we must serve the Lord until we come thither," i.e., to the Wilderness. We are invited to believe that they were allowed to go up to Canaan in the same state of uncertainty, there to withstand the allurements of idolatrous rituals to which they were, as their subsequent history proved, prone to succumb. We are invited to believe that, under these circumstances, they were left without any ritual or ceremonial guidance;¹ which, at the lowest, might help to distinguish them from the nations whom they were to extirpate. And we are asked to believe this theory of Critics as against the explicit Tradition, and the conviction of the race, which was that they were to be a peculiar and holy people, and that their training had for that purpose been actually conducted on the basis of the Pentateuchal laws. No new facts are produced to support such a theory. We are, moreover, invited to adopt this conclusion in direct contradiction to the narrative in the books held sacred alike by Jews and Christians; and, as already pointed out, without any other evidence than that which has always been available. Whatever Critics may claim to have discovered is less, not more, than was known to the Jews themselves. The Jews had no need of canons of literary or historical criticism to enable them to discover the deviations from the Levitical scheme, which are alleged by Criticism to be gross and unmistakable! The argument from silence is worked to death by Criticism; but no explanation is so much as suggested of the entire silence of all Jewish history and tradition as to any enactment, or any publication as a new code, of the Levitical law, except in the Wilderness.

The Law produced by Ezra was admittedly the same as that which we have now in the Pentateuch, and which was declared to be the Law of Moses, thus confirming the Jews in their unvarying conviction that the Pentateuch as we now have it is as old as the time of Moses.

It has been suggested already that the regulation of ritual and ceremonial law, such as the Levitical law provides,

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 397.

would be fitly placed at the stage at which the Pentateuch places it, as it admittedly prescribes a discipline eminently calculated to produce that separation and distinction which were to stamp Israel as a peculiar and holy people among the Canaanites and the surrounding nations. This separation and distinction Criticism declares to be a later Post-Exilic feature. It must, however, be incredible to one who believes in the Divine mission of Israel that they should have been left without guidance at such a crisis of their history, as was their entrance into the promised inheritance! It is really indisputable that the people brought with them out of Egypt some usages as to sacrifice and worship, which may reasonably be supposed either to have been already tainted by contact with idolatry, or, at any rate, to be liable to such taint. The Levitical scheme is apparently regarded by Criticism as having acquired, at some period, Divine authority, and therefore as representing the mind of Jehovah as to what was a suitable scheme of ritual for His people, at some stage of their history. But we are told that, at the time when Jehovah entered into covenant with them, He left them entirely without guidance as to these matters. And then, when they had been partially cured of lapsing into idolatry, and when the worst danger had passed away, the leaders of the people, under the guidance of the earlier Prophets—who had, it is said, been throughout emphatic in denouncing ritual, and in impressing upon the people that even sacrifice was not divinely prescribed or sanctioned—elaborated a scheme of sacrifice and ritual, and embodied it in a narrative which emphatically contradicts the Prophets, as interpreted by Criticism, by declaring that the Ceremonial Law, notoriously new, was proclaimed, in substance, in the Wilderness. Yet this statement met with unhesitating acceptance!

There is nothing surprising in the zeal for the Law, including the Ceremonial Law, displayed by the faithful in Israel after the Exile. The need which was met by its original enactment in the Wilderness had not wholly passed away, as far as human eyes could then see. The people had long been subject to idolatrous rulers, as had originally been their case in Egypt. They were returning to a land polluted with idolatry, both their own idolatry and that of the settlers who had been brought in to supplant them. It might well be felt as an urgent necessity that the Levitical discipline should at last be thoroughly enforced. When we read that

it was enforced more thoroughly than it had been since the days of Joshua, we recognize the enthusiasm and joy of the writer; the statement is, however, one which the contemporaries of Ezra and Nehemiah could not make of their own knowledge; and such a comparison is very difficult, or rather impossible, to make, even with all the aid of an unimpeachable tradition. The very comparison, however, implies that the same obligation to observe the Ceremonial Law was recognized as having existed at the time of Joshua, and was not a new obligation.

The nation, sifted by the Exile, ultimately became completely weaned from idolatry. But it was, as even Criticism admits, under this very ceremonial discipline that the cure was perfected, which is emphatic testimony to its efficacy as a discipline, and furnishes conclusive evidence of the fitness of its promulgation, in substance, in the Wilderness. There was a considerable number of features, similar to the Wilderness conditions, in those of the Return, and similar laws were suitable to both periods, those which fitted the one period "to a nicety" would fit the other equally well.

To contend that the Ceremonial Law was of human, not of Divine authority, would be, at least, intelligible. But to maintain that it was withheld and denounced until the tendency to idolatry had diminished, and was then introduced by those who had repudiated its Divine origin, is absurd. None of the supposed discrepancies or puzzles with which the Critics confront us can approach in intrinsic incongruity the course which they invite us to accept as that of the Divine dealings with Israel.

Testimony of the Historical Books.

Great stress is laid by Criticism upon the alleged silence of the historical books of Samuel and Kings as to the existence or observance of the Levitical law. On the other hand, little or no importance appears to be attached to the incessant and unvarying statements in other books of the Old Testament¹ affirming its existence, or to such indications of a law of sacrifice or priesthood as are found in the historical books themselves. The bulk of the references to the Levitical Law having been already removed to the Exile as part of the priestly code are thus put out of the way!

¹ See the "Higher Criticism and the Pentateuch," by Professor W. H. Green, pp. 43, 52.

If the Law had been given in the Wilderness, and, especially, if it had been reduced to writing, the writers of the historical books would have had no occasion to mention so notorious a fact. Reference to laws is comparatively rare in any history, even in modern times, and there is little occasion for such reference except in the case of breach of the Law, or of some notable instance of its observance, especially after a period of neglect, as in the case of Josiah's Passover, mentioned both in Chronicles and Kings (2 Chron. xxxv, 18, 19; 2 Kings xxiii, 21, 22), and of the Feast of Tabernacles after the Exile (Neh. viii, 17).

Silence as to the existence or observance of the Law could only imply that it was observed, and that mention of it was unnecessary, and that what was stated to be happening was in the usual course. History would only have occasion to mention breaches, or notable observances, of the law, or enactments of new laws, not ordinarily of old, well-known laws, or their observance, but only of whatever was unusual, whether breach or observance.

There are, however, statements in these books, Samuel and Kings, showing, quite incidentally, that a law governing sacrifice and priesthood was in existence. The Books of Joshua and Judges trace the conquest and settlement of Canaan; Samuel and Kings contain notices of the national history during the subsequent, but still early period; such indications of the religious and social system as appear being merely incidental, just as it is said incidentally, and only by way of explanation, that "there was no king in Israel and that every man did that which was right in his own eyes," and then the momentary glimpse into the social state of the country is abruptly shut out.

Even Criticism does not deny that a priesthood and a practice of sacrifice existed, although it contends that they rested upon *custom*, not upon express law.¹ It would, indeed, require some courage to assert that any of the ancient religions were without these institutions. And, if they existed, would sacrifice not be the *exclusive* function of the priesthood, even on "entirely human" analogies?

Still there are among these collateral incidents sufficient indications of the existence of a law of priesthood and sacrifice. Eli was the High Priest; but, apparently,

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 332.

nothing would have been heard of him but for his connection with the early life of Samuel, and with the loss of the Ark; both matters of national importance. There was clearly a ritual law in existence in his days. Criticism replies, "True, but it was not the Levitical law!" But there is a previous question, "Was it a Divine law?" for, if so, sacrifice was part of the Divine law.

This Divine law is found in the Pentateuch, as already given, although often imperfectly observed and even disregarded. The practice at Shiloh was obviously regarded both by Eli and the people as prescribed by a Divine law.¹ But it is again said that the ritual insisted upon as correct, by 1 Sam. ii, 13 *sq.*, R.V., deviates from the Levitical Law, and that such deviation shows that the Levitical Law, at any rate, was not in existence. The deviation is thus described by Mr. Robertson Smith:² "The great offence of Eli's sons was that they 'knew not Jehovah and the priest's dues from the people.' They made irregular exactions, and, in particular, would not burn the fat of the sacrifice till they had secured a portion of uncooked meat (1 Sam. ii, 12 *sq.*, R.V. marg.). Under the Levitical ordinance this claim was perfectly regular; the worshipper handed over the priest's portion of the flesh along with the fat, and part of the altar ceremony was to wave it before Jehovah (Lev. vii, 30 *sq.*, x, 15). But at Shiloh the claim was viewed as illegal and highly wicked. It caused men to abhor Jehovah's offering, and the greed which Eli's sons displayed in this matter is given as the ground of the prophetic rejection of the whole clan of priests of Shiloh (1 Sam. ii, 17, 29). This was apparently not the sole ground of rejection, as verse 22 relating to their gross immorality indicates."³

Now what the passage of Lev. vii, 29 to 32, partially cited above, says as to waving is: "He that offereth the sacrifice of his peace offerings unto the Lord shall bring his oblation unto the Lord out of the sacrifice of his peace offerings of the Lord made by fire; the fat with the breast shall he bring, that the breast may be waved for a wave offering before the Lord. And the priest shall burn the fat upon the altar, but the breast shall be Aaron's and his sons'. And the right thigh (marg. 'shoulder') shall ye give unto the priest for

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 332.

² *Ibid.*, p. 269.

³ *Ibid.*

a heave offering out of the sacrifices of your peace offerings." And Lev. x, 15 repeats the same injunctions in a condensed form. There is no mention of "seething"; and the narrative in 1 Sam. does not show what place it occupied in the sacrifice. In 1 Sam. ii it appears that the priest's servant insisted upon taking the priest's portion before the offerer had brought the fat and the breast to the priest, and before burning the fat. To an ordinary understanding it does not seem correct to say that "this claim was perfectly regular"; it would seem that both the fat and the breast were to be brought to the priest, the fat to be burnt, and the breast waved, and the right thigh heaved. Eli and the people agreed in repudiating and resenting the action of Eli's sons, which the Critics approve. Whichever of the parties was right, it is obvious that they all recognized that sacrifice was obligatory—yet the critic just quoted can find no recognition of that obligation! They all recognized that there was a binding ritual—again the Critic finds that there was none. They all recognized a Divinely organized, even if originally only customary priesthood at this time, Divinely ordained, the Critic differs from them all. Much more knowledge would be required to decide the question raised by Criticism. It is part of the Critical case that the present text insists on placing the giving of the Law in the Wilderness, and therefore regards that Law as obligatory at Shiloh, whatever corruptions may have crept into the actual practice.

But if the sons of Eli were making a claim in perfect accordance with the Levitical Law, where, except in that Law, did they find the justification of such a claim? Was it in the custom of the priests, and was that custom in conflict with the custom of the High Priest and of the people? And if the view of the rights of the priest, enforced by Eli's sons, came to be afterwards sanctioned, was its adoption due to their pious example? If it was a custom which was in accordance with the mind of Jehovah, as fitted for that stage of religious development, was it unfitted to be ordained in the Wilderness?

The sons of Eli were evidently felt to display an arrogant and violent temper, characteristic of the corrupt priest, but deeply painful to pious minds, even if their practice or interpretation of the ritual rule was right and that of the people wrong. If they observed the right ritual they abused it to the dishonour of Jehovah, and to their own corrupt profit. The narrative does not expressly say which contention was

right. Jehovah, however (1 Sam. ii, 29), speaks of Eli and his sons "kicking" at His sacrifices and offerings, "to make yourselves fat with the chiefest of all the offerings," which seems to point to the abuse of priestly rights, such as the sons of Eli were considered by the worshippers to be guilty of. But even if the author of 1 Sam. ii took the people's view, it would probably be because that view gave effect to the Levitical Law. The inference that the Law was unknown cannot be legitimately drawn from it, in contradiction to the previous proclamation of the Law, which it is, as already noticed, a prime aim of the present text to emphasize; still less can it be inferred that both parties were ignorant of the Ceremonial Law.

More important, however, than this point, which is one of detail, are the undisputed facts that at that time Jehovah had placed His Name at Shiloh, where He dwelt, represented by the sacred Ark of His Covenant and the "Glory" above it, and was ministered to by a High Priest of Aaron's line, chosen in Egypt, as well as by subordinate priests of the same line (1 Sam. ii, 27, *sq.*), and that this priesthood was a permanent institution, whose functions included at least sacrifice (1 Sam. ii, 19) according to an appointed order or ritual.

There would be nothing surprising in practices not strictly in accordance with the Mosaic Law, whether Moral or Ceremonial, surviving in those troubled times as late as the time of Eli. Mr. Robertson Smith himself says¹ "The importance attached to these details shows how essential to the religion of those days was the observance of all points of established ritual. But the ritual was not that of the Levitical Law." His point seems to be that there was a customary ritual which held its ground, and was in fact not disapproved of, or, at least, not condemned.² The narrative in 1 Sam. ii, 27-29, however, expressly states that priesthood, sacrifice and the sacrificial ritual had been regulated by Divine authority. Such regulation would, as doubtless Leviticus does, select and add to established customs. It would also, as the Pentateuch does, introduce changes gradually, as suited the circumstances. The utmost that Criticism can even pretend to show—and that only by

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 269.

² Cp. Driver, "Introduction," pp. 142-145.

reliance on the "silence" argument¹—is that the Levitical Law was not in all points enforced or obeyed, but cannot displace or even touch the Tradition which is the only evidence. That evidence declares that the Levitical Law was in existence. Criticism makes the futile retort: "It was never enforced or obeyed." That does not displace the positive evidence of its existence, since it may be consistent with it!

There are many other references² to the existence of a priesthood, in the double order of Priest and Levite, to their functions, to the ritual, to ceremonial purity, &c., for all of which no basis is found, except in the Tradition, which declares that such matters were subjects of inspired regulation as early as the time of Moses, the same Tradition affirming that the regulation of those matters which took place in the time of Moses was recorded by him and is handed down in the Pentateuch, including the Levitical portion of it.

According to Critical reasoning the entire absence of allusions to an organized priesthood and sacrifice, as customary institutions, before the time of Moses, should prove that none such existed; yet their existence is asserted, and that existence is utilized to displace the corresponding Mosaic institutions, by referring the actual High Priest, priests, sacrifices, &c., to these supposed customary institutions, and thus getting rid of their Mosaic origin.

Sound criticism, while relying upon facts, and accepting the best evidence available, at its proper value, refuses to displace the Mosaic Tradition—which in the present case, at all events, is the substance of evidence which has been outworn by time—by anything but well-established fact, surer and better, in contradiction of it. The Higher Criticism has little or nothing of this kind to offer.

Before we accept the silence of a narrative, however clearly proved—which is far from being the case here—as proof of anything, we must know whether the narrative aimed at recording such matters. There does not, as already remarked, appear to have been any need or intention that the national chronicle, which is contained in Samuel and Kings, should include ecclesiastical matters, except incidentally. A de-

¹ Dr. Sanday gives a note of warning as to the free use of the "silence" argument in general (see "Inspiration," p. 183).

² See *infra*, p. 186.

tailed account of the ecclesiastical constitution was already in existence in the Pentateuch.

The incidental mention of Eli has been already noticed. In the account of the return of the Ark mention is incidentally made of Levites, who had or took charge of it (1 Sam. vi, 15). In a similar incidental way we are told of a body of priests at Nob,¹ of whom, as far as appears, we should have heard nothing but for David's hurried flight thither; and, incidentally again, we hear of the shewbread,² and of the requirement of ceremonial purity. The fact that Abimelech inquired of God for David, and had been in the habit of doing so, similarly appears quite incidentally; as does also the existence and use of the ephod.³ Again, the use of Urim is incidentally mentioned by Saul,⁴ when he desires to obtain guidance in his despair, the unlawfulness of witchcraft also appearing incidentally in the same connection.⁵ The circumstance of the Priests carrying the Ark at Jericho may also be noted.⁶

It would be tedious to cite here the numerous instances which seem to show that the existence of a sacrificial system of Divine authority is so pervading a presupposition of the narratives of Samuel and Kings, as to indicate that everybody is assumed to be familiar with their use, as would naturally be the case if the Levitical Law had been ordained in the Wilderness.

Consequently, no inference arises from the silence of these narratives, except the inference that the exercise of priestly and sacrificial functions under a Divinely established system, to which Jehovah responded, was too well known to need mention, especially in a narrative evidently concerned with national rather than ecclesiastical interests. Not only is this, the true inference, rejected; but the positive evidence of the Pentateuch is displaced on mere surmise and arbitrary theory.

What then was this system and when was it instituted, if not (as the documents and Tradition affirm) in its substance as part of the Mosaic legislation? It cannot be the case that the people were unfitted to receive a Ceremonial Law in the Wilderness, since we find them in possession of one in Eli's time, and even disputing with Eli's sons about its minute details.

¹ 1 Sam., xxi. ² *Ibid.*, xxi, 4-6.

³ *Ibid.*, xxi, 9; xxii, 15; xxiii, 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xxviii, 6. ⁵ *Ibid.*, xxviii, 9.

⁶ Josh., iii, 6.

Deviations from the Mosaic Law in Mosaic Times.

The question whether the Pentateuchal Law existed cannot be evaded by instancing supposed deviations from the Levitical legislation, or even conflict with it. Such deviations, even if clearly established, could, at most, only show that survivals of old practices were tolerated in the condescension of God; and the subsequent denunciation of them would only show that they had become evil past toleration. They cannot show that the Levitical system was not, at least, the standard or ideal of worship, or that it was not recognized as such, although imperfectly observed. Although the mass of the people lapsed frequently, and perhaps increasingly, into idolatry, through ease and prosperity, Criticism agrees, as already noticed, that ultimately, after the Exile, they became weaned from idolatry. According to the Critics this was a surprisingly sudden result. According to the documents it was the work of long discipline—a discipline often resisted or evaded, such disobedience culminating in appalling disaster.

According to the Critics¹ the nation was sent to mix with idolaters—for they could only extirpate them by themselves reaching a higher standard, such as that of the Law—without any visible mark of separation, even in ritual, from them, and without any express or authoritative provision for their worship.² According to the Tradition, on the contrary, ample protection was provided for them, simple obedience being all that was required of them. Which set of conditions best explains their being weaned from idolatry at last? Yet the Critics boldly claim an impossible admission—“Those who maintain that the whole Pentateuch was then extant as a theoretical system must admit that before the Exile the pedagogic ordinances of that system were not the practical instrument by which the relation of Israel to Jehovah was preserved, and the people hindered from sinking altogether into Canaanite heathenism.”³ So far from such an admission being due, it may safely be affirmed that the call of the prophets to worship Jehovah in justice and righteousness would have fallen upon ears even less fitted to hear fruitfully had no Divine method been provided which

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 279.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 347, 378.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

might hedge round the people who were to be separate to Him, and might assure them of an acceptable mode of access to Him, in positive ordinances. They were children, stiff-necked children; and required to be taught by external ordinances. "That is not first which is spiritual but that which is natural; and afterwards that which is spiritual."¹

Even if the Critics had proved that the histories of Samuel and Kings were more silent as to sacrifice, priesthood, &c., than they have shown, it would be sufficient explanation, as already indicated, that these histories only mentioned such matters when they were connected with events of national interest; and that there was no occasion for reference to the existence of a state of things which was, necessarily, universally known. Still less was it necessary to refer to the priestly Law of the Pentateuch.

We find, moreover, that silence on these matters is not peculiar to these books, but is equally characteristic of all the historical and prophetic books; none of them, except Chronicles, refer in detail to such matters or to the documents, except so far as they have occasion to mention them for the purposes of their narratives or teaching; it would be very strange if they did! Even Chronicles does not, any more than the others, describe the system of ritual, or mention the writings, &c., except to note additions, modifications, and so forth, or to denounce or applaud those concerned in such matters. Nor is there anywhere any detailed account of the Ceremonial Law, except in the Pentateuch. If that account was in existence no further account of the matter was needed. It cannot be shown that deviations were allowed to pass without notice, when they demanded notice, in accordance with the scope of the narrative. The standard of ritual, which Criticism accepts as that of the time after Moses, is entirely based upon its own views as to the interpretation and proper application of the ritual and Ceremonial Law of the Pentateuch—views which cannot claim to represent the actual views prevailing at the times in question, and which have never been accepted throughout the intervening centuries! Whatever the standard was, there were doubtless many deviations from it, but the histories pass them by, and deal with other matters. It is impossible to find a foundation in fact for the Critical theory.

CHAPTER IX.

PRIESTHOOD AMONG THE HEBREWS.

Sacrifice and Ritual.

THE law of sacrifice and ritual is adjudged by Criticism to be of late institution. It is even contended¹ that the prophet Amos declared that Israel did not sacrifice to Jehovah in the Wilderness (Amos v, 25). In the Revised Version this passage runs: "Did ye bring unto me sacrifices and offerings in the Wilderness forty years, O house of Israel? Yea, ye have borne Siccuth your king and Chiun your images, the star of your god which ye made to yourselves. Therefore will I cause you to go into captivity beyond Damascus." It is said that this translation is incorrect, and that it should be, not "ye *have* borne," &c., but "ye *shall* take up your idols and I will send you into captivity," &c. But, whichever may be the true translation, it is apparently an appeal and warning to the Jews of Amos' time, founded upon their past history. It cannot be intended to reveal to them, as an historical fact, that their fathers did not offer sacrifice to Jehovah in the Wilderness. It implies, indeed, that they were not loyal to Jehovah, although they claimed to have sacrificed to Him. It is a statement coupled with a threat, or, at least, a warning, that they had merited exile by their conduct, particularly, by their conduct with respect to sacrifices. But it does not expressly deal with, and certainly does not commend their not sacrificing more frequently in the Wilderness; it seems rather to imply that they had been required to offer such sacrifices, but that they had disobeyed and revolted, and served other gods.

The only intelligible meaning that can be given to the passage, in connection with the context, is that whether they claimed to have sacrificed to Jehovah or not, and whether their sacrifices were profuse or scanty, the disloyalty of the people was such that they must be punished. It seems, however, to be cited by Criticism as a statement or revelation

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 294.

of fact, that Israel did not sacrifice to Jehovah in the Wilderness at all—although it is in form a question—and as showing that the sacrifices, which they were so profusely offering at that time, were not required of them; and, if not “absolutely wrong,” were, at any rate, not acceptable to Jehovah, and could not “purchase any favour” from Him.¹

The Tradition, however, proves that sacrifice was acceptably offered in the Wilderness (Ex. xxiv, 4-8; xxix, 11-19). Evidently the people who importuned Jehovah with sacrifices, but did not give Him their hearts, must have thought that Jehovah would be pleased with the sacrifices of bullocks and rams and he-goats without the surrender to Him of the heart. And it can hardly be doubted that they supposed themselves to be acting, at least, in outward obedience to Jehovah. And while it was probably a surprise to them to find that the mere external act was held of no value, or even offensive, it would doubtless have been a greater surprise and shock to be told that it had never been ordained at all. Obviously, on any interpretation of the passage, they held it to be undoubted that sacrifice had been ordained of old. If the prophet, speaking in the name of Jehovah, only meant to tell them that the Levitical Code was not enacted in the Wilderness, that intention still implies that the Levitical Code was in existence at the time of that declaration, and was, mistakenly, held applicable at that time. But if the prophet intended to teach them that they were mistaken in supposing that sacrifice had ever been ordained, either in the Wilderness or elsewhere, that interpretation, again, still implies a belief on their part that it had been ordained, and the prophet's reference to the Wilderness would favour the inference that it was there they supposed it to have been ordained. Whatever interpretation is put upon the passage it must, if it reveals an historical fact, imply that the people were not aware of that fact. Was it then on account of their ignorance of that fact that the revelation of it to them was accompanied with the terrible doom of captivity?

If a revelation was needed to dispel the ignorance of the people that ignorance must have been profound, and of long standing! If, however, the statement merely expresses Amos' belief, that sacrifice was not ordained or practised in

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 295.

the Wilderness, there is no ground for preferring to the evidence of the record and of oral Tradition, his denial of a fact asserted by the entire Tradition, and of which he had no personal knowledge. The statement, indeed, does not expressly refer to the Levitical or any other *law* of sacrifice, and has reference only to actual practice. It is, however, admitted that there was a *practice* of sacrifice in earlier times, although it may have been restricted in the Wilderness. The passage is evidently not meant in commendation of the people in the Wilderness. The existence of the Levitical Law is, however, assumed by the Critic to be negatived by it, although it does not, as just observed, allude to law, but refers to practice only. It is, nevertheless, confidently declared that "it is impossible to give a flatter contradiction to the traditional theory that the Levitical system was enacted in the Wilderness."¹

Even so, the question—whether it is more cogent evidence than the record and the invariable and ancient Tradition—remains, unless the statement is a Divine revelation. And, in any case, it must be equally impossible to give a flatter contradiction to the Critical theory, that the Levitical or any law of sacrifice was ever Divinely instituted, and particularly *after* such a condemnation as is assumed to have been pronounced by Amos, and especially to the idea that it was instituted as the ultimate fruit of prophetic teaching.² The Critic quoted can hardly have accepted sacrifice as Divinely ordained.

Again, the Critics, as already mentioned, lay much stress upon the words of Jeremiah (vii, 22): "For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices; but this thing I said, Hearken unto my voice," &c. The historical fact once stated—whether revealed to Amos, or stated by him on his own authority—hardly required repetition. A subsequent reference to it must be in the nature of a reminder, or an appeal to it as a fact already known. In any case, the persistency of the people in attributing the Levitical legislation to Moses sufficiently disposes of all such theories as depend upon the interpretation of these statements as anything but appeals to the people to put sacrifice and ritual into due subordination to the Moral

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 295.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 310, 372, 429, 430.

Law. If these statements are intended to be statements that the Levitical Law did not originate, or was not practised, in the Wilderness, the people did not accept them as true, and Amos and Jeremiah alone adopted such a view. The prophetic teaching, which is supposed to have constrained the people to accept this very Law as a new enactment, cannot have been founded upon the worthlessness—if not wickedness—of sacrifice! And why was it ever instituted if it was worthless or wicked at an earlier time? Had anything occurred to give it spiritual value after the Exile had, partially at least, weaned the people from idolatry?

The Priestly Code.

It is not easy to grasp the theory of Criticism as to the imaginary P's operations. He has put the Law before the Prophets, while Criticism puts the Prophets before the Law. Which order is right is the point at issue.¹

We are told that P did not "wilfully desert or falsify Tradition." Then he must, so far as he was able, have faithfully followed such tradition as he had knowledge of. Criticism seldom recognizes Tradition, except grudgingly, unless it supports its own theories! What Tradition does it suppose P to have had? Was it a tradition that Moses gave to Israel the bulk of the Law in the Wilderness, and wrote or superintended the record of it? That is the only tradition known to exist, and at that Criticism carps, but cannot displace it! Or was it a tradition that Moses was, in some shadowy, mythical, or half-mythical way, the channel or author of some indefinite, but almost insignificant items of law, if indeed of so much, which had, by alteration and colouring in successive generations, grown to the dimensions of the Priestly Code? P answers this question himself; he says Moses was the channel through which the whole of this Code was given in the Wilderness. Did he overlook or forget the fact that the Code had been ignored up to that time? There is no evidence that he did, any more than there is that any of his statements were other than those of the tradition upon which they were based.

It is evident that the origin and stages of development of the Law cannot be disentangled in the Pentateuch so as to support the Critical theory, even if the statements of the

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 128.

Pentateuch as to the share of Moses in the composition and promulgation of it could be eliminated. An assumption must still be made that the Code—which Criticism declares to be the result of slow growth from an indefinite nucleus in the Pentateuch (when it admits even so much), and which, at some late period, is admitted to have existed—did not take shape in substance in the Wilderness, as the Tradition asserts, although the Code may have received some modification in the course of ages. No attestation of the statement that the Law was delivered in the Wilderness, beyond that of the Pentateuch itself, the oral Tradition, and the existence of practically identical institutions can be required or furnished. Our Lord and the Church have accepted and affirmed that testimony. To that evidence Criticism can oppose nothing but uncertain or unfounded evidence, inference, speculation, &c. The positive testimony cannot be displaced by such machinery! Even if the correspondence of the institutions, admitted to have existed in pre-Exilic times, with the Law falls so short as to render the proof of their identification materially defective, this defect, although preventing the acceptance of the identification as proved, and, perhaps, thereby suspending the acceptance of the Wilderness as the scene of the Law, would do no more. The gap to be bridged is indeed almost imperceptible; there are certain Institutions, which Tradition asserts were ordained at Sinai, but the description of those Institutions is not “precisely” the same, in Critical judgment, as the actual Institutions which are noticed in the history; consequently the sensitive historical conscience boggles at the supposed discrepancy, slight as it is, and awaits further proof. But one who accepts the Tradition has nothing to boggle at, for the Tradition states expressly that these very institutions, which it describes, were ordained and put into practice in the Wilderness. He is in no way called upon to surrender this piece of evidence, which he believes, because the institutions, as observed at a later date, have deviated to some extent from their model. The Tradition asserts that the model, the Mosaic Law, was in existence. The fact, if proved, that in the time of Samuel the practice was not in precise accordance with that Law, does not disprove the already proved existence of that Law.

The question which arises, if the discrepancy is real—which it may very well miss being—is, Whether the main, the dominant facts of the Tradition are to be discredited on

account of such a discrepancy in detail. That question really raises the question of the relative weight of the dominant and subordinate facts. That the Law was given in the Wilderness through Moses is *the* dominant fact in the Tradition; it is easily carried down, even orally, and has been universally accepted. Until displaced by better and surer evidence, it remains dominant. And when confronted by an indirect conflict, such as the alleged discrepancy between the Law, as set out in the Pentateuch, and the Institutions supposed by Criticism to be in use—the question is whether the inference from the Tradition itself, impeaching its credit as to its dominant statements, is sufficiently surer or better than those dominant statements, to discredit and displace them. At the present stage, when these dominant statements as to the giving of the Law have been gaining strength by acceptance during the ages, the question has long been closed; and no question can arise as to the credit of Tradition, unless some fresh and potent fact is produced. It is not at this stage a question whether the Tradition can be accepted, as to its dominant facts; that has long ago been decided; and that decision cannot be reversed without fresh and potent facts. The question is now simply whether such facts are now produced as are surer or better than the Tradition.

The facts in the present case are not fresh; they have always been as visible as they are now. We have no means of knowing the precise circumstances of the alleged discrepancy between the Law and the vague traces of the Institutions, as presented to us by Criticism. That discrepancy might—if it exists—have arisen in a great variety of ways, of which no knowledge is now available. Such conflict can hardly be seriously adduced as sufficient to displace the Tradition. Its belated discovery is, in itself, sufficient to stamp it as futile.

Theological Representations.

The theological indications which Criticism finds in the Pentateuch are relied upon¹ as cogent evidence of the different dates of the appearance of the sections containing them. Even applying human analogies in order to fix the length of time which must elapse between different theological stages—an application which assumes that the religion of Israel was a natural development—nothing but vague estimates can be

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 157.

arrived at. We are told that centuries must have elapsed between some of the supposed stages found in the laws. The only express evidence, however, is that which remains unchanged after Criticism has exhausted its efforts in tearing asunder the history, and which declares that the substance of all the laws was enacted in the Wilderness. No contradiction of this statement can anywhere be found; the statement is emphatically reiterated from the beginning of the history of Israel as a nation to the end. It cannot be displaced by speculative inference.

If it could be so displaced no materials appear to be forthcoming for that purpose. We have no other records—even if relevant—of other races or religions showing that “at the same place and time,” or at any place or time, corresponding theological or ritual stages made their appearance in such religious systems at certain periods separated by a certain length of time. One or two such instances, if any could be found, would clearly not suffice. There must be a sufficient number of instances, similar to the present case, to establish a general principle as governing such developments. Israel is said to have started with a moral law, which remained unchanged, or little changed, during its whole history, and which is even now not obsolete. It has been expanded by Our Lord, and the expansion is declared by Him to be not an abrogation of it, but a development of its inner and true spirit. Can any proof be given, even in the case of an “entirely human” development, that those who received or developed such a law would be unfit to receive or develop a Ceremonial Law, such as that of the Pentateuch? Is the “science” of Comparative Religion in such a state of maturity that it can say with certainty that such Moral and Ceremonial Laws as those of the Pentateuch can only appear at an interval such as that alleged to exist between them in the Critical theory? If this question could be answered in the affirmative as to all other religions, it would still be necessary to assume that the religion of Israel was a natural development—similar to a sufficient number of other religions—before the course of its development could be judged by that of any natural religion, or even by the invariable course of all of them, if there were any invariable course as to such developments.

Israel is alleged by Criticism to have had no law of sacrifice, priesthood, or ritual before the Exile, although it is admitted that it had practices which included and governed

all these institutions; but these practices, it is said, were not sanctioned, or otherwise regulated, by Jehovah. Is it in accordance with the development of other religions that the regulation of such matters as these should be so long after the regulation of morals in making its appearance? Priesthood and ritual seem institutions eminently congenial to primitive religious ideas; and it is difficult to imagine a primitive religion without sacrifice, priesthood and ritual. Ritual especially—even an elaborate ritual—must surely be eminently congenial to the early stages of religion.

We are told that we ought to “feel”¹ that the Priestly Code must be centuries after Moses. Some standard is required to generate such a feeling. There is, however, no need to strive after such a feeling, for the Priestly Code itself tells us that it was ordained through Moses, and Criticism cannot give us any better or surer evidence to the contrary.

If, however, the stages of theological development could be fixed by some exact scientific standard, and if those stages appeared to be separated by the same distances as are required by Criticism, a definite point of departure would be indispensable. But we do not know when the more rudimentary stages first began to appear. If the Pentateuch is trustworthy, we still do not know whether the stage which Criticism considers earliest in development was the first to appear. It is unquestionable that Circumcision was regarded as an institution appearing as early as the time of Abraham. Without fuller information, or probably, even with it, we could not say how much of the “simpler ritual” had been in existence before the Exodus, and was sanctioned by and taken up into the Mosaic legislation. So that we cannot get a definite starting point for the application of an exact standard, even if such a standard—drawn from natural religions—was forthcoming and applicable.

And if we measured back from the Exile, the difficulty would be the same; we should still require to be satisfied that the points thus arrived at were, in fact, the correct dates of the development of the earlier stages of theological ideas.

And the guidance of scholars is misleading; they decided at first, wrongly, as is now alleged, that the Ceremonial Code was the oldest part of the Pentateuch; and then, again wrongly, according to the express evidence that it was the

¹ Driver, “Introduction,” p. 85.

latest part, all of it being, in fact, substantially of the same age.

Deviations and Differences.

The supposed deviations which are relied upon as sufficient to warrant the inference that the entire Ceremonial Law could not have been enacted in the Wilderness, and so to contradict the Pentateuch, will now be examined. They are :—

- (1) Sacrifice, in Samuel and Kings, elsewhere than at a central Sanctuary.
- (2) Laymen officiating at the Altar.
- (3) Ritual simpler and establishment scantier (at Shiloh).
- (4) No distinction between Priests and Levites.
- (5) Difference of tone and spirit between pre-Exilic times and Priestly Code.
- (6) Difference of theological conceptions between the same periods.

I.—*Sacrifice elsewhere than at a Central Sanctuary.*—It is said¹ that although in the Law (1) the “place of sacrifice was strictly limited,” and (2) there were “severe penalties imposed upon any, except priests, who presumed to officiate at the Altar,” yet “sacrifice was offered elsewhere, and laymen officiated at the Altar, without protest or objection, or even with official sanction.”

This ground rests largely, if not entirely, upon incidents which happened during the time between the capture of the Ark by the Philistines—accompanied, as appears from Ps. lxxviii, 58-60, and Jeremiah vii, 12-14, xxvi, 6, by the destruction or desecration of Shiloh—and its reinstatement on Mount Zion.² There was “no open vision,” even at Shiloh (1 Sam. iii, 1). Evidently if Shiloh was not the “Central Sanctuary,” there was none at all. But even if it was the “Central Sanctuary,” yet, during this period, Jehovah did not “place His Name” at Shiloh or anywhere else. Although Israel could not approach Him during this period of alienation, as in covenant with Him, can it be considered displeasing to Him that His people should have tried to obtain restoration of the covenant relation with Him, under

¹ Driver, “Introduction,” p. 136.

² Driver, “Introduction,” p. 86, referring to a contention that this period was “an exceptional one,” says “it may be doubted whether [it] is satisfactory.” But it cannot be denied that Shiloh was abandoned or destroyed; and where did Jehovah then “place” His Name? Dr. Driver ignores the destruction of Shiloh and the captivity of the Ark.

the guidance of those approved by Him, by means of sacrifice, or should have striven to be, at least, in the position in which they were before the Covenant and the Wilderness legislation? Or were the people to abandon all attempts to approach Him? Even if they made such attempts without the intervention of priests—which is neither stated nor implied—the situation was one to which neither the laws regarding the Sanctuary, nor those regarding the priests applied; and the sanction of Samuel seems sufficient warrant for what was done. It does not appear to have occurred to any generation that there was anything done which was open to question; although they were satisfied that the Deuteronomical law existed, Jehovah appears to have, in some measure, responded to these approaches, which Criticism condemns.

Criticism contends that there was no *law* of sacrifice before the Exile; and that Israel worshipped Jehovah, not faithfully indeed, although sometimes profusely, with a constantly developing ritual; and, after the reign of David, in the rich Temple Solomon built, but under no law or regulation, save that of custom and usage! It is not a probable, hardly a possible, theory. Jehovah is, moreover, said to have responded to the worship, particularly to that in the Temple, built under His sanction.

On the other hand, the Tradition states most emphatically that, in the Wilderness, Jehovah had in Egypt placed Himself in a special relation to the people, the children of the Patriarchs—with whom He had made covenants from the time of Abraham—and had revealed Himself to their children under the Name Jehovah, and had thereafter made a new covenant with the nation He had delivered, and given them Moral and Ceremonial Laws, the observance of which was their duty under the Covenant. Their part of this Covenant was, indeed, never strictly performed; and their failure ultimately drew upon them the destruction of Shiloh, the departure of the "Glory," the Shekinah ("There is no Glory," Ichabod, 1 Sam. iv, 21, 22, R.V. margin), the loss of the Ark, and subjection to the Philistines, culminating in the Babylonian Exile. At length the Ark was restored to them, and Jehovah resumed His covenanted relations with them; and "the Glory of the Lord filled the house" (2 Chron. vii, 1-4). Jehovah had never wholly ceased to respond to His people; as in after-times also, they were not entirely abandoned, although the severest punishment was inflicted for the breaches so often committed by Israel.

With reference to the place of Sacrifice, the matter now in question—it had been thus ordained in the Wilderness—“An altar of earth thou shalt make unto me, and shalt sacrifice thereon thy burnt offerings, and thy peace offerings, thy sheep and thine oxen; in every place where I record my name (cause my name to be remembered, R.V. marg.), I will come unto thee and I will bless thee”; followed by directions as to an altar of stone, should such come to be made (Ex. xx, 24-26).

Afterwards, a Tabernacle, with the Ark of the Covenant, was directed to be made. And, in Deuteronomy xii, 4-11, 13, 14, after directing the destruction of the high places as they gradually conquered Canaan—they are told that they must not imitate the Canaanitish worship; “but unto the place which the Lord your God shall choose out of all your tribes to put His name there, even unto His habitation shall ye seek and thither thou shalt come; and thither ye shall bring your burnt offerings and your sacrifices and your tithes and the heave offering of your hand and your vows and your freewill offerings and the firstlings of your herd and of your flock: and there ye shall eat before the Lord your God, and ye shall rejoice in all that ye put your hand unto, ye and your households, wherein the Lord thy God hath blessed thee. Ye shall not do after all the things that ye do here this day, every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes; for ye are not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God giveth thee. But when ye go over Jordan and dwell in the land which the Lord your God causeth you to inherit, and He giveth you rest from all your enemies round about so that ye dwell in safety; then it shall come to pass that the place which the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, thither shall ye bring all that I command you; your burnt offerings and your sacrifices, your tithes and the heave offering of your hand and all your choice vows which ye vow unto the Lord . . . Take heed to thyself that thou offer not thy burnt offerings in every place that thou seest; but in the place which the Lord shall choose in one of thy tribes, there thou shalt offer thy burnt offerings, and there thou shalt do all that I command thee.”¹

Criticism is apt to emphasize, not to say exaggerate, the rigidity and strictness of the Law in Deuteronomy. It is,

¹ Deut. xii, 5-14. See also vv. 18, 26, &c.

however, a strain which the language cannot bear, to make it applicable when the place where Jehovah had put His Name had been abandoned and destroyed; and when the Ark, the sign of His presence, had been delivered into the hands of the Philistines, and stood before Dagon, and the "Glory," His visible Presence, had departed.

But the Law was only in abeyance during that time, and perhaps only as to matters which were affected by Jehovah's withdrawal from His Covenant. Criticism, however, gives no effect to this withdrawal.

It is not and cannot be proved that the sacrifices now impugned were such as to come within the provisions of Deuteronomy; which do not appear to deal with sacrifices such as those now in question, and which do not seem to be public or regular and ordained sacrifices, but seem mostly special and occasional offerings, and, perhaps, of a more primitive and private sort than those indicated in the verses quoted above. The laws both of Exodus and Deuteronomy seem intended to keep the worship loyal to Jehovah, as against idols. By Jehovah's withdrawal the people may have been thrown back upon some customary worship or upon Ex. xx, 24-26, not because the law in Deut. xii had not been promulgated, as Criticism contends, but because it was, for the time, in abeyance, in consequence of there being then no such Central Sanctuary as Deut. xii contemplates.

The Tradition relates without a blush these alleged breaches of the Law; Samuel sacrificing at Ramah, David expressly directed by Jehovah to build an altar at the threshing-floor of Araunah (2 Sam. xxiv, 18, 19), &c.

"The practice of Joshua (1 Kings vi) conforms," it is said,¹ to "the principle laid down" in Ex. xx, 24b, but not to that of Deut. xii, that is, to the principle of the altar of earth at a place other than the Central Sanctuary.

There are various instances referred to in support of this statement. In Josh. xxiv, 1b, the elders of Israel are spoken of as "presenting themselves before God at Shechem," where (Josh. xxiv, 26) Joshua, having made a covenant with them, "wrote these words in the book of the law of God; and he took a great stone, and set it up there under the oak that was by the sanctuary of the Lord" as a witness against

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 85.

them. It does not appear that Jehovah had recorded His Name elsewhere at this time. If there was a Central Sanctuary at this time, it may have been an irregularity to do what Joshua did, but it appears to have been sanctioned, as he was himself the representative of Jehovah. It cannot show that the law of Deuteronomy had not then been prescribed, contrary to the express statement in the narrative. It will be observed that there is no mention of sacrifice in this instance.

In 1 Sam. vii, 9, 10, there is mention of sacrifice by Samuel at Mizpah; and, in 1 Sam. vii, 12, of his building an altar at Ramah. Assuming for the moment that the interpretation of Criticism is correct, this might be an irregularity, if Jehovah had set His Name at a Central Sanctuary, which He does not appear to have done; in any case, Samuel must have considered that it was sanctioned by Jehovah.

In 1 Sam. ix, 12-14, "the people have a sacrifice" at Ramah, and Samuel is expected to come to "bless the sacrifice"; whether he did so does not appear. Again, there does not appear to have been any Central Sanctuary at the time. A practice is, perhaps suggested by this incident, of which, however, we know no more.

In 1 Sam. x, 3, 5, Saul is told that he will meet men, at "the oak of Tabor," carrying provisions, and that he will meet a band of prophets "at the hill of God." There is nothing said about sacrifice; the "oak" and the "hill of God" are, presumably, supposed by Criticism to suggest sacrifice.

In 1 Sam. x, 8, Samuel tells Saul that he will come down to Gilgal to him "to offer burnt offerings, and to sacrifice sacrifices of peace offerings," apparently in connection with Saul's installation as King. At this stage an anointed King is to take over the leadership of the nation. If there had been a place where Jehovah had put His Name Samuel might still consider this exceptional sacrifice proper; we are not concerned to justify him.

In 1 Sam. xi, 15, the people sacrificed at Gilgal and made Saul king. Obviously the circumstances are not fully stated; and inferences of impropriety, drawn from a scanty narrative of exceptional circumstances, can have no value. Saul also sacrificed at Gilgal, when Samuel delayed; and he was rejected for disobedience in so doing (1 Sam. xiii, 7-14).

In 1 Sam. xiv, 35, Saul built his first altar after the rout

of the Philistines near Michmash, and sacrificed, apparently to stop the eating by the people of the captured animals with the blood. The case is quite exceptional, and no approval by Samuel appears.

In 1 Sam. xx, 6, David proposes to excuse his absence from Saul's court by pleading that a yearly new-moon sacrifice at Bethlehem, his home, required his presence. No more is known as to this incident.

In 2 Sam. xv, 12, Ahithophel is said to have offered a sacrifice at Gihon. His conduct can hardly be considered of any importance in the present inquiry.

Again, in 2 Sam. xv, 32, Mt. Olivet is spoken of as a summit "where God was worshipped." Sacrifice is not mentioned.

The above are all the instances cited by Dr. Driver¹ as justifying the inference, not that the occurrences were (if Deut. xii was in existence) either regular, as far as they were sanctioned by Jehovah or by His representatives, or wholly irregular—but that worship by sacrifice was allowed by Ex. xx, 24, at the places in question, and had not then been disallowed by Deut. xii.

There is no evidence that these instances conformed to Ex. xx, any more than to Deuteronomy xii, within the scope of which latter ordinance they hardly fell. It is not even alleged that there was then a Central Sanctuary in existence, or that these places were places where Jehovah had recorded His Name, under Ex. xx, 24. All the instances in 1 Sam. fall within the period between the destruction or abandonment of Shiloh and the installation of the Ark on Mt. Zion. There was no Central Sanctuary in existence during that time; and there could not, in fact, have been such a Sanctuary, for the Ark was apparently not properly installed anywhere; Criticism even contends that it was, at one time, in irregular custody, and in lay hands.² The effect of the positive statement of Deut. as to the time at which the supposed rigorous law of the Central Sanctuary was to come into operation, viz., when the Lord should have given them rest,³ was, according to the unvarying interpretation of that law by the Jews, that it did not come into operation until Solomon's Temple was dedicated.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 85.

² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

³ Deut., xii, 1-11.

Jehovah Himself, by sanctioning the building of the Temple, seemed to proclaim that the time of unrest was at an end; and this view seems to accord with the facts, and is confirmed rather than displaced by the instances relied upon by Criticism; the circumstances under which those instances happened being, however, largely unknown. It has already been urged that it did not fall within the scope of the history, in which mention of these events is incidentally made, to give the information which is essential before such an inference, as that of Criticism, can be legitimately drawn. Criticism, indeed, does not feel the need of such knowledge. Even "Conservative Criticism" assumes that it is for the Scriptures to explain to them how their view of these and other matters can be reconciled with its statements, as interpreted by Criticism, and decides that no such explanation could be found in "a fuller knowledge of the times."¹ Those who look upon these Scriptures as the work of men regarding themselves (at lowest) as under unique influences, cannot accept as sufficient to displace their positive statements, inferences such as Criticism is eager to draw, but such, it is submitted, as would be scouted if the books were ordinary, "entirely human," works. The people of Israel, as a nation, and as individuals, regulated their lives by these books—especially the Book of the Law—with many shortcomings and backslidings, it is true. They felt it of vital importance to know the real meaning of their Scriptures, and to be assured, beyond the possibility of doubt, of their truth and authority. Without adequate knowledge of the circumstances under which acts were done by those who were venerated as leaders and guides, which are now alleged to be such as to raise inferences unfavourable to the truth of the Scriptures or to the character of those leaders or guides, no such inference can be justifiable.

II.—*Sacrifices offered by Laymen.*—It is nowhere stated or implied that they did anything more than was proper, according to the recognized law, so far as it applied to the period at which the events occurred. Dr. Driver, indeed, says² that it "seems evident" that David sacrificed "with his own hand," at the removal of the Ark to the City of David, although the narrative (2 Sam. vi, 13, 17, 18) says nothing about "his own hand"; and there is nothing but

¹ Driver, "Introduction," preface p. vii

² *Ibid.*, p. 137.

the words "sacrificed" and "offered" to show what he did. The offerer had to slay and cut up the victim (Lev. i, 5, 7). There is absolutely nothing to show that he did any exclusively priestly act, according to the Levitical law. There was no lack of priests present at that time (1 Chron. xv). If he did put the crowd of priests aside, it must have been in his capacity of Jehovah's Anointed; and what he did was sanctioned and accepted, and, in one instance, directed by Jehovah. Criticism can hardly deny that he might be a King-Priest; and it cannot be shown that he violated the Levitical law; that law does not provide for such an exceptional occasion, or define the position of the King in relation to it.¹ Moses sacrificed, doing Priestly acts, in hallowing, under Divine command, Aaron and the priests.²

Solomon sacrificed three times in the year; he offered "burnt incense" upon the Altar "which he had built before the porch of the Temple" (1 Kings ix, 25; 2 Chron. viii, 12, 13). In 2 Chron. viii, 12, 13, many occasions of his doing so are specified. He also offered daily, 2 Chron. viii, 13. The Critical theory is that he "officiated at the Altar in person."³ But "all the people" offered sacrifice at the dedication of the Temple (2 Chron. vii, 4, 7); and Solomon then "offered 22,000 oxen and 120,000 sheep" (1 Kings viii, 63; 2 Chron. vii, 5). Did he and "all the people" officiate at the Temple—or at any Altar in person on this occasion, and burn the fat and sprinkle the blood, while the Priests and Levites "waited in their offices" (2 Chron. vii, 6) and looked on? Or could he even have slaughtered and cut up all the victims with his own hand? And did the naïve "Chronicler" not discover that all this was in flat contradiction of his pet theory—that the Ceremonial Law had been enacted in the Wilderness, including the Laws of Sacrifice and Priesthood?

When the Ark arrived at Beth-shemesh, on its return from the Philistines, we find that "they clave the wood of the cart and offered the kine for a burnt offering unto the

¹ Provisions guarding the abuse of power were indicated, but the existence of monarchy was not further contemplated. Jehovah was to be the leader of Israel in war, and to desire any other leader was regarded as treason to Him.

² Lev. viii, 15, 16, 19, 21. Ex. xxix, 11-30, 35-44.

³ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., pp. 260, 358.

Lord. And the Levites took down the Ark of the Lord, and the coffer that was with it, wherein the jewels of gold were, and put them on the great stone, and the men of Beth-shemesh offered burnt offerings and sacrificed sacrifices the same day unto the Lord" (1 Sam. vi, 14, 15, 16). Did laymen here perform priestly functions, the Levites, who had clearly some official connection with the matter, looking on while they did so? How the Levites came to be there is not stated; they may have been in charge of the Ark at the time of its capture, and were taken with it into captivity. The language here, as to the men of Beth-shemesh sacrificing, is not less favourable to the Critical view than that relating to David, Solomon, and others; but it is altogether absurd to suppose that the men of Beth-shemesh thrust aside the Levites, and performed sacrificial functions themselves. It is equally absurd to *assume* that no Ceremonial Law existed which constituted the Levites custodians of the Ark; or that this law was not the Pentateuchal Law.

The inference drawn by Criticism from alleged deviations from the Law as contained in the Tradition, whether such deviations were sacrifices by laymen, or sacrifices at unauthorized or forbidden places, equally with the inference from silence as to the institutions of the Law in the historical books, so far as they are founded on fact—can only be drawn if it can be shown by facts, not by opinions of scholars, that it is *impossible* that such deviations, or such silence, could occur if the Mosaic Law was in force at the time.

With reference to deviations from these Laws, just referred to in detail, it is obvious that the acts done *could* be done in spite of any law to the contrary, but they might be improper or illegal. What is needed in order to deduce the presence or absence of a law from such action is to know whether the acts actually done were lawful or not. That is just what we are trying to find out, in order to test the truth of something which is told us, namely, that the whole Law originated in the Wilderness. We cannot contradict that statement merely because, let us suppose, worthy people are acting as if that Law had not been enacted, and yet could not be ignorant of it, if it had been enacted. Every act must be either lawful or unlawful; it is impossible to say whether an act is lawful without knowing whether there is a law which forbids it. How then can it be known what laws exist by knowing what law-abiding people do? Unless

it is *impossible* that law-abiding people could act in a certain way if there was a law forbidding such action, we may surmise, but cannot infer with certainty, that such a law did not exist. Such a surmise would not suffice to disprove credible evidence of its existence. So long as it is possible that the Law may have been enacted and yet be disobeyed by law-abiding persons, the breach of it cannot show with any certainty that it has not been enacted.

In the present case, we know that both David and Samuel were venerated by the Jews of all ages as holy and upright men, although it was well known that David wilfully broke two of the Commandments (the 6th and 7th), which were undoubtedly in existence; he was punished for those breaches by a life-long punishment. He also violated the Law, with a justification, no doubt, in taking possession of the Shewbread. Yet these acts did not lead to the absurd inference that either those Commandments, or the Ceremonial Law, were not in existence—the “irresistible” inference of Criticism, to which there is no possible alternative! The Jews *knew* that those Commandments were in existence, just as we know the whole Law to have been in existence, and on the same evidence as we have. They believed David to have been a holy man, described by Jehovah Himself as “a man after His own heart,”¹ and yet they knew that he wilfully broke two of the Commandments. There can, therefore, be no such irresistible inferences from the acts now in question as Criticism needs and assumes.

But Criticism also interprets the Law as to sacrifice in a way which makes into offences acts which neither David nor Samuel, nor, as Criticism itself emphasizes, any of their contemporaries discerned to be unlawful, although they never doubted the existence of the Law! Here we meet with something which raises a valid inference, namely, that they took a different view as to the true intent of the Law, or of its applicability to the cases in question. One view which they may, or rather must, have taken, as regards the Central Sanctuary, is that Deut. xii could not apply when there was no Central Sanctuary, as was the case after the destruction of Shiloh. Moreover, they may, and almost must, have held that Deut. xii did not operate when they were not in a state of “rest from all their enemies round about,” which is a condition precedent to the operation of

¹ 1 Sam., xiii, 14.

this provision of Deut. xii. They were in subjection to the Philistines, and during the whole of David's reign they had no "rest," David himself being debarred from building the Temple, because of the bloodshed which marked his reign. After the Ark was installed on Mt. Zion sacrifice was not confined to the tent or Tabernacle there, but was offered also at the ancient Tabernacle, which was then at Gibeon (1 Chron. xvi, 39, 40; xxi, 29; 2 Chron. i, 3, 13). It seems a perfectly reasonable view, which the Jews held, that the condition precedent of Deut. xii was not fulfilled till Solomon built and dedicated the Temple, under the influence of the Law, and with the Divine sanction, Jehovah recognizing the House as His own by the restoration of the "Glory" so as to fill and occupy it.

III.—*Simplicity of the Ritual at Shiloh*.—Dr. Driver, speaking of the worship at Shiloh, says:¹ "Incidental allusions in books belonging to the same time create the impression that the ritual in use was simpler" than that of the Priestly Code.

He instances (a) "the elaborate provisions for the maintenance and safety of the Tabernacle, and for the reverent handling of the Ark and other sacred vessels," compared with those in 1 Sam., which are "evidently much simpler"; and (b) "the establishment at Shiloh . . . is clearly not on the scale of Ex. xxxv-xl, Num. iii, iv; the Ark is sent for and taken into battle as a matter calling for no comment"; when "brought back to Kirjath-jearim instead of the persons authorized by P being summoned to take charge of it, it is placed in the house of a native of the place, whose son is consecrated" ("sanctified," 1 Sam. vii, 1) "by the men of Kirjath-jearim themselves for the purpose of guarding it."

The refusal to recognize the exceptional situation of Israel at this time inevitably leads to distorted views of their acts. Some critics consider that the tribe of Levi was wiped out before this time; that cannot be assumed; but, if it were the fact, there would be no irregularity. Whether the custody was "proper" depends upon the law, if any, applicable to the circumstances, and the means of complying with it. The Priestly Code does not contemplate such a case.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 136.

It cannot be assumed that in seeking a safe and proper custody for the Ark at Kirjath-jearim an improper one was accepted. In 1 Sam. vi there happens to be an account of the circumstances under which the Ark came to be removed from Beth-shemesh to Kirjath-jearim. It was removed on account of the terrible visitation upon the men of Beth-shemesh for looking into it. It was its awful holiness which prompted the awe-stricken men of Beth-shemesh to seek for it some other, and presumably safer and more fitting custody. They applied to Kirjath-jearim to receive it (1 Sam. vi, 19-21), evidently regarding the custody of it by persons at Kirjath-jearim as more likely to be acceptable to Jehovah than their own; although Levites either accompanied the Ark from Ekron to Beth-shemesh, or were at Beth-shemesh ready to receive it (1 Sam. vi, 15), Criticism boldly treats the custody as improper. Is it right to infer from the narrative that Abinadab and his son, or the men of Kirjath-jearim who took part in this matter, did *not* possess the necessary character and qualifications for what they did?

But if the people concerned did not know of these requirements they knew that Jehovah would avenge a mishandling of the Ark; and the men of Kirjath-jearim, no less than those of Beth-shemesh, were doubtless bent on doing what would be pleasing in His sight. The question thus resolves itself into the simple question whether they succeeded in doing so. The answer is clear that they did; for Jehovah did not visit them with His displeasure. But whether this success was due to compliance with the Priestly Code could be decided only if we knew whether it was in force; if it was in force, and applicable, the approval of Jehovah shows that it was sufficiently complied with. The history says it was in force; and there is no sufficient evidence in the account of this incident to contradict it. Without fuller knowledge no inference unfavourable to the statements of the Pentateuch can be justified.

With regard to the Tabernacle and its establishment, the narrative in Samuel does not profess to deal with it, and consequently no inference as to scantiness arises. It is impossible to deal with "impressions" which cannot avail to contradict the positive and unvarying statements of the history. The "scale" of the establishment at Shiloh may never have reached, or may have declined from the standard; but no inference as to details can be drawn from the silence

of a narrative which does not deal with that subject. It is not exactly "simplicity" that would flourish in that corrupt atmosphere in days when, as the Psalmist declares, Israel in general was in decadence and was preparing its own doom, as well as that of Shiloh, by its "hill-altars" and "images." The desperate effort to avert or arrest that doom by invoking the protection of the Ark in battle, whether right or wrong, could hardly be expected to provoke comment from anybody, unless it were from blind Eli or the child Samuel! And in order to judge whether it should have provoked comment, we must at least know, in sufficient detail, the circumstances under which it was removed.

IV.—*Want of Distinction between Priests and Levites.*—Priests and Levites are said¹ to be "conspicuous by their absence" when the Ark was brought to Mt. Zion (2 Sam. vi, 12-20) and David sacrificed, it is contended, with "his own hand," and gave the blessing, which is claimed as an exclusively priestly function (Deut. x, 8; xxi, 5; Num. vi, 23-27).

The passages cited authorized the sons of Aaron to bless the people, and prescribed the form of the Blessing (Num. vi, 23-27). This authority to the priests, however, does not necessarily exclude the King from having the same function on suitable occasions; and on such an exceptional occasion as that of the restoration of the Ark to its place it would surely be very suitable that the King should bless the people. The blessing of the Priests is not excluded; if in place, it was probably given. The Priests cannot have been all absent;² but if they were, the King's blessing would have been still more in place.

The reference to the absence of the Priests and Levites, just quoted, seems to be meant to suggest that there were no official Priests or Levites in existence. Levites had, as already noticed, made their appearance at Beth-shemesh, in charge of the Ark, on its return from the Philistines (1 Sam. vi, 15).

The true inference from the narrative is, consequently, that, if their presence was necessary, they were present, and performed their proper duties, and that their presence was a matter of course, and needed no special mention in a narrative such as that of Samuel, since everybody would

¹ Driver, "Introduction," pp. 136-137.

² See Ps. cxxxii, 9.

know they must have been present, if their presence was necessary or proper. We know from 1 Chron. xv, xvi, that the Priests and Levites were, in fact, conspicuous by their presence. As to David's sacrificing "with his own hand," it has already been dealt with.

V.—*Different Tone of Priestly Code.*—"The different *tone of feeling* and the different *spirit* which animates the narratives of the historical books cannot be disguised; both the actors and narrators in Judges and Samuel move in an atmosphere into which the spirit of P has not penetrated."¹ (The italics are Dr. Driver's.)

This point, so far as it arises, has been already incidentally touched upon. Judges and Samuel are apparently national as distinguished from ecclesiastical narratives. There is difference but not conflict between those and other sections. The stress laid upon the impossibility of disguising the difference involves an admission that such difference must have been palpably visible all along. In no age, however, did it lead to the present Critical conclusion, reversing the former judgment, that the priestly section must be later than the national or popular one. Moreover, it could not warrant any conclusion as to date unless the development of Israel was a merely natural development. Now the Jews of all ages were convinced that it was not such a development; but that the growth of Israel was a development under the special guidance of God, of which the Scriptures, including the ecclesiastical section, were the record, and the Law the instrument, as represented in the history. That history is set aside by Criticism, on no surer ground than an assumption that it cannot be true, that if it were true "the spirit of P" *must* have penetrated the "atmosphere" in which the national life moved, and must have been more prominent in the record of it. In what more definite shape it would have shown itself is left obscure; and the absence of its manifestation is only supported by the alleged ignorance and violation of its law which we have just been considering. Some generation of Israelites knew whether the Priestly Code was in existence from Mosaic times, and they have, in the Tradition, handed down their witness to its existence; a witness which is accepted by "conservative critics," so far as it affirms the existence of institutions similar to those of P, although not as to the

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 137.

existence of "the particular document P," and not as to the existence of institutions or laws "with the precise formalities described in P,"¹ or as "now codified in P,"² "in the shape in which they are formulated in the Priest's Code" being "simpler and less systematically organized."³ This subtle distinction seems too slight a thread to bear so weighty a theory! The institutions and laws, it seems, in some shape, sufficiently penetrated the national life, but the "spirit" or "tone of feeling" now detected by Critics as associated with them in the "completed Priest's Code" did not penetrate it. This conclusion, as to the lateness of the Priestly Code, does not, however, as already remarked, decide that the "Priest's Code" in its *original* state was late, or even later than Moses, and Criticism itself decided, or assumed, originally that it was the earliest of the sections of the Pentateuch, and that the Law was Mosaic.

The subtle aroma of the "completed" Code similarly failed to penetrate the then Critical sense, as it is said to have failed to do in the Jewish nation's life! Much more flagrant failures are the constant theme of the teachers of Israel, who did not find the people penetrated with the weightier matters of the law to such a degree as to leave their prophets any leisure to insist on the "precise" performance of the Ceremonial Law, which, however, as easier of observance, the people were more inclined to perform. In fact, as Dr. Driver points out,⁴ the earlier prophets who were moved to "attack formalism and unspiritual service," had no need to foster the "atmosphere" of the "Priest's Code," which might so easily degenerate—as it did—into the very formalism they were battling with.

It cannot be legitimately inferred, from the scanty notices of institutions in the pre-Exilic history, either that those institutions did differ from those described in the Pentateuch, as we have it now, or that any deviation, such as those alleged, would show that those who took part in such deviation were not aware of the Pentateuchal Ordinances, still less that those Ordinances had not then been enacted. The express statement that the Ordinances had been solemnly prescribed could not be displaced by such inferences; unless,

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 143.

² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

at any rate, they were of such a character as to amount to absolute contradictions, which an inference can scarcely amount to, and which these inferences cannot claim to do. In any case, there would be nothing more than a contradiction by an inference drawn by a later generation, which could not have direct knowledge, as to what had happened in a previous generation. For the history would, or might, be later in date than the events. There would, indeed, be much less than such a contradiction; for no more could, in any case, be properly inferred than that the institutions did not exist, in the later generation, not that they had not been ordained, or that they had not been in existence.

The whole Critical argument on this subject is, in effect, an attempt to shift from the shoulders of Criticism the burden of producing better evidence to displace that of the Pentateuch, and to place that burden on the shoulders of the record by calling, in effect, for better evidence from it, instead of producing evidence to displace it. And, at the same time, it is confidently said that fuller knowledge could not support the express statements of the sacred writings. What is this but a bare-faced begging of the question?

We are sufficiently assured by the Tradition that any development or modification in the Mosaic institutions which may have occurred, under Divine sanction, did not affect the substantial identity of those institutions in any later form with their original form. No further attestation of the Pentateuchal ordinance is, therefore, required. It is attested by the Tradition that in all stages of the institutions, whatever they may have been, the substance of them persisted throughout unaltered.

Tabernacle and Temple.

When Solomon built the Temple he framed it in accordance with the directions at Sinai for the Tabernacle and on the model of the Tabernacle.

There is no account of the structure at Shiloh. It appears to have been the Wilderness "Tent of Meeting." It has already been contended that the worship at Shiloh, while uncorrupted, was in conformity with the Law, so far as circumstances permitted. The nation had not at that time attained to the permanent "rest" contemplated by Deut. xii, 13. That rest appeared in sight in the later part of David's reign, and Jehovah then sanctioned the preparation by David for a dwelling for Himself, and appeared in the new Temple. In the period between the abandonment of Shiloh and the

dedication of the Temple, worship was offered at various places, but in the later years of that period, mainly at the old Tabernacle, which had apparently been preserved, and which was found at one time at Nob, and afterwards at Gibeon; to it David would have resorted, at the crisis of the judgment by pestilence, but for "the sword of the Angel of the Lord" (1 Chron. xxi, 28-30). Gibeon was then "the great High Place" (1 Kings iii, 4). There, in the Tabernacle, was the Sanctuary, with the horned Altar, prescribed in Ex. xxvii, 1, 2 (1 Kings i, 50, 51; ii, 28, 29).

There was also a numerous organized Priesthood, and an organized worship (1 Chron. xvi, 39-42).

The Tabernacle and its contents were brought up from Gibeon and deposited in the Temple, at its Dedication (1 Kings viii, 3, 4).

These facts, if true, show an incredible anticipation of the Priestly Code, not in operation, according to Criticism, until centuries later. They are, however, perfectly accounted for if the Law was given in the Wilderness. The testimony of Kings accords with that of Chronicles, and both show a very deep penetration of the life of Israel by the Priestly Code, with a corresponding practice, as to which Kings is said to be silent! The Critical theory is, as already indicated, that the details of the construction of the Tabernacle (if it ever existed, which some deny) and of the Temple, the existence of which cannot be denied, were, in fact, drawn from the Temple itself, as it stood at the Exile, and then projected back into the Wilderness, and made to appear as the express Divine directions for the construction and furnishing of the Tabernacle! This inversion of the narrative, turning the cause into the consequence, the cart into the horse, is based mainly upon the alleged silence of Samuel and Kings as to the existence of the Priestly Code before the Exile! And then there is nothing to account for the existence of such a Temple with its furniture, Priesthood, Sacrifice, Ritual and Worship!

VI.—*Difference of Theological Conceptions.*—"The legislation of P is not presupposed by Deut.," that book being "based consistently upon JE, and using language . . . repeatedly, implying that some of the fundamental institutions of P are not in operation." Had such institutions been in operation "it is difficult not to think that allusions to it (P) would have been both abundant and distinct."¹

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 137.

The ancient Israelites have, in effect, handed down to us their conviction that the allusions to this same legislation *are* sufficiently abundant and distinct; for they regarded Deut. as summarizing the entire Law—so far as was suitable on the occasion on which Moses uttered his exhortations—in a popular form for practical use. The precise details of the Ceremonial Law were more appropriate for, and were specially enacted for, the training and guidance of the Priests; and were less suitable for the teaching of the people, who, indeed, would probably depend upon the priests for such instruction and direction as to the entire Law, both Moral and Ceremonial, as they needed. The treatment of the Law by Deut. sufficiently shows that the “precise” Code, as we have it now, or perhaps as it then existed, if there was any difference, was not expected or, indeed, intended to “penetrate,” as a matter of information or theory, the life of the people; but as a matter of practice and discipline, it was to teach and foster due observance to the Law, as received from the priests when occasion required. The Law, indeed, as a whole, and as an instrument of training, was so far an ideal that, as St. Paul emphasizes, its precepts, whether moral or ceremonial, never completely “penetrated the life of the people,” collectively or individually; that was a climax only reached in Him who alone perfectly fulfilled it.

Relaxations and modifications might be made, under Divine sanction, on fitting occasions. Dr. Driver¹ admits the probability or possibility of relaxations; but, as to the cases of deviation, already noticed, thinks that “this view lacks support in fact.” It has, however, the support of the history, which shows, as already pointed out, that so far as the law is alleged to have been departed from, the departure (if any) was usually made, or was sanctioned by those inspired men who were the authorized guides of the people, from Moses onwards. If Moses, in Deut. xii, ordained a single exclusive Central Sanctuary in modification of the previous law, Moses was still the authorized exponent of the mind of Jehovah; and, so far as Samuel and other loyal Israelites are found departing from the alleged strictness of that ordinance, either in letter or in spirit, the true explanation is, except in cases of wilful disobedience, that they acted under Divine sanction, as is clearly shown when Jehovah responded to their call.

¹ Driver, “Introduction,” p 138.

The "fundamental institutions," said not to have been in operation at the date assigned for Deut. by Criticism, that is, Josiah's reign (a date some centuries after the Mosaic date), are those (1) of an exclusive Central Sanctuary, and (2) of the division of the Levites into two orders, Priests and Levites.

The Central Sanctuary.

(a) As to the Central Sanctuary, Dr. Driver contends¹ that Deut. xii, 13 "is unambiguous, and strict"; sacrifice "is not to be offered in Canaan in every place that thou seest (Deut. xii, 13), but only at the place chosen by God out of all thy tribes to set His name there." The true meaning of this is surely that Jehovah will choose where He will meet with His people. They were to depend on Him, not He on them. The practice during the period before the dedication of Solomon's Temple is said to have ignored this law, and to have been based instead upon Ex. xx, 24, which says, "in every place where I record my name I will come to thee and bless thee."

This declaration, however, seems to enunciate the same principle as Deut. xii, 13. It has been already repeatedly pointed out that during the period between the capture of the Ark and its return to Mt. Zion, at least, there was no Central Sanctuary. The glimpses that are given of the religious practices of this period are casual or incidental, and palpably fragmentary; there is no attempt to give an exhaustive or, indeed, any complete or detailed description of the religious life or practice of the people as actually prevailing at this period, or, indeed, at any other period. The history seems to take for granted, what is plainly asserted in the Pentateuch, that the Law, both moral and ceremonial, had been declared in substance in the time of Moses; and, therefore, that, except where it was thought desirable to notice deviations from it, it required no further mention, its observance, with more or less fidelity, being assumed. Reference to the record of it was still farther from the mind of the time, and only became at all appropriate after the abeyance of the Law in the Exile. And if the interpretation now contended for is correct, and applicable to the period when the Ark was in captivity or displaced, the people who acted otherwise than as Criticism would approve may have

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 85.

adopted a different interpretation of the Law from that of the Critics, or may have thought the Critical view inapplicable to their case. In a variety of ways they may have been led to act as they did, although perfectly aware that Deut. xii, 13, existed.

Moses, however, in Deut. is represented as summarizing and interpreting a law already given; modifying it also, when necessary, in view of the approaching entrance into Canaan. In Deut. xii, 13, he does not profess even to modify the law, much less to ordain something new in principle. He seems to say that, as in their wandering life in the Wilderness, Jehovah had accompanied them, and met them, at successive halting places, chosen by Him, in their march, so when they should be settled, and "at rest" in Canaan, Jehovah designed to set His Name at a place in the midst of them at which He would meet with them, as a people, at a national centre of worship, and that, in any case, it was not for them, especially for individuals, to choose a place to worship, and to expect to constrain Him to meet them there. There seems to be here no allusion to such worship as that of the Patriarchs. The National worship alone is dealt with. There is, however, no penalty prescribed for worship elsewhere, as there is usually in the Law for offences against Jehovah. Such penalty would, perhaps, hardly be appropriate in a national ordinance; and, in any case, might be sufficiently supplied by the futility of the unauthorized worship. Such worship, however unfruitful, may have been regarded as innocent, so long as it was not tainted with disloyalty, idolatry, or moral evil. Moses seems to be laying emphasis upon the necessity which would arise when they should come to be scattered at places at distances from one another, instead of being all clustered round the Wilderness Tent of Meeting. They would then need a centre; and Jehovah had anticipated this need, and would meet it by the choice of a place in which to set His Name. This declaration would also prepare the people to recognize the Divine choice, instead of meeting with jealousy, or possibly, rebellion, the preference which was to be given to one of their tribes. As the history stands, there is neither inconsistency nor any serious difficulty. The strictness alleged seems merely an emphatic warning against setting up a rival sanctuary. In any view of the passage, however strict its requirements, it could not come into force until they were at rest from their enemies, and *à fortiori*, not

when they were in subjection to their enemies, and it would not remain in force when Jehovah withdrew Himself from them, and would not meet with them.

But, assuming the correctness of the Critical view, that any other national worship than that at the Central Sanctuary, although allowed by Ex. xx, 24, was sternly and absolutely forbidden, and assuming its applicability in the time of Samuel and David, the result is, at the utmost, a contradiction, or an inconsistency, that is, a partial contradiction, in the narrative, between the Law and the supposed practice. Does this justify the removal of the Deuteronomic precept to some period where it would no longer be in conflict with the prevailing practice? This method surely cannot be sound, especially when, it is alleged, the prevailing practice at the time in question conformed to the earlier precept. The inference would be that the earlier precept was accepted as still in force, Deuteronomy in that case must have interpreted or modified the former law in a way which was either not accepted or not held applicable when Deut. was written. No inference whatever can arise that the conflicting precepts were not proclaimed in the Wilderness, as stated in the Pentateuch.

Priests and Levites.

(b) Similar considerations apply to the alleged absence of allusions to the distinction between Priests and other Levites. Criticism denies, without any express evidence, what the Pentateuch expressly affirms, that the two orders of ministers were ordained by Moses, and actually exercised their appointed functions. Criticism denies that there was any such distinction, and asserts that all Levites were priests down to the Exile. Dr. Driver says,¹ "In the laws of P in Leviticus and Numbers a sharp distinction is drawn between the priests and the common Levites; in Deut. it is implied (Deut. xviii, 1a) that *all* members of the tribe of Levi are qualified to exercise priestly functions; and regulations are laid down (xviii, 6-8) to meet the case of any member coming from the country to the Central Sanctuary, and claiming to officiate there as priest."

Deut. xviii, 1a (cited above) says, "The priests, the Levites, even ('and' R.V. marg.) all the tribe of Levi shall have no portion nor inheritance with Israel." This is made

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 82.

to imply not only that all Levites are in the same position as to having no inheritance with Israel, but that they are also, as to their functions, all in the same position, although their functions are said, in ordinances purporting to have been already made and acted upon, to have been sharply distinguished. Such a construction can be placed upon Deut. xviii, 1a, only by assuming that the distinction had not been made, which is the thing to be proved. Deut. xviii, 6-8 (R.V.) (also cited above), says, "And if a Levite come from any of thy gates out of all Israel, where he sojourneth, and come with all the desire of his soul unto the place which the Lord shall choose (v. 6), then he shall minister in the name of the Lord his God; as all his brethren the Levites do, which stand there before the Lord (v. 7). They shall have like portions to eat, beside that which cometh of the sale of his patrimony" (v. 8).

Criticism endeavours, as we have seen, to show that although the narrative was framed, by the final compilers or editors so as to represent that the whole of the Law, including (1) the Ordinances as to Sacrifice, Priesthood and Ritual; (2) the substitution of a rigorously exclusive Central Sanctuary for a number of places for Sacrifice; and (3) the division of the Levites into a twofold Order of Priests and Levites, was enacted in the Wilderness, yet indications have been allowed to appear, presumably by inadvertence, which show that in the original "Sources," which are supposed to have lain before the compilers or editors, all these institutions first appeared, in the form alleged by the narrative to have been, in substance, their Mosaic form, centuries after Moses.

In order to maintain this theory, fresh interpretations of the text of the history of these institutions are invoked. But it is palpably obvious that these interpretations contradict the fundamental and dominant fact which the compilers or editors sought to establish, namely, that the entire law was, in substance, given in the Wilderness. It is admitted, and is indisputable, that the final form of the Pentateuch was intended to assert this fact with the utmost emphasis. Any interpretation of the words which conflicts with the meaning the words were intended to convey must be inadmissible. The final compilers or editors could not have meant to convey to their readers contradictions of their own most cherished convictions, and of their own most emphatic statements. According to the Critical theory itself, they zealously sought to eliminate what Criticism supposes to have been present

in their "Sources" whenever it conflicted with their theory that the entire Law was given in the Wilderness. Criticism maintains that the secret still leaks out of the narrative, which its framers believed watertight. But this cannot be proved by interpretations which make the writers mean what they plainly could not have meant. They could not have meant to say anything which would even raise a suspicion as to the truth of their narrative. That they have nevertheless unconsciously and inadvertently done so requires clear proof. That after setting out the division of Priests and Levites in the Law they could have meant to say that all Levites were Priests is incredible.

Thus, Criticism flies in the face of the Pentateuch as it stands; as well as in the face of P's belief in the historical truth of the Pentateuch, clearly shown by the supposed compilers of the Priestly Code. Those compilers treated the institutions of that Code as dating from Moses; and as thenceforth in unvarying operation. Criticism also flies in the face of the entire Tradition. But it claims, as to the Priesthood, to be in accord with Ezekiel, who is said,¹ in Ezek. xlv, 10-16, to show "incontrovertibly that all Levites had theretofore enjoyed priestly rights." Ezekiel, in the passage just referred to, declares that "the Levites who went far from 'Jehovah,' when Israel went astray, shall bear their iniquity." They are to minister, but not to execute the office of Priest unto Jehovah. "But the Priests the Levites the sons of Zadok," who remained faithful, should exercise the office of Priest. Ezekiel is here merely dealing with the position of the disloyal priests as compared with the loyal ones. He is not dealing with the distinction between loyal priests and loyal Levites; but with the distinction to be thenceforth made between loyal and disloyal priests. Dr. Driver² appears to assume that Ezekiel is also dealing with all Levites, for he says that "the prohibition in v. 13" against the disloyal Levites exercising the office of priest "would be superfluous," if the Levites had not enjoyed such rights. But it would clearly not be superfluous if some of the disloyal Levites were priests, which "it is difficult not to think" that some of them must have been.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 139.

² *Ibid.*, p. 140.

The Projection Theory.

A late date for the section of the Scriptures, distinguished as P, is, as already pointed out, an essential aim, in fact, the goal, of the modern Critical theory, although it is of little benefit, of itself, to that theory, unless Criticism can also make out its theory of the projection by the Exilic compilers of events which took place late in the history back into the Wilderness; which must necessarily be an assumption, for no proof is, or can be, given of it. That theory of projection can only be offered as an explanation of facts supposed to be already proved. It is treated as proved that the giving of the whole Law, including the P section of it, certainly did not happen in the Wilderness, as the Tradition asserts, and the explanation of its coming to be placed there by the ultimate compilers, which Criticism offers, is the theory that it must have been placed there in the ultimate compilation of our present text, because the compilers of it mistakenly projected it back into the Wilderness; misled, as it is said, by the Temple usage existing at the Exile, into thinking that the same usage must have prevailed all along from Mosaic times.

We have seen, if our contention is correct, that the only proof offered of the late date adopted by Criticism is that which is alleged to show that the P section could not have been in existence before the Exile, since it contains laws for Sacrifice, Priesthood (in two Orders), and Ritual, of none of which does any trace appear in the earlier history; but which, on the contrary, are shown, by the non-observance and violation of them, not to have been enacted in the Wilderness. We have seen that the proof attempted altogether fails, and is, indeed, refuted by the evidence, which confirms the Tradition. It is sought to show that the Law was the fruit of Prophetic influence. The evidence, it is submitted, shows that the Prophets and the Law started together in Moses, and remained in union until they culminated in Christ.

A ground particularly relied upon by Wellhausen¹ for the late date of P is its suitability for the situation of the Jews after the Exile, when, according to Criticism, it became a "Church," and ceased to be even a Nation, much less a Monarchy. Its character was, as the Tradition declares,

¹ "Encyclopædia Britannica," 9th edition, vol. xviii, p. 508. Art. "Pentateuch."

that of "a sifted nation." The legislation of P does not, he says,¹ "suit" any period earlier than the Exile, but "fits Post-Exilic Judaism to a nicety." Since Post-Exilic Judaism received as its Law the present Pentateuch, which includes this legislation, and apparently lived in more or less conformity to it, and was accordingly moulded by it, the Law perhaps fitted it "to a nicety" as completely as was to be expected.

The narrative in the Pentateuch, however, tells us that this same legislation had, centuries before, been given, accepted, put in operation in the Wilderness, and must have equally "fitted to a nicety" all generations down to the Exile; and, after its abeyance in the Exile, came again into operation as soon as the situation allowed, not as a new law, but as the old Law which had never ceased to be in force. There does not seem to be anything proved which can displace this positive evidence, which is that of the Law itself, of the narrative, and of its compilers and authors from first to last. There is no similar counter-evidence, and nothing but the suggestion of a Critic, however distinguished!

The late date for P is said to be "confirmed"² by "the character of the religious conceptions which it presents." The "anthropomorphism" of J is contrasted with the "transcendence above nature" of the Deity in P. "In JE the patriarchs are men of flesh and blood"; even the genealogies of JE are "fresher." "In P we have a skeleton"; "no explanation is given in it of the corruption overspreading the earth, and rendering necessary" the Flood. In it "Legislative, statistical, chronological elements are the sole conspicuous features." "There is a tendency to treat the history theoretically." "The representations of the patriarchal age seem . . . not to be so primitive as in JE. The patriarchs, for instance, are never represented as building altars or sacrificing; and Noah receives permission to slaughter animals for food without any reference to sacrifice, notwithstanding the intimate connexion subsisting in early times between slaughtering and sacrifice."³

The anthropomorphism of JE is not at the same level throughout. Jehovah does not walk on earth after the time

¹ "Encyclopædia Britannica," vol. ii, p. 570.

² Driver "Introduction," p. 140.

³ The analogy from pagan races seems to be treated here as applicable to the Divinely and specially guided race.

of Abraham. Does not this show that the anthropomorphism is not a peculiarity of an author but the fruit of the teaching of Jehovah Himself? He designed, apparently, to reveal both the transcendence of His nature, and His nearness to mankind; and God and man are shown converging from the beginning until they are revealed in their eternal union in Christ.

In any case, the anthropomorphism which is converging throughout to that union cannot mark the date of the history. That must depend upon the date of the ultimate stage of anthropomorphism shown in the history by the author, and not by any earlier stage, even on the Critical assumption that it is a purely human development. It cannot indicate different authorship unless the transcendence of God is inconsistent with His revelation of Himself to man in the form of man, beginning with His walking in the garden, continued all through in the forms of "Angels," and culminating in the "unity of person" in Our Lord.

The presence of more graphic elements in some parts of the Pentateuch than in other parts is obvious on the surface. The difference in subject involves a corresponding difference in style. The matters said to be omitted in the less graphic and drier parts are found in the other parts! The "skeleton" of P, and the "flesh and blood" of JE, are largely produced by the stripping off the flesh from P and giving it to JE. To treat this arrangement as showing a difference of authors implies an assumption that the same person could not have written both. To say of the sections that one is thus shown to be later than the other adds a further assumption that the plural writers could not be contemporary. The narrative, however, as we have it, declares that both refer to the very same period of Israel's history; and the Tradition ascribes the history, in substance, to Moses. Criticism contradicts the history and the Tradition, and asserts that two widely different stages of development were brought together; in the period of the supposed later stages of development, by a compiler, apparently unconscious of their incongruity. Such conduct on the part of a compiler is evidence that he, at least, did not think there was any such incongruity; and all subsequent generations have agreed with him.

In fact there is no such incongruity; since the matters said to stamp the P section as later, as belonging to a later stage of development than the JE section, are admittedly congruous when combined, by a supposed later hand, in the narrative

as it stands. Can the fact that matters are omitted in one part of a narrative, which are supplied in another part of the same narrative, justify any such inference as that the authorship is composite, or that the narrative combines histories of widely different stages of development, or of different dates of authorship? The narrative purports to depict, more or less fully, a certain period. There is no other evidence of what happened during that period.

The narrative may be incredible, but that can only be if something is independently known of that period, and if what is known is more trustworthy than, and in contradiction to, or in conflict with, the narrative. Even if institutions ordinarily characteristic, among other races, of a simpler and earlier stage of development were represented as existing along with those characteristic of a more advanced stage, of the same race, that would only show that the whole was written after the later stage had been reached, but would prove nothing as to different authors or dates, unless we knew that the existence of such various institutions, side by side, was impossible, and impossible, not in some other development, but in that particular development. In truth, the survival of the institutions and ideas of one age into a later age is common enough, as the laments of reformers abundantly testify. It is not even necessary to appeal to the specially unique, much less to the inspired character, of the document, or of the development, in order to show the unwarrantable character of the Critical inference, for no two developments can be similar enough to warrant such analogies. It might almost as well be argued that cloth striped in different colours was made in strips; as that a narrative has as many authors as it has characteristics. Here, one author and one age are not less, but more consistent with the phenomena than more authors or more ages.

Some friends of modern Criticism half admit the precariousness of its conclusions when they gently rebuke it for "arbitrariness." If it were otherwise shown that there are, in fact, divergent ages depicted, or different authors engaged in the work, the phenomena might be consistent with that state of the facts. The facts here are *more* consistent with the work being of one age, and also of one author. There is overwhelming evidence that the events described all happened at one period, the Wilderness period.

The grounds upon which it is sought to bring down the so-called P. section of the Pentateuch to the Return from the

Exile have now been examined in detail. Each, in turn, has been shown, if the reasoning is sound, to be baseless, and therefore insufficient to support any such conclusion as that the P. section is of a later date. The difference of authorship owes its importance to the difference of date based upon it, as already remarked.

Finally, all these matters, which are said to show so unmistakably the distinct character and late date of the Priestly Code, were visible all along, and could never have escaped notice. The inferences drawn from them by Criticism have always been rejected by the Tradition; and, it is submitted, on their own merits, rightly rejected.

It is, however, urged¹ that the proof of P.'s later date and independent authorship is "cumulative." There can, however, be no cumulative result from a series of unfounded assertions. If each of these grounds was sound, although each proved something less than the full proposition, the sum of them might prove the complete proposition. Cumulative evidence may be compared to a battery of artillery; if the fire of each gun misses the target the effect is nothing at all; if some hit the target, the effect is the sum of the effects of all the blows.

It is also sought to carry the war into the enemy's country by attacking what is called the "traditional view."² The present discussion does not depend upon either that view, or the correction of it by Bp. Ellicott in "Christus Comproborator." Nor does the argument here advanced against the Critical views base itself upon the validity of the claim of the Scriptures to Inspiration. It has, indeed, been contended that the Critical method is fundamentally unsound, because it gives no weight, and attributes no influence, either to the Inspiration or to the author's consciousness of it, or to the Divine control or the unique character of the development; and because it even treats Scripture, as it could not treat any other book, with prejudice and hostility, and, at lowest, injustice. As to the "traditional view," all that is here maintained is that the Scriptures are substantially true, and are, in all respects, what they purport to be; and that Criticism has not proved any of its assertions to the contrary.

Modern Critics suggest, as already stated, that the compilers of the Old Testament, in or after the Exile, assumed

¹ Driver, "Introduction," preface, p. iv.

² *Ibid.*, preface, p. viii.

and believed that the entire Law was, in substance, given in the Wilderness. That Criticism, as represented by Dr. Driver, admits,¹ as also already stated, that these compilers—Ezra and his associates—had sources which they did not intend to desert or falsify, but that they were so misled by the “Temple usage”² as to represent *bonâ fide*, but erroneously, that there had been no material change in the usage of the worship since Mosaic times, and that the Temple usage sufficiently represented the Law as originally enacted, and as governing the Ceremonial usage, thenceforward, down to the Exile. The “sources,” which they did not intend to desert, must also have seemed to those compilers to say the same. But although, according to Modern Criticism, they sedulously and unsparingly removed from the record, as compiled by them, all traces which they detected of a tendency opposed to their own, they failed in thoroughness of scrutiny, and left in many cases, according to Criticism, a surprising number of features which betrayed an opposite tendency, and which are sometimes said to stare us in the face, although the compilers missed seeing them.

Deuteronomy, it is said,³ was not written by Moses, although, as some Critics admit,⁴ there is apparently nothing in it, purporting to relate to his lifetime, which could not have been written by him, except the setting, and the “rhetorical form”⁵ in which the “principles” are presented; these are supposed⁶ to have been added by a compiler in order to give effect to the “ideals of the prophets, especially of Hosea and Isaiah.” This setting consists mainly of the farewell speeches of Moses, which are also held by some to be in the “spirit” of Moses, and such as “he would have cordially approved,” and to be, perhaps, founded on some Tradition as to what he did say. Nevertheless Criticism refuses to allow that these speeches are actually his.

They are denied to be actually his, although exactly, or very nearly, what he might have said; and probably based on a tradition which affirmed that he did, in substance, say what is presented in Deut. as his very words. Among the

¹ Driver, “Introduction,” p. 128.

² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 157, 158.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-81, 90-91.

Ibid., pp. 76, 91.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

grounds for impeaching them are (a) that the "oratory of the speeches implies a long development."¹ That ground is one which takes no account of the influences, to which reference has already been frequently made, which must have been acting upon Moses, and must have tended to place his utterances in an unique category, even if he was mistaken in thinking that he was speaking what God had Himself specially moved him to say. Even to describe his addresses as "oratory," the fruit of cultivation, and as depending upon the development of that art or skill amongst his own people, is entirely out of place; much more, to compare his gift of expression with what may have been developed amongst other races, of other characters, aims and ideals, and with other training or development. There does not appear to be any material for judging of the stages of development of "oratory" among the Israelites, even if the elevated language of the prophets at a later time could be considered analogous instead of each being unique. There is no proof that the "oratory" of the one was moulded on the oracles of the others; and without knowledge of their order in time no inference can be drawn as to the course of the development of their "oratory." Criticism, however, infers their order in time from their assumed moulding, on human lines, on one another. The standard for comparison is, however, as far as appears, drawn from "entirely human" literature. But it was to Moses that Jehovah said, "I will be with thy mouth."² It was He who moulded the divine eloquence which Critics who "presuppose" inspiration call "oratory" and treat it as requiring a long natural development. The guests at Cana of Galilee might "presuppose" miracles, and even protest against naturalism, and yet have "felt" that the "good wine" had undergone a long development!

The experiences of Moses, after his call by Jehovah, might—even on human lines—be expected to mould him in speech, as in other qualifications, for his work. In any case, on the most "entirely human" principles, no inference as to the stage at which "oratory" had arrived in the time of Moses can be drawn without evidence of its cultivation or growth; and there seems to be absolutely no such evidence. Deborah's Song is admitted by many critics to be very ancient; although

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 88.

² Ex., iv, 12.

both that Song and the blessing of Moses are assigned to a date much later than Moses. Since Deborah's Song was chanted, has "public oratory" been steadily developing, soaring higher and higher? If so, and if, as Criticism contends, Deut. is long after the date of that Song, it ought to have reached even greater heights. Its exact date, moreover, ought almost, on Critical principles, to be capable of being fixed by the distance of its level from that of Deborah!

Another ground upon which Deut. is assigned to a late date is (b) on account of its "prophetic teaching,"¹ "the point of view from which the laws are presented, and the principles by which conduct is estimated"; all which "presuppose," it is said, "a relatively advanced stage of theological reflexion," approximating to the theology of Jeremiah and Ezekiel. They were both Priests, and had the duty of expounding and applying this same Law of Deuteronomy; this would account for the resemblances. Jeremiah—who prophesied in the days of Josiah—is admitted by some critics to have been deeply imbued with the ideas of Deut. restored to sight in Josiah's reign. Dr. Driver says,² "Jeremiah's phraseology is modelled most evidently upon that of Deut." This is a "literary" inference on human grounds. It is, indeed, not surprising, as just noticed, that Jeremiah should be in harmony with the Law of Moses, or that Ezekiel and other Priests and prophets should likewise base themselves upon it, as they evidently do. That would fully account for their style and phraseology, without the "modelling" insisted upon.

We seem to have, in the ground just stated, another "entirely human" analogy appealed to. Deut. is alleged to be based upon the teaching of other prophets, besides Moses, namely, Hosea and Isaiah.³ It is thus, apparently, mainly or largely, a human development. Any Divine stimulus to its production seems to be, so far, at second-hand; the prophets seem to Criticism to receive much of their oracles, not direct from God, but largely from their human predecessors.

Some Critics postulate, and all, in effect, assume by criticising it on human analogies—that the Jewish religion is "one of the religions of the world, neither more nor less."

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 88.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159, 149-150.

The views now under consideration are in harmony with, and are, in effect, based upon that principle.

The book of Deut., according to Criticism, is a product of Prophetic influence, and could not have reached its present stage in the time of Moses. And this is assumed, although we do not know the starting point, or the previous stages of the development, or the rate of its progress, which is not necessarily constant or uniform throughout. The Compiler, while stretching out the development so as to include, it is said, elements as late as Jeremiah and Ezekiel, commits the usual blunder of placing it all in the Wilderness. The development of oratory in Moses was, of course, necessarily placed there. But the "presupposed," "relatively advanced stage of theological reflexion"¹ stretching as far as to Jeremiah and Ezekiel is also, by the mistaken compiler, compressed into the same period of the Wilderness life, which Criticism "feels" is too narrow to hold it.

There may, perhaps, be stages of "theological reflexion," which may be "felt," in flat contradiction of the evidence, to be widely severed, although they cannot be proved to be so. Such feelings are not proof. Criticism would not accept such feelings as proof of facts which did not suit its own theories.

"Changed social conditions" which required, as Criticism insists, more than 40 years for their growth are also "presupposed"; but where is the standard measure of theological growth, which eludes proof, but is capable of apprehension by "feeling"? It must be a Divine growth, to fit the story. The measure cannot be derived from other races, nor from what a Critic by analogy to human experience, may "feel." Neither can change of social conditions in Israel be thus measured. Other races, even Semitic races, did not start or march, stage by stage, in theological or social development, either at the same time, or at the same pace, or under the same influences, or, consequently, to the same goal as Israel. The special Divine development of Israel is really ignored, and, in effect, denied by Criticism, and an "entirely human" development substituted. So we are told that Deut. "presupposes" (as just noticed) "changed social conditions of the people" from those of Ex. xxi-xxiii, although no change inconsistent with the history, which places Deut. in the Wilderness, can be proved. The differ-

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 88.

ence in the condition of the people, which occurred during the Wilderness period is shown in the Pentateuch; and no other different development is, or can be, proved. It must be shown that the stage of Deut., as reached within the Wilderness period, even under Divine control, or consciousness of it, cannot be reconciled with such a stage as that of Ex. xxi-xxiii, reached at the beginning of that period. Can any standard of either social or theological development, even if proved, be of sufficient certainty to measure such a Divine or special development, so as to displace positive testimony as to the actual dates, period or course?

In the present case, however, the two supposed incompatible stages are fixed in the narrative as making their appearance at an interval of some forty years, the stage of Ex. xxi-xxiii being reached early in the Wilderness life. If, to modern eyes, it is simple and crude, as compared with Deut., it is not proved to be unsuitable either for application at the time, or as a preparation for a fuller and more advanced stage. So far as Deut. constitutes a stage in legislation at all, it is mainly one of modification of previous laws. The additional legislation is chiefly intended for future operation, when the people should be at rest in Canaan, a distant prospect at the time. Even on human lines there is nothing which can displace the statements of the narrative. Could no development, even according to human analogies, take place during the Wilderness period? Criticism, although unable to show by evidence contained in, or extrinsic to, the Scriptures what are the relative periods of any stages of Israel's development, decides that neither, or only one of two alleged conflicting stages, was appropriate to its assigned period in the narrative. The Pentateuchal legislation undoubtedly incorporated among its enactments elements of the older system, such as circumcision ("which was of the fathers"), as approved by the legislator, Divine or human, of those times. The new and the old could not both be enacted at one time, according to Criticism. On the principles applied in the present case, the new must form a stage at a certain distance from the old, and cannot appear earlier, yet they do appear together in this very Pentateuchal legislation, although the distance between them remains, imperceptible unless brought to notice. The actual distance is not, however, determinable from the express legislation; the time required to develop successive stages is not the period elapsing between the enactment of the laws relating to those

stages. This reasoning makes no assumption as to Inspiration, or Divine legislation. If, however, the legislation or development is Divine, it cannot, it is evident, be gauged by any human standards.

There are other minor grounds for assigning a late date to Deut. which may be briefly noticed.

(c) The Law of the Kingdom, said to be "reminiscent of Solomon," is as follows:—

Deut. xvii, 14, "When thou art come unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it and shalt dwell therein; and shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are round about me; (15) thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee whom the Lord thy God shall choose: one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee; thou mayest not put a foreigner over thee, which is not thy brother. (16) Only he shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt, to the end that he should multiply horses: forasmuch as the Lord hath said unto you, Ye shall henceforth return no more that way. (17) Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, that his heart turn not away; neither shall he greatly multiply to himself silver and gold. (18) And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book, out of that which is before the priests the Levites (19), and it shall be with him and he shall read therein all the days of his life; that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them."

This law, according to Driver,¹ "is coloured by reminiscences of the monarchy of Solomon." "That Moses may have made provision for a monarchy" Criticism does not deny; but "affirms that the form in which the provision is here cast bears traces of a later age." The "reminiscences" and "traces of a later age" seem to rest merely on Critical opinion, which assumes that what were apparently provisions against future abuses, which were apprehended, were based upon past experience, although there is no apparent reference to such past experience, and no definite correspondence between these apprehended abuses and those recorded as marking the reign of Solomon. But it was, according to Criticism, experience of such abuses that coloured the "Law of the Kingdom," which must, therefore, be of later date.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 88.

As this Law purports to be proclaimed by Moses, it is clear that it could not have been interpreted in the way Criticism insists upon; nor, as just remarked, do the prohibitions of this Law correctly describe the abuses of the monarchy of Solomon's time. Nor was any such experience as is assumed needed by the legislator.

Criticism cannot, apparently, believe that Moses, even with inspiration "presupposed," could have thought of warning a future king against being tempted by love of horses to "cause the people to return to Egypt"; although, according to history, the people had missed the fleshpots of Egypt at times in the Wilderness, or against the excessive love of women, or of silver and gold. These warnings, Criticism suggests, could only come from some writer of a much later time, who had heard of or, possibly, witnessed Solomon's actual delinquencies.

(d) "The worship of the host of Heaven," which Deut. (iv, 19; xvii, 3) forbids, is said¹ to be "presupposed" and "not merely anticipated prophetically," apparently meaning that the worship already existed; and that it was rather the "danger" of its spread *in* Israel than *to* Israel which was in view. Dr. Driver admits that "no mention" of such worship in Israel is found until "the period of the later kings"; and adds, "while we are not in a position to affirm positively that the danger was not felt earlier, the law as formulated in Deut. seems designed to meet the form which the cult assumed at a later age," and must, therefore, be itself of that or a still later age.

"The law as formulated in Deut." is, apparently, the 2nd Commandment, referred to in Deut. iv, 16-19, as a prohibition against making graven images of male or female, beasts, winged fowls, creeping things and fishes; and against the people being drawn away to "worship the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the hosts of heaven." No "form" of "the cult" appears to be indicated. But what has become of the statement of Deut. that this prohibition was pronounced by Moses, and not in the time of the later kings? to say nothing of the "presupposed" inspiration, which once "presupposed" appears to be severely ignored? Or is this statement of Deut. itself, as to the date of the prohibition, to be ignored in considering the question?

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 88.

Such grounds as (e), the supposed absence of any "certain traces" of the influence of Deut. in the writings of Hosea, the so-called First Isaiah, while such traces appear in Jeremiah, Ezekiel and the "Second Isaiah," or (f) that Isaiah's prophecy that a *mazzébah* (pillar) should be set up to Jehovah in Egypt (Is. xix, 19b) showed¹ that he could not have known of the prohibition of such pillars in Deut. xvi, 22, need not be discussed here at length. As to the Mazzébah, there are other inferences which may arise—in our profound ignorance of the circumstances of the case—in preference to one contradicting the narrative, and discrediting Moses or the prophets or both. The fact, that the substance of Deut. is placed by the narrative in the Wilderness, cannot be displaced by such surmises.

Amalek and the Canaanites.

The case of Amalek and the Canaanites, which is dealt with in Deuteronomy xxv, 17-19, is, on the face of it, so plainly inconsistent with the date assigned to the book, (the 7th century B.C.²), that Criticism feels called upon to notice it. In the 7th century B.C. Amalek had been blotted out in pursuance of a command, first given through Moses, and recorded in Ex. xvii, 14, 16³—a passage assigned by Criticism to E⁴—and, consequently, long before the alleged date of Deut. That command is alleged to be the only command given before its execution. Moses was commanded to record it (v. 14). "I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven." It was recorded (v. 16) as follows: "The Lord hath sworn the Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation." In 1 Sam. xv, 2, 3, Samuel says to Saul: "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, I have marked that which Amalek did to Israel, how he set himself against him in the way, when he came up out of Egypt. Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." This terrible task was imposed upon Saul with corresponding solemnity; he was reminded (xvi) how he had been chosen by Jehovah to be king over Israel, and pointedly and

¹ Driver, "Introduction," pp. 88-89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

significantly warned not to fail in obedience. According to Criticism Deuteronomy was not then in existence, nor was the "Source" of the passage relating to Amalek (Deut. xxv, 17-19). That passage is as follows: "Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way as ye came forth out of Egypt, how he met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost of thee, all that were feeble behind thee, when thou wast faint and weary, and he feared not God. Therefore it shall be, when the Lord thy God hath given thee rest from all thine enemies round about, in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance to possess it, that thou shalt blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven, thou shalt not forget." This is the interpretation by Moses, under the guidance of Jehovah, of the will of Jehovah, of which the passage in Exodus xvii, 16, is a less exhaustive declaration. It entirely accords with the directions given to Saul by Samuel, under the same guidance. If Saul had been merely directed to attack Amalek, Criticism would probably have triumphantly declared that Deuteronomy xxv, 17-19, which required the blotting out of the race, and not merely a perpetual feud with them, which was all that was practicable while the people were still fighting their way to their inheritance, was unknown to Samuel, and was unknown because it was not in existence. Samuel, however, has embodied the command, as more fully stated by Deut., in his instructions to Saul; and what does Criticism say now? Incredible as it may seem, it says the very same—that Samuel did not know of the Deuteronomic command to blot out Amalek, because neither the passage in Deut. nor its "source" was in existence. That passage, Criticism says, came into existence long after the blotting out of Amalek, which had been effected without its express direction. The ordinary man would vainly guess what could possibly be said for such a contention. Dr. Driver's explanation¹ is that this belated command "would indirectly have a real value; occurring, as it does, in close connection with the prohibition of all intercourse with the Canaanites, it would be an emphatic protest against tendencies which, under Ahaz and Manasseh, became disastrously strong."

The passages relating to the extirpation of the Canaanites, referred to by Dr. Driver (Deut. vii, 1-5, and xx, 16-18) prescribe as follows:—

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 92.

Deut. vii, 1-5, directs that the Israelites shall "utterly destroy" the Canaanites, and "make no covenant with them"; they shall not intermarry with them; but shall "break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and hew down their Asherim, and burn their graven images with fire."

Deut. xx, 16-19, directs that they shall "save alive nothing that breatheth," but shall "utterly destroy them."

These passages are said to be repetitions of Ex. xxiii, 31-33, as the passage in Deut., respecting Amalek, is said to be a repetition of that in Exodus, both of which latter passages have been already quoted.

Ex. xxiii, 31-33, directs that they shall "drive out" the Canaanites, and make no covenant with them, "nor with their gods. They shall not dwell in thy land, lest they make thee sin against me, for if thou serve their gods, it will surely be a snare unto thee."

In each case the command to extirpate is an addition, or expansion, suited to the time at which Moses was giving his farewell directions; but absurd at the time at which Deut. is said to have been published, when Amalek had long been blotted out, and when the Canaanites had been extirpated, as far as they could be, or, at least, as far as they ever were extirpated. And these directions, both those in Exodus and those in Deut., are all said, in the narrative, to have been given in the Wilderness, for execution when the nation should be settled in Canaan. The same statement is made by the "Sources" as well as by the present text, and there is nothing to contradict that statement. Criticism, however, maintains that the command to extirpate was first expressed after the extirpation had been carried out, and was then first thought necessary on account of its "indirect" value; of which there is no hint in the "Sources." The prohibitions in Exodus were already absolute as to intercourse with the condemned races, and did not then need, or admit of, any indirect additions; and the additions were emphatic directions to do what could not, in Josiah's reign, be done, as it had already been done.

Dr. Driver seems to admit that the directions as to Amalek were given through Moses, as stated in Deut. xxv, 17-19, but Samuel did not know it. They were not published until they were only of "indirect" use! This argument is thought

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 92.

good enough to displace the Tradition. What sort of reception would such a plea have met with if offered in favour of the Scripture?

Minor Criticisms of Deuteronomy.

It is not within the scope of the present argument to deal in detail with the points raised by Criticism, except to show their unsoundness of principle. There are, however, a variety of points raised by Criticism, of comparatively trifling importance, on which it is necessary to touch, because Deut. is held¹ to show such conflict with the books from Exodus to Numbers that it cannot be by the same author, or its laws by the same "legislator." Moses is spoken of as a "legislator," although Jehovah purported to be, and was believed to be, the real legislator. Apparently, according to Critical experience, laws made by the same authority or by the same person, are never found to conflict. In fact, not only does such conflict occur, but there are recognized rules for dealing with such conflicts, and amendments are frequently needed.

Deuteronomy does not profess merely to recite the law, and does not always enunciate it in the same form, or in the same terms, as the other books of the Pentateuch. Its object is, apparently, not to provide a Manual of the Law as formulated in those books.

It is a restatement of parts of the Law then existing, with modifications and additions, for operation in Canaan after the settlement of Israel in their new possession. A long time had elapsed since the Law was given on Sinai; and it seems clear that modifications had been made from time to time. There is nothing like cast-iron legislation suggested in the narrative, nothing like "the laws of the Medes and Persians." There was no need for such rigidity in the laws or institutions, for Jehovah was Himself always present, as administrator of His own laws, "after the counsel of His own will." If we do not share in the belief of the writers of Scripture, we must still recognize it as a fact when we come to adjudge these writers to be inconsistent. The limits of possible "inconsistency" must, even on "entirely human" principles, be fixed if any can be fixed with reference to the point of view of those to whom it is imputed. Conflict in Divine laws cannot exist; the conflict, if any, must arise out

¹ Driver, "Introduction," pp. 82, 157, 158.

of the human mind which is employed as an instrument in communicating them to man. There is, consequently, a marked distinction between "entirely human" laws and laws emanating from a Divine legislator; whether the mode of communication of them to man is so direct as to be fitly described as "the voice of God," or "the finger of God," or is merely a heightening or illuminating of the human faculties.

The Law given at Sinai, so far as it had received application in the Wilderness, had been brought into relation with human wills; and these human wills had shown their attitude towards it, with the result that Jehovah saw fit to make other provisions, in some cases, for the future. There is no room for conflict in such a case; different instruments are employed to effect the same Divine purpose, as is constantly seen in the Divine dealings.

Amongst the minor instances of alleged conflict of laws, between Deut. and the other books of the Pentateuch, are those as to

(a) *The Release of Hebrew Slaves*.—Deut. xv, 12-18, is said¹ to be in conflict with, or out of "relation" with Lev. xxv, 39-43. Evidently the conflict (if any) cannot amount to a contradiction, and a contradiction is not alleged. It could not, of itself, displace the Tradition. The passages are as follows: "Lev. xxv, 39-43, enjoins the release of the Hebrew slave in the year of Jubilee," while Deut. xv, 12-18, "prescribes the release of the Hebrew slave in the seventh year of his service." Lev. xxv, 39, 40, says "If thy brother be waxen poor with thee and sell himself unto thee thou shalt not make him to serve as a bondservant: but as an hired servant, and as a sojourner he shall be with thee; he shall serve with thee unto the year of Jubilee." Deut. xv, 12, says, "If thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years; then, in the seventh year, thou shalt let him go free from thee," and "thou shalt furnish him liberally." The two cases are obviously different; the conditions of service are quite different; as is also the treatment at the end of the period. How can the two conflict, treated as merely human laws? Deut. deals with the case of a bondservant, a Hebrew "sold unto thee," not, apparently, selling himself; Leviticus expressly excludes that case, the case of the bondservant.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 82.

There seems to be nothing to bring into "relation." The Jews, so far as appears, saw no incongruity in the two ordinances standing together; and felt, apparently, no difficulty in applying them to their respective cases. Even as applying to the same case they are perfectly compatible, release at the Jubilee taking place, even if the six years were not completed.

But if a conflict must be found between them, which may not or cannot be reconciled, what is the result? One must prevail and one yield, or some other enactment must be substituted for both. And, if one legislator could not have enacted both provisions, could the priestly redactor, with his fixed idea that the institutions he saw around him had existed from Mosaic times, have found both existing and have represented them as both emanating from Jehovah through Moses? If he did so, as, according to Criticism, he did, he is supported by all the evidence there is, which is all in favour of their compatibility; and there is nothing to displace that representation. If he did not recognize any inconsistency—which is on the surface, if it exists, he may have interpreted the rules as applying to different cases, as above suggested; or he may have considered one a modification of the other. He may have considered such a modification in place when Moses was expounding the law as it was to be practised in Canaan. It is, however, for Criticism to explain how their redactor could have found both existing and in conflict without recognizing any inconsistency. These laws, supposed to be conflicting, must, whether Mosaic or Exilic, have been applied during a long period, and their incongruity was not discovered till many centuries after they had ceased to be fully applicable.

(b) *The portions of the priests* in Deut. xviii, 3, conflict, it is said,¹ with those in Lev. vii, 32-34. Deut. xviii, 3, gives them "the shoulder, and the two cheeks and the maw" of ox or sheep. Lev. vii, 32-34, does not specify any particular animal as the victim; but specifies the peace-offering as the sacrifice under regulation; out of which it declares that "the right thigh" (R.V. marg. "shoulder") is to be given; and adds that this is "a heave offering," the breast having been already given as "a wave offering."

There is no conflict here; and if there is, the remarks already submitted apply to it.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 83.

(c) *City of the Levites*. Deut. xviii, 6, Dr. Driver says,¹ "is inconsistent with the institution of Levitical cities prescribed in Num. xxxv : it implies that the Levite has no settled residence, but is a 'sojourner' in one or other of the cities ('gates,' see p. 99) of Israel. The terms of the verse are indeed entirely compatible with the institution of Levitical cities, supposing it to have been imperfectly put in force; but they fall strangely from one who, *ex hypothesi*, had only six months previously assigned to the Levites' permanent dwelling places. The same representation recurs in other parts of Deut.: the Levites are frequently alluded to as scattered about the land, and are earnestly commended to the Israelite's charity." Num. xxxv. contains the directions as to allotting 48 cities (including the six cities of refuge) to the Levites when the people should be settled in Canaan. Deut. xviii, 6 (already quoted in another connection), says, "If a Levite come from any of thy gates out of all Israel, where he sojourneth" to the "place which the Lord shall choose, then he shall minister" there. It is, no doubt, contemplated that a Levite was not fixed to his allotted city, or unable or forbidden to leave it, even for the purpose of ministering at the Sanctuary. "The terms of the verse" (Deut. xviii, 6) are, as is admitted,² "entirely compatible with the institution of Levitical cities;" which had (in the Wilderness) not then been required; and, consequently, the institution had not then been put in force, perfectly or imperfectly, and could not have been. But "it falls strangely," it seems, that the institution, having necessarily to be put in force in the future, provision should be made for a Levite stirring out of his city, and finding himself in another city, even at the Sanctuary! Is it imagined that the Levites would instantaneously shift into their permanent residences, still to be acquired when these laws were enacted, or that no provision was meanwhile necessary?

(d) *The law as to Firstlings* in Deut. is said³ to conflict with that in Num. xviii, 18, in which "the firstlings of oxen and sheep are assigned expressly and absolutely to the priest; while in Deut. (xii, 6, 17 f, xv, 19 f) they are to be eaten by the owner himself at the central Sanctuary." Num. xviii, 17, says (addressing Aaron), "thou shalt sprinkle their blood upon the altar, and shalt burn their fat for an offering made

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 83.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

by fire. (v. 18) And the flesh of them shall be thine, as the wave breast and as the right thigh it shall be thine." Deut. xii, 6, says, "Thither" (i.e., to the Sanctuary) "ye shall bring your burnt offerings, and your sacrifices, and your tithes, and the heave offering of your hand, and your vows, and your freewill offerings, and the firstlings of your herd and of your flock (v. 7); and there ye shall eat before the Lord your God." This follows a command that they must not do as the nations whose high places they were to destroy. It is followed, in v. 17, by a prohibition against eating those offerings "within thy gates," and by an emphatic declaration that "the Levite that is within thy gates" shall share. Deut. xv, 19, 20, also deals with the firstlings; it directs that they are to be "sanctified," and that no work should be done with them, and says, "Thou shalt eat it" at the Sanctuary, "thou and thy household."

These passages must be read together, for they all purport to be parts of the entire legislation, which had been given through Moses in the Wilderness. The passage in Numbers does not deal with the *eating* of the sacrifice; it says that, after sprinkling the blood and burning the fat, the remaining flesh is Aaron's. Moses, dealing in Deut. with the settled life in Canaan, declares that both the Levite and the offerer, with his household, are to share in the sacrificial meal. There is no conflict. The gift to the priest in Numbers is subject to restrictions or exceptions of the fat and the blood, but nothing is said as to how the flesh is to be eaten or dealt with. That is supplied, as regards the settled life in Canaan, by a declaration, which can cause no surprise, and certainly produces no conflict, that the offerer and his household are to share in the meal, and that the priest is not to devour it all. And, if there is a conflict, again the considerations already suggested apply.

(e) *The Tithes*.—A similar argument is used as to the tithes—that they are given to the Levites with one hand, and then taken back and given to the original owner with the other. Dr. Driver says,¹

"In Num. xviii, 21-24, the tithes, both animal and vegetable alike (Lev. xxvii, 30-32), are definitely assigned to the Levites, who, in their turn, pay a tenth to the priests (Num. xviii, 26-28): in Deut. there appears to be no injunction respecting the tithe of animal produce; but the reservation

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 83.

of a tithe of vegetable produce (xii, 17; xiv, 22), is enjoined, which is to be consumed by the offerer, like the firstlings, as a sacrificial feast, in which the Levite shares only in company with others, as the recipient of a charitable benevolence."

Lev. xxvii, 30, 32, says, "All the tithe of the land, whether of the seed of the land, or of the fruit of the tree, is the Lord's"; also "the tithe of the herd or of the flock." In Num. xviii, 21-24, the tithes are said to have been given to the tribe of Levi, as "a heave offering," and the Levites (Num. xviii, 26-28) are to give "a tithe of the tithe" as "a heave offering," which is to go to Aaron the priest. Deut. xii, 17-19, purporting to be later, and to be addressed to the people, provides for the eating of the tithes of corn, wine and oil, and of the firstlings of herd and flock, of vows, freewill offerings and heave offerings, and directs that they shall be eaten at the Sanctuary by the owner and his household and the Levite, as in the case of the firstlings already referred to. This had not been previously provided for. The obligation to render tithes, and its extent, are apparently assumed, having been previously declared in Leviticus and Numbers. The same injunction as that in Deut. xii, 17-19, is repeated in Deut. xiv, 22, 23—the Levite not being mentioned there—prefaced by the declaration, "Thou shalt surely tithe all the increase of thy seed, that which cometh forth of the field year by year." (Deut. xiv, 22.) Dr. Driver says,¹ "A large proportion of what is assigned in Num. to the Levites remains implicitly the property of the lay Israelite in Deut." Whether it is "a large proportion" does not appear; it depends to some extent upon the number of Levites partaking, and the number of the lay household. And the "property" is not altered, it is Jehovah's. But if there is a conflict, what does it prove? The injunctions in Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy are all, according to the narrative, parts of the legislation through Moses, Deut. being the latest. It is said² that they "represent the usage of two distinct periods of the nation's life." Why not? They purport to belong to two distinct periods—to represent respectively the earlier and the final periods of the nation's life in the Wilderness. Dr. Driver contends, "Though it is no doubt thoroughly conceivable that Moses may have seen the

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 83.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

neglect of his own institutions, this will not explain his enjoining observances in conflict with those which he had already prescribed." The directions in Deut. purport to provide for a matter not previously provided for, and to supplement earlier directions by including the offerer and his household in the sacrificial feast, as was probably already the usage.

By what standard are we to judge what Moses would do? By an "entirely human" standard? Jehovah purports to be the legislator. Conflict there is none, it is submitted; but if there were conflict, Moses had the experience of the Wilderness life and of the backslidings and disobedience of the people. He had also a nearer view of Canaan. If then, Moses were the legislator and were governed by "entirely human" motives, we might rest satisfied that he had good reason for what he did, although we could not possibly, at any rate without fuller knowledge, predict what he would do; we may think that he could hardly do less than he did.

Once more, however, what does the conflict, if fully made out, prove? Which of the two conflicting injunctions is to prevail? Whenever the later injunction was given, the conflict, if there is a conflict, is the same. If Moses could not issue directions conflicting with his own previous injunctions, could any other legislator do so? If another legislator could cause this conflict, no other legislator, Exilic or Mosaic, is forthcoming to claim it. The legislator purports to be Jehovah Himself through Moses. But Criticism chooses to assume that the legislator was really later, and the work that of a human lawgiver, who was misled, although inspired, into describing what he saw around him, and declaring it to be Mosaic legislation. Who was this person? Was it Ezra? Nobody knows. If Moses himself could not have thus contradicted himself and the facts, was it by inspiration that the late editor was enabled to produce the account as it now stands, and to father it upon Moses?

In the whole of the history, so far from there being any suggestion of anyone daring to enjoin anything in conflict with Mosaic legislation, everything is based on its harmony with that legislation. And it is insisted that the imaginary late authors or redactors believed that all they represented as occurring in Mosaic times did so occur, and was not only not in conflict with Mosaic legislation, but was actually Moses' own legislation, or rather Jehovah's, through Moses.

Again, Dr. Driver assumes¹ that the Levites were poor in the time of the author of Deut., but not, it seems, in Mosaic times. He says,² "As regards the impoverished condition of the Levites"—as shown, apparently, by the exhortations to show them "charitable benevolence," as the Critics interpret the texts—"there is no indication that this is merely a future contingency, for which the legislator is making provision; it is represented throughout as the condition which the writer sees around him (cf. Jud. xvii, 7 f xix, 1 ff)." The two isolated instances cited do not warrant any inference as to the condition of the Levites; there is nothing to show that, in the instance in Judges xix, 1, the Levite was poor. This sweeping statement as to their poverty seems to rest on the supposed charitable character of the provisions under notice, and that character does not seem to be well founded, even if their condition in the time of the Judges is evidence of any weight as to their condition in Mosaic times, or in the time of the author of Deut., whenever that may have been. The Pentateuch does not appear to make any such representation; and Deut. expressly deals with the anticipated or foreseen condition of the Levites in Canaan. The supposed later writer of Deut. may possibly—if he ever existed—have seen the Levites in this condition, but in Deut. he does not "represent" it as existing, either then or at any other time. Or is it JE, or J, or E, the supposed components of JE, who saw it? If so, they do *not* so represent it as the state of things in Mosaic times or later. The instances cited from Judges are (1) the case of the young Levite of Bethlehem-Judah (Judg. xvii, 7, 8) who left Bethlehem-Judah to sojourn, in those disturbed times, "where he could find a place." And he came to Micah's house, in the hill-country of Mt. Ephraim. Nothing is said about his poverty or means; but Dr. Driver infers, perhaps, from his accepting Micah's offer, that he was poor, and generalizes, from this particular, and apparently exceptional case, that all Levites were poor. The other case is (2) that of the Levite sojourning in the same hill-country of Ephraim (Judg. xix, 1), who took a concubine from Bethlehem-Judah. As to him the narrative (Judg. xix, 19) makes him say that "there is no want of anything." He was then on his way to "the house of the Lord" (Judg.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 84.

² *Ibid.*

xix, 18). These are the instances cited to show that the Levites, as a body, were in an "impoverished condition." But the writer or redactor of the Pentateuch, or of Deut., does not represent it to be so "throughout" or at all; on the other hand, Deut. expressly deals with a future time, foreseen or anticipated, when Levites might be found sojourning among their brethren.

The solution of these and a few minor alleged discrepancies between Deut. and P, which is offered is the following. "In¹ the light of the *demonstrated* dependence of Deut. upon JE, it can scarcely be doubted that the real solution of these discrepancies is that the representation in Deut. is based upon parts of the narrative of JE, which were still read by the author of Deut., but which, when JE was afterwards combined with P, were not retained by the compiler."

The "demonstrated" dependence of Deut. on JE merely amounts to a question-begging statement of the apparent fact that Deut. describes what Moses, under Divine guidance, expounded to the people, in view of their approaching entrance into Canaan. He did so in a way suited to his purpose. He referred to what Tradition declares to be his own work, the earlier books of the Pentateuch, some parts of which are framed in a more popular style than others, suitably to their topics; these, under Divine guidance, he used to some extent. It was not suitable to set before the people those parts of the Pentateuch which were less adapted to his purpose, or which concerned the priests only, or which dealt with elaborate or minute ceremonial, or were couched in a technical style. These latter are called by Critics P, the former, or more popular parts, being labelled JE or J or E. That is what is treated as his "dependence" on JE! It is assumed that JE's own independence has been demonstrated, and this involves the "dependence" of Deut., and contradicts, but cannot displace the Tradition that Moses wrote both Deut. and what Criticism is pleased to call JE, and was not dependent on anybody. According to the narrative of Deut. as it now stands, after all the manipulation which Criticism assumes it to have undergone, Moses had first-hand and full knowledge of all the history from the Egyptian bondage up to the time of his last addresses. He had no need to be dependent upon any other sources. There is no proof that any of the "Sources" ever existed inde-

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 84.

pendently. Yet, not only is the existence of JE now assumed, but also that it included more than is now extant in the earlier books of the Pentateuch; the additions covering matters dealt with in Deut.; and that those additions were seen and used by an equally imaginary author or editor of Deut., not Moses, and were ultimately dropped out of their place by another and equally imaginary editor!

Even believers are seriously, and, indeed, imperatively, summoned to accept all this as displacing positive evidence. The Critics, moreover, who have surrendered so much, and accepted so much, assume a tone of righteous indignation if the harassed believer should betray apprehension that they who have surrendered so much should surrender more or all; and if those who fear that the character of their Lord is menaced, if not impeached, by past surrenders should view with distrust parleys which have hitherto preluded such surrenders.

If all the discrepancies alleged were proved, and if the inferences drawn from them as to a later date were as legitimate as, it is submitted, they are unfounded, we should still only have the result that the supposed later passages in the Scriptures, as they stand, are discrepant, but not that they are true, or were ever contained in the "Sources." They must be regarded as additions or alterations in course of time; whether warranted or unwarranted could not be decided without that "fuller knowledge" which would merely hamper speculative Criticism.

The fact that the alleged successive compilers, and those who, as Criticism supposes, "worked over" the Pentateuch did not discern the discrepancies in it, or, if they noticed them, did not think it worth while to correct them, sufficiently proves their insignificance. And if the Levites were robbed of their dues, they could not be ignorant of their wrongs; it was a strange remedy for their "impoverishment" to deprive them of their rights, and to reduce them to dependence on "charity." The control which even Criticism sometimes concedes to Jehovah over all but the outward form of the record is, moreover, conspicuous here by its absence. The inferences of Criticism are, however, merely "literary," and cannot displace the Tradition in any particular.

Argument from Silence.

The effect of Critical analysis upon the influence of the Pentateuchal ordinances in the discipline of Israel is, as has

already been indicated, to displace them almost entirely from the position they occupy in the Tradition, and to transfer them to the time of Josiah or to the Exilic period. Not only is the bulk of the legislation of the Pentateuch, according to Criticism, misplaced in the Old Testament, as it now stands, but the events recorded as happening in the Wilderness did not, for the most part, occur there, if at all; while the institutions and ordinances, which are said by the Tradition to have taken shape there, only took that shape, if at all, at the same late period; particularly in the case of the Priestly Code, including the Ceremonial system, it cannot be denied that Our Lord and His Church have always, without doubt or question, recognized the place assigned to such events, institutions and ordinances by the Pentateuch narrative as their true place. The Jewish nation was condemned for their rejection of Our Lord on this footing—they had received the Law, in the words of S. Stephen,¹ “by the disposition of Angels.” Although faith may survive the shock of finding that this condemnation was passed upon the basis of a long discipline, continued from a period and in an order which is now alleged to be wholly imaginary, it is not surprising that it should be shaken to its very foundations.

Now the first thing which strikes the reader of the Critical argument is that it sets aside altogether the statements of the narrative itself as to the time and course of the events in question. The narrative expressly places these events in the Wilderness. Our Lord and His Apostles accepted the narrative as substantially true, as the Church has, consequently, always done. Cogent, and indeed overwhelming, evidence would be needed to displace *bonâ fide* statements of this kind; even if made in an ancient document of the ordinary kind; and, indeed, Criticism eagerly accepts statements supposed to be favourable to its theory, when found in Assyrian, Babylonian, Egyptian, and other records, with little or no scrutiny. In the case of Scripture, however, it embarks upon a minute, microscopic enquiry, with a thinly veiled aim of falsifying the narrative; and proceeds to consider, not whether evidence of sufficient weight to displace the narrative can be found, but whether there is anything upon which doubt can rest, and to which a different date can be assigned. And what does such evidence amount to, even on the most indulgent view of it? Only to this, that the Exilic date might not be

¹ Acts vii, 38, 53.

improbable if only the narrative had made no assertion as to date. The Critical discussion does not attempt to show that there is sufficient evidence to contradict the narrative; it suggests difficulties and doubts, but adduces no fact, which can have any claim to outweigh the express statements made in a narrative, which cannot be shown to be other than an honest account of events. The discussion, at the outset, treats the question whether the narrative, or its "framework," was prior in point of time, as quite open; and merely seeks to avoid any *a priori* objection to its theory that the narrative originated before the "framework"; although it has to be admitted that the "chronological framework . . . constituted, as it were, the groundwork of the history."¹ It is, indeed, an integral part of it, inseparable without contradiction of the narrative.

It then proceeds to adduce other arguments, chiefly of a negative character, to support the conclusions of "the principal critics of more recent years" against the date assigned by the document itself, and formerly accepted, even by Criticism.

These arguments depend on the effect of Silence.² "The pre-exilic period shows no indication of the legislation of P as being in operation." This is, at best, only a negative argument; and even as such, its weight entirely depends upon whether the history under consideration *must* have mentioned the matters, said to be omitted, if such legislation had existed. It has been already pointed out that there *are* indications—all the more impressive for their incidental introduction—of the legislation in question.³ To one Levitical institution (at least) Our Lord himself referred—in the incident of David and the Shewbread. It has been here further contended that if that legislation was in constant use, especially if it was actually formulated in writing, mention of it might, on ordinary human principles, be expected to be rare and incidental; and that such mention *does* appear in the historical books, and is rare and incidental. Further, the

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 135.

² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

³ Driver, "Introduction," p. 143, admits allusions to "institutions" comprised within the Priestly Code, but distinguishes them as "priestly usage," and says they attest "the existence of certain institutions; they do not attest the existence of the particular document (P)." The shewbread is one of these institutions. And where is the "particular document" (P) attested at all, except in the Pentateuch?

argument as to the "place of sacrifice" depends entirely upon the interpretation which the Critic chooses to place upon the text; an interpretation sought to be fortified by the arbitrary rejection of any explanation; such as that of a relaxation according to circumstances; or of Jehovah having withdrawn His presence (as Ps. lxxviii, 60, asserts, as a notorious fact, an assertion which accords with Jer. vii, 12-14; Cp. xxvi, 6). Similarly as to laymen sacrificing—the laymen being Judges or Kings for the most part—offering sometimes thousands of victims, which Criticism appears to suppose they sacrificed with their own hands,¹ and without the intervention of priest or Levite, and ignores the fact that the presence of priests, with the ephod, appears incidentally on several occasions; and that there was an organized priesthood at Shiloh and afterwards at Nob, embracing numerous priests, who were available to officiate. Any relaxation, if it had been needed, according to the critics, "lacks support." But the fact that the Jews always believed, as far as can be ascertained, that David, and the other laymen who are said to have sacrificed, were loyal to the Law (which the Jews also believed to have been then in existence, is, it is submitted, ample support for the conclusion that the acts now in question, of David and others, were either in full harmony with the Ceremonial Law of the Pentateuch, or were otherwise authorized.

Very different support, however, seems sufficient for the conclusions of Criticism. It has an "impression," or finds it "difficult not to think"² the facts to be as Critics contend.

Finally, all these features of the history upon which Criticism relies were equally visible from the first, and were regarded by the authors and compilers, as well as by the people themselves, as consistent with a conviction that the Law, including the Ceremonial Law, was given in the Wilderness. Criticism produces no fresh facts.

Date of Priestly Code.

The Tradition establishes, beyond contradiction, until displaced by evidence, better and surer than itself, that the

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 137.

² It finds, for instance, in Deut. (iv, 19, xvii, 3) "regulations for the worship of the 'host of heaven' by other nations, relying upon its own interpretation of the texts" (Driver, "Introduction," pp. 136-138, 88, 202). This text, to an ordinary mind, refers only to the distribution of the celestial luminaries to all mankind.

entire Law, including the Ceremonial Law, was, in substance, given in the Wilderness. It has not yet been displaced by Criticism. It follows, therefore, that all evidence in the same Tradition which seems to be in conflict with the Wilderness date for the entire Law, must be subordinate to that date, and must be reconciled with that date, unless it suffices to displace it. The conflict, if irreconcilable, must remain unreconciled. The Wilderness date is dominant, and cannot be displaced by anything short of conclusive proof, not by uncertain inference, that it is wrong.

The giving of the Law in the Wilderness is the basis of the whole Development; everywhere asserted, and nowhere denied or even questioned. The supposed indications in the history of facts in conflict with that date do not contradict that pervading fact, they only suggest, at most, facts which may be, or may seem, inconsistent with it, but which do not make it impossible. It still remains the dominant fact, until displaced. For those who have accepted it, such subordinate facts, however fully proved by similar evidence, cannot displace it; they rest, indeed, upon the testimony of a part only of the same evidence, the same tradition, subject to the same infirmities, but in a much greater degree. They are of far less weight, for they are made to contradict the dominant fact against their own intention. The Tradition has itself to be made to contradict itself.

A fact which we know to be true, a transaction, for instance, in which we have taken part, one, perhaps, known only to ourselves, can hardly be displaced by any evidence. That is because no evidence can be of equal weight with our own direct knowledge; to allow it that weight involves the abandonment of our confidence in our own consciousness. The evidence of the Wilderness date is, of course, not in the same position with that of our consciousness of our own acts, but its weight is very great, being the record of the consciousness of a nation. Its weight is far greater than that of any of the conflicting facts alleged by Criticism, even if fully proved by similar evidence.

Development of Israel.

The development of a Nation, as of a man, must proceed in an appropriate order. When either is left without superintendence or control the order of development is also left to the operations of the various natural influences which may happen to affect the subject which is exposed to them in the

course of its experiences. Christians believe that God controls all the influences of Nature and of the world, and uses them for His purposes; bringing them to bear on nations and individuals in order to effect, in co-operation with such nations and individuals, the fulfilment of His purposes. Men and nations looking back on their own experiences have frequently been struck with the guidance under which, as they realize on retrospection, they have acted at critical points of their careers. In a natural development we can only see a purpose, other than their own, when the development has reached a stage at which it is possible to discern the results of it. Some men and nations apparently are left to develop under less control and guidance than others, and some are not conscious of any.

According to the Scripture account the Jews were under the special and complete guidance of Jehovah, Who had declared to Abraham, and afterwards to them, His purpose to make of them a people of a particular character, in whom "all the families of the Earth should be blessed"; they were not to be like other nations, whether Semites or others. And they were, accordingly, subjected to a special discipline in order to fit them to fulfil that purpose. The discipline to which they were subjected was given under continuous manifestations to them of Jehovah's will; these manifestations being fitted to produce a development of the designed character. The Jews consciously passed their lives under this discipline; the manifestations of Jehovah's will for them being disclosures also of aspects of His nature suited not only for the particular purpose at the time of their appearance, but also for the guidance of "all the families of the Earth" who might come to have knowledge of them. It was a dispensation of special manifestations of God's Will in direct dealings with the Jews—of miracles, in fact.¹ Criticism suggests that it is immaterial whether these dealings actually took place or not; that certain truths have been evolved—or revealed, if revelation, except by evolution, is recognized—and that these truths are still possessed by mankind, and are the only results of value. Thus it claims that rejection of the actual dealings of Jehovah with Israel in no way impairs the real value of the history. In short, it claims that the particular discipline said to have been applied by Jehovah to His people was unnecessary. Such discipline as

¹ Driver on Genesis, p. lxxviii, §4.

other nations received from the ordinary influences of the world, although, in their case, it might not result in the attainment of the standard to which the Jews were brought, seems to Criticism all that was wanted! It does not care for miracles. Without the continuous special guidance of Jehovah, however, their development would be due to what is now called Evolution; under, possibly, some Divine influence, such as science might allow; differing from that which other nations enjoyed, it at all, in degree, not in kind, but wholly different from that intimate intercourse with Jehovah described in the narrative as we have it. Such Evolution is excluded from operation by that history, which constantly emphasizes the infinite distance between the direct and special Divine dealings with Israel and those with the world in general; these dealings with men in general being unnoticed, except to emphasize, by contrast with them, the exclusive condescension shown to Israel. But because the disclosures as to God's character, described in the narrative as made in His special dealings with Israel, are found in the narrative, and can be appropriated by all men, we are boldly assured that we may and should discard as immaterial the facts narrated, with which the disclosure of God's nature is indissolubly connected, and treat the history as a fairy tale, the fictitious character of which makes no difference. If, however, the supernatural is eliminated from the history by this audacious device, even the truths, which are said to be alone of value, can only be appropriated so far as mere human intelligence may approve them, in the same way as they might be accepted from the Vedas, or even from any ordinary literature; we should have to *bring* to them their warrant of authority, we should not *find it there*; that is to be found in the fact that God actually dealt with His people as there related in the record.

So far from the discipline being without significance, and the lesson of it the same, whether the events described are real or fictitious, those who do not accept Critical theories hold the events themselves to be the channels of the Divine Revelation, and that it is through their actually happening that the Revelation is made. If these events did not, in substance, happen, of course no revelation is made through them; Criticism, indeed, seems prepared to maintain that God chose or accepted, as the vehicle of His Revelation, a fiction, a fairy tale with a moral, represented as a true history; with appeals for confirmation to objects still extant,

and with all the appearance of actual statements of fact, and believed to be such by all ages, and stamped as real, actual events, by Our Lord and His Apostles. The substantial happening in due order of these events is thus really "crucial for Christianity."

Criticism, as has been abundantly shown, applies to Scripture "entirely human" analogies, and seeks, by means of them, to dislocate the narrative of the Old Testament, and to invert the vital order of the development of Israel.

Principles of Criticism.

It will now be useful to examine briefly some of the principles upon which it proceeds, assuming, for the moment, that human analogies are applicable, and that the "outward form and composition" of Scripture are, as Bishop Ryle declares, "entirely human."

In making this assumption we must also, in order to adopt provisionally the Critical point of view, assume that the Scripture writers might be mistaken as to the date, order and circumstances of the giving of the Law, and as to the course, order and method of the development of Israel.

It is not disputed that there is unity of plan in the entire narrative of the Old Testament, especially in the Pentateuch, and particularly in Genesis. Indeed, this feature is insisted on as showing the hand of an editor, who is supposed¹ to have selected the materials from the "Sources"—now very familiar to the imagination under various labels, but otherwise unknown.

Taking the Pentateuch, as the most important part of the narrative for the present purpose, we know that the Jews not only recognized this unity of plan, but regarded the Book as, substantially, the work of one man, Moses himself. Criticism so far agrees with them as to accept the Book, as it stands, as ultimately the work of one man, but of an editor or compiler; of whom and of whose period nothing is known except by speculative inference. Criticism must, therefore, on ordinary principles, prove that such a person must have existed, and have done what is attributed to him, otherwise the Tradition of the Jews cannot be displaced.

Criticism takes the Massoretic Hebrew text, in which it considers that many errors exist. It holds the Pentateuch, in particular, to be composite, the work of many hands, the

¹ Driver, "Introduction," pp. 4, 8,

component parts being, at times, very doubtfully traceable, but in which it assigns large portions to various "Sources," J, E, D and P, and to many redactors and editors.

These "Sources" cannot be accepted as proved; there is no further proof of their existence, or of their contents; nor is there any other proof of their authorship, or of their date, beyond what can be inferred from their present contents and place in the narrative. It is not known, on independent evidence, in what language or script they were originally written; but it is, apparently, supposed that the language was Hebrew, and that the script was an older one than that of the present text. It is contended by M. Naville¹ that the original script of the Old Testament was Babylonian. It is evident that the date of these "Sources" cannot be fixed with any certainty.

On examination of these supposed "Sources" Criticism comes to a conclusion as to their original dates, placing Deut. some comparatively short time before the finding of the Book of the Law in the time of Josiah (about B.C. 650), J and E somewhat earlier, and placing P and its combination with JE, to form the present text, after the Exile (including also a portion, called by the Critics the Law of Holiness (H)). All are supposed to have been "worked over," more or less frequently, by editors or redactors, to bring them into their present shape.

As Criticism holds that the whole course of the history of Israel is inverted by the text, as it now stands, it is driven to allow that these "Sources," of which only fragments are now, even according to Criticism, discoverable, once contained more ancient elements, and that, possibly, these more ancient elements, to some extent, contained true accounts of actual events; although some Critics disallow most of the more ancient history, as it now stands in the text, accepting little earlier than the Monarchy.

Criticism thus makes the Hebrew text, as we now have it, contradict and invert the true history, and reconstructs it accordingly, placing the Law, especially the Ceremonial Law (P), as the end, and as the outcome, of Israel's national experiences, instead of as the beginning and instrument of their training, as represented throughout the history, as it stands. It has therefore been driven to suggest some expla-

¹ "The Discovery of the Book of the Law," p. 40.

nation of so strange a misrepresentation by Jewish writers of their own history. It naturally does not find any recognition of such a perversion in the text, as it stands; for from first to last the history, as it stands, expressly asserts that the discipline and training of Israel were throughout conducted by Jehovah on the Law, including the Ceremonial Law (P). And Criticism admits, indeed asserts, that the present text was expressly intended to make that representation; and that, so far as the true history peeps out, it is in spite of the utmost efforts, and the very extraordinary skill of the compilers, in their endeavours to give it the contrary effect. Criticism also allows, and, indeed, asserts, that these compilers believed that in so doing, they were giving the true history; but were themselves misled, by the institutions which they saw around them—embodied in the “Priestly usage”—into misunderstanding these same “Sources,” and into misinterpreting them, as showing that those institutions, which they saw around them after the Exile, were ordained from Mosaic times, as represented in the present text. And they are supposed to have tried to suppress, as errors, all traces of the true history, which seemed in conflict with their belief, but without complete success; for Criticism professes to have discovered sufficient traces of the true history, inadvertently allowed to appear, to enable it to contradict the spurious account thus foisted upon the record, and to be thus able triumphantly to reconstruct, and so again invert, and thus restore to its true shape, the entire course of the history.

This amazing claim raises at the outset a question as to the evidence for the reconstructed narrative. Out of a narrative containing discrepancies it may be possible to extract evidence of its untrustworthiness, or even of its falsehood, but it is a very different feat to make it disclose the truth, as Criticism claims to have done.

The “Sources” which the compilers of the text had before them must have corresponded in substance with the narrative as we now have it; for the compilers could not have believed that the institutions which they saw around them were of Mosaic date if their Sources had stated what is now alleged to be the truth, viz., that they were not in existence, as to some of them, until some short time before Josiah, and as to the rest, until Exilic times. The “Sources” must, therefore, have stated what they now state. It is admitted, as already noticed, that they did not wilfully intend to “desert”

or "falsify" them, but to embody them¹; and as they are said to state matters, sufficient even now, to betray their untruth, and to reveal the truth, after every effort to obliterate all traces of it, we must, in considering the Critical case, assume, for the moment, that they contained originally more of such traces. The compilers of the present text, however, acting, it is insisted, in perfect good faith, must have failed to perceive the falsehood of the story told by their "Sources," even with the assistance of more glaring indications of it than are now, inadvertently, allowed to appear; but which the Critics find sufficient to show not only the falsehood of the story told by the "Sources," but also to betray the truth which those compilers sought to efface.

The Critics have performed a feat so apparently impossible as that of compelling a narrative to furnish proof of facts which it contradicts. Such a feat does not seem "entirely human." The assertion of a fact has thus proved to be the evidence of a contradictory fact! Of course, this could not happen until the superhuman sagacity of the Critic was employed upon it. The achievement of the expert advocate who succeeds in compelling a living witness to contradict himself, and to confess the truth, is child's play to this. We have, however, no means of testing the correctness of the disclosures extorted by the Critic, except the document itself, which still persists in affirming what it is said to contradict.

The process of proof of the Critical theory includes:

(1) The Partition. This separates and seeks to assign differing dates to various portions of the Scriptures, previously regarded as a unity; the analysis is based on "entirely human" canons and considerations, thus at once destroying its claim to inspiration, or the consciousness of it, or the consciousness of uniqueness, whether due to Divine guidance or otherwise; and suggests the possibility of claiming the same "entirely human" character for the whole of what had been accepted as a Divine manifestation.

(2) A system of naturalistic interpretation, in harmony with "entirely human" principles, including the assumption of an almost incredible treatment of materials by redactors, editors, and others, not known, or even supposed, to be inspired for the work, or to be conscious of any special responsibility in performing it. This is, in short, the application of the principle of "The Bible like any other book," only not entitled to the same fair treatment.

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 128.

(3) Having thus rendered the record entirely plastic, Criticism proceeds to remould it, and consequently the development of the nation of which it is now the only record, according to "entirely human" analogies and standards.

It is submitted that if the present record is proved to be untrustworthy—which is denied—the true history cannot be proved by it. Its alleged fault is that it has falsified the facts; although all that could be proved from it, without knowledge of the true facts, is that, by its inconsistencies, it has forfeited confidence. Does this render what, in good faith, it denies or is supposed to attempt to conceal, true? All that could be proved is that its allegations cannot be accepted as true; but the true facts still have to be proved before the allegations of the discredited account can be held to be false; and before the denied facts, or those which it is supposed to conceal, can be treated as proved. It is, moreover, obvious that *all* the statements in a discredited story are not proved to be false, merely because none of them can be believed on its evidence alone. This applies to ordinary human statements, where ordinary possibilities afford a standard by which the truth of statements can be, in some measure, judged. Still more does it apply to statements to which the entirely human standard of probability is not applicable. When a witness who knows all the facts in question gives a false account of them, some of his statements may be shown to be false; but that alone will not prove that *all* his statements are false, or justify the reconstruction of the facts. Some facts may be inferred, in some cases, even from his denials; but that can only be done with any security when facts have been otherwise proved, the proof of which his denial, proved to be untruthful, has thus confirmed, and so far proved the contrary to be true. The proof does not come out of his denial, but out of affirmative evidence of contrary facts, which his attempt to deny only serves to confirm. The most uninstructed would, for instance, hardly consider that a man could or should be convicted of a crime, because he had told an absolutely false story as to his movements and doings; although such a person could readily understand that a false story might clinch the proof of contrary facts, otherwise not, perhaps, quite convincingly proved, although sufficient evidence may have been given to prove them until contradicted by other evidence. The Critics, however, treat the accepted Scriptures worse than an untruthful witness or a suspected criminal could be treated; and make them con-

demn themselves out of their own mouth by putting into their mouth what they have contradicted.

Criticism can by no legitimate procedures extort from the text as it stands, or from the supposed "Sources," known only from that same text, any statement contradicting their unvarying assertion, that the law and history of Israel took the course described in the text.

Criticism must, therefore, prove its case independently. It is not permissible for it to represent that what they allege to be facts are testified to, either expressly or implicitly, by the Scriptures.

But this is not a case of an alleged criminal on his trial, or even of a defendant in a suit. It professes to be a case of the discovery of truth, which is to benefit mankind by uprooting false ideas which have gained a footing. We need for this purpose the true facts. These must be found outside the false account, which is supposed to have been discredited. If that account consisted entirely of true statements, nothing more is required. If, as is alleged, it is substantially false, it is evident that any statement which may happen to be true cannot be accepted as true, either on its own testimony, or on the testimony of the rest of the account, which is *ex hypothesi* mainly false.

If we are to reach the truth we must have other evidence. But there is no other evidence. There is no evidence which will enable us to prove that the facts were other than those stated in the narrative which Criticism discards. The contents of the supposed "Sources" can themselves only be discovered from the discarded text; and the sources of those "Sources" cannot be proved to differ from them; and there is no other evidence which can carry us back to the events themselves. Then how can the narrative be proved false? Surely not by picking out the small proportion of facts in the discredited narrative which Criticism is content to accept from it as true, and which it cannot distinguish from the facts which it rejects, except by the fact that they fit in with some preconceived theory which Criticism seeks to support. That is, however, what Criticism does; then claims that its theory is proved, by a narrative, which is never weary of expressly contradicting it.

The whole process is futile; the narrative cannot be shown to be false without proof of the true facts; and can only be reconstructed on such facts as are otherwise proved to be true.

Discovery of Sources.

The process by which Criticism evolves "Sources" of the present Scriptures has already been incidentally noticed, but may usefully again be touched upon. As far as can be gathered, it is a system of selection of sections, passages, phrases, and sometimes single and isolated words, found in various parts of the present text, more particularly in the Pentateuch, which are supposed to be distinguished from other sections by definite characteristics of language, style, representation, theological thought, &c. Each of these collections of sections, passages, phrases, &c., is treated as derived from a separate "Source," or, in one case (JE), from two "Sources" combined. They are labelled J, E, D, P, H, &c. There are many of them, and they are increasing and multiplying freely. The "characteristics" of each set of sections are collected out of the sections assigned, for the time being, to a particular "Source," and the aggregate thus gradually collected, for the time being, from each set of sections, forms a standard by which admission to the same particular "Source" is adjudged. The standard for each "Source" is formed gradually, starting with the Divine Names as tests, and adding other characteristics later as the process of selection goes on. The standard is thus, during its formation, open to additions or accretions of "characteristics," collected out of passages or phrases or even words added to the supposed original "Source." This standard, of course, consisted, at first, of passages showing the respective Divine Names. The gradual building up of the standard, until it comes to include all the alleged characteristics of the particular "Source," renders the "Sources," until completed, provisional and ambulatory. The Divine Names are the tests of the "Sources" at first, the badges of the two bands bearing on them "Jehovah" and "Elohim" respectively; but, as the bands march on, they incorporate many added "characteristics," which are, singularly enough, often found mingled in both the "Sources"; the Divine Names becoming similarly mingled, so that the Elohist is ultimately found marching, with all his train of "characteristics," under a flag exclusively displaying the name "Jehovah," the alleged exclusive symbol of the Jahvist.

These various sets of sections, &c., are declared by Criticism to require distinct writers for each of them. No evidence is thought necessary for such a conclusion; their alleged difference from other sets of sections, &c., in the

writings themselves, as they now stand, being apparently considered sufficient proof. We are simply told that the difference between them is so great that one man *could not* have written more than one of the multitudinous sets into which this fissiparous volume is constantly disintegrating. No mention is made of experience of similar phenomena, such as some similar work appearing to be a unity—as the Pentateuch, and particularly Genesis, is admitted to be—which has been similarly decomposed, and then shown by satisfactory proof to be rightly disintegrated. Such satisfactory proof could only be the actual verification of the objective existence of its sources. The instance of Homer—even if its composite character is accepted—would not suffice, for it is not a similar work, and no actual sources have apparently been discovered, as having ever been in independent existence. Criticism, apparently, assumes that the inner consciousness of mankind, or, at any rate, of scholars, must have some definite standard by which to judge what differences in language, style, representation, theological character, &c., is compatible with unity of authorship, and that such standard must be applicable to these Scriptures.

It is said that, in some cases, “literary characteristics” alone—difference of language, phraseology, and style—are sufficient to show conclusively that the various sets of sections, in which they occur, must be the work of different writers. Again no instances are thought necessary; the proposition is treated as elementary or axiomatic. It is, perhaps, conceivable that “literary” differences may be sufficient in particular cases to warrant such a conclusion; but it must be because experience has shown that such differences always arise, in similar works, from plurality of authorship. We must remember that parodies imitate styles, that difference of topic often requires difference of style, that the taste or fancy, or even the caprice of a writer, may lead him to vary his style, that particular classes of subjects come to be more or less rigorously tied to a conventional style, and that there was a “traditional phraseology,” a “priestly phraseology,” a “religious terminology,”¹ besides the legal and other styles, any or all of which a writer might choose to adopt, however incongruous they may seem to others, especially to foreigners, at a distance of many centuries. Those, therefore, who are to be satisfied of the correctness of the

¹ Driver, “Introduction,” pp. 87, 103, 156, 157.

Critical inferences from style need cogent evidence of its truth, drawn from similar cases. None such exist. Whatever may be the ordinary inference from difference of "literary" style, it can have no application to a work which is not a "literary" work, but is, or purports to be, written under entirely different influences, and with entirely different aims. The different "Sources" admittedly sometimes mingle together inextricably, and even borrow one another's style and characteristics.

As already indicated, it is here contended that in order to prove difference of authorship by difference of style or "literary characteristics," even in ordinary literature, it must be shown that one man could not have used more than one of the styles in question, since it is obvious that one writer may, under some circumstances—as in dealing with different topics—use more than one style. In the present case it cannot even be shown that in similar works, "of the same time and place," such differences as here exist *indicate normally* different authors. Nor can it be shown that, in ordinary literature, they necessarily do so. The Jews themselves did not think that there were different authors at work. Contemporaries of the work may have known, as the Tradition asserts, that one author wrote the bulk of the Pentateuch. Some generation must have known whether that was true. Moses is expressly stated, in the Pentateuch, to have committed part of it to writing, and nobody else is mentioned as the writer of any part of it. There is nothing which can displace the positive evidence of Tradition. Those who framed or accepted the Tradition were well qualified by their knowledge of the habits and temperament of their nation, if not by actual knowledge of the writers, to judge what the true significance was of such differences as actually exist, and which were always visible.

Similarity is rejected by Criticism as a necessary or sufficient mark of unity of authorship, as in the case of J and E, where the two supposed authors often cannot be discriminated. This similarity is promptly attributed, not to unity of authorship, but to similarity of subject-matter. It is, indeed, contended by Criticism that, in this instance, the difference of subject-matter is not sufficient to account for the difference of style in the Pentateuch. The fact of difference of subject-matter is not and could not be denied; it is frequently emphasized as a difference of representation. Whether such differences would account for difference of style must depend, not

on the opinions of foreign critics, centuries later, but on the view of the author. If he thought the style suited to the subject he might use it. He might have one style for the popular or national history, and a different one for the legal, ecclesiastical record. He may have mingled the two styles—even inappropriately, as critics may consider—but he may have been unconscious of its inappropriateness, or indifferent to its inappropriateness, or may have differed from them. His business was to record the events, and to bring out their true significance, especially their religious significance. In an age, supposed, at one time, to be illiterate, literary canons and models may have been unknown or unregarded. He may have recorded the existence of anthropomorphic ideas of God in one place and in one style, and the more spiritual ideas of Him in another place and style. We do not know, and cannot, at any rate without more knowledge, undertake to explain, what he did and why he did it. We have only the Tradition, which tells us that the Pentateuch was, in substance, the work of Moses, and no inference, such as Criticism offers us, is of equal weight, much less sufficient to displace that evidence.

Differences of representation are also alleged in support of "literary characteristics," as justifying partition. These have been, perhaps, sufficiently noticed. The attempt to find difference of representation in the supposed doublets and triplets entirely fails, in most cases, to do more, if anything, than create, by the severance itself, a spurious conflict. It does not succeed in showing that one person, and that person a contemporary, could not have embodied the alleged discordant narratives in the narrative as it exists. Those different representations, alleged to exist in the Pentateuch, even if shown to exist, and to be divergent or conflicting—which, it is submitted, is not shown—do not require a plurality of authors, since one person, even a contemporary, may have collected the divergent accounts, oral or written, and have embodied them in the original record, as the result and true effect of the information and knowledge of the writer; or, at any rate, as a true record of the information he received, as he received it. Every writer or narrator of history or of facts has sources of some kind, even if they are only his own knowledge and experience. The real question here is whether a single contemporary writer could have produced the Pentateuchal record. The aim of Criticism is to establish plurality of authors, in order to get the Pentateuch, and especially the

Priestly section, away from Mosaic times. The tearing asunder of the narrative is a necessary condition of success in that attempt; it is not, however, sufficient for the purpose. A later date has to be assigned to the sundered parts, and that cannot be achieved, although it is rendered more possible, by severing the narrative, so that the Priestly section can be "lifted out." For this purpose we have, consequently, an appeal to the supposed indications of the historical books, and to the supposed differences of theological ideas. Both these grounds have been dealt with already to some extent, the historical indications more fully.

As regards the stages of theological belief, no reliance can be placed upon the later date of the "Source" while they, and the narrative itself, which is to be displaced, place them, as *ex hypothesi* it must, at an earlier date, said to be a wrong date. That such date is wrong cannot be proved by assuming that the appearance in the record at a later date of these ideas shows that they had not appeared before, and that the later date was the true date of origin, for the same record contains, *ex hypothesi*, the earlier mention of them. That is begging the question. The earlier date, which is sought to be displaced, must be proved wrong before that earlier mention of them can be treated as premature and wrong. The only means of doing this is by the indications of the historical books; which have been shown to favour instead the correctness of the narrative as it stands. The true date of the theological ideas cannot be proved by analogy to the development of theological ideas in other races, of other religions, without assuming that the religion of Israel is "one of the religions of the world, no more and no less," and is not even unique among them.

Even if it could be shown that mention of a given stage of religious development, the Priestly stage, for instance, as reached in the Wilderness, was first made in a document as late as the Exile, nothing material would be gained for Criticism, if that later mention placed, as it does, the stage of development in question in the Wilderness. If the fact, of earlier development, had to be proved afresh, the late mention of it might weaken the force of the evidence of earlier development, but it would still be the only evidence, and, without other independent evidence, could not be displaced.

All we know about the supposed "Sources" is derived from the narrative of which they are assumed to be the sources, and therefore prior to it. There is no other evi-

dence that they are its sources. These "Sources" must, therefore, substantially agree with the strands of the present record supposed to be derived from them. We have no knowledge of their contents except their supposed identity with the present record. Any substantial variation from the present record would defeat their claim to be its sources, unless independent evidence were forthcoming to show how the discrepancy arose. Criticism, however, does not want sources which merely make identically the same statements as the present narrative. Criticism is therefore no forwarder. It does not want the supposed "Source" to come forward and confirm the statements derived from it in the present record; it wants it to come forward to contradict those statements. But that it cannot do consistently with its being their source.

In order to meet this want Criticism has tried to show that the supposed "Sources" are incorrect in some of their most vital statements, especially as to the date of the Ceremonial Law. This is attempted by trying to show from the historical books that the provisions of the Law, especially of the Ceremonial Law, could not have been in force until a time long after the entrance into Canaan, because the actual practice was either in violation of that Law, or ignored its enactments. This contention has been already dealt with; and reasons have already been given for rejecting the Critical inferences as to these supposed facts. Criticism, however, treating its historical inferences as well established, proceeds to deal with the "Sources" in the light of those inferences, as if they were already proved facts, and thus seeks to contradict its own "Sources" by its own inferences from the historical books. It should be noticed here that the contradiction is not confined to the particular points as to which Criticism claims to have found some justification from the allusions, or absence of allusion, of the historical books, but is extended to almost the entire scene of the Wilderness legislation; and sets down again portions of Deut. partly in some uncertain period before Josiah's time, but mostly in or after the Exile. From their new stations they still reiterate the same unwelcome assertion—that the entire Law was given in the Wilderness. They must be silenced and contradicted.

In order to neutralize the witness of the "Sources," as well as of the present record, to the Wilderness as the scene of the legislation, it offers a theory—necessarily unsupported by the "Sources," which are, from first to last, insistent as

to the Wilderness being the scene—that the authors of those “Sources,” or those who embodied them in our present document, found the Law in operation at later dates, and took for granted that it had been in existence in the Wilderness, and so represented it in the present narrative, thus projecting its origin back into the Wilderness. All this is based upon the same inferences of neglect or violation of some of these laws, from the same alleged indications in the historical books.

The supposed “Sources,” having so far served their turn as to aid, if they do aid, in tearing the present record asunder, and thus enabling the critics “to lift out” the “sources,” are then in turn contradicted, and displaced; they are ultimately, in effect, repudiated as sources; since they are made to contradict that of which they were made to pose as “sources” in order to effect the Partition, and then to be deposed.

Thus, according to Criticism, these “sources” must either have contradicted the real facts, or must have stated the real facts, which the compiler of the present text must have contradicted, and set aside!

What did the Editors or Redactors do at the Exile?

Ezra or the editors or redactors at the Exile, must apparently, according to the Critical view, have had before them at least the combined JE, if not the separate J and E and their Sources, as well as Deuteronomy. There must also have been some documentary materials for the Priestly Code, supposed by Criticism to have assumed its present shape at the same time. We have no evidence of the contents of these various “Sources,” except the record, as it now stands, which is said by Criticism to be radically incorrect, and to invert the true order of the actual course of the history.

What did the compilers of this false history do with their materials? They did not, it is alleged, do what they should have done, viz., faithfully reproduce their original materials with such corrections and additions as they found sufficiently warranted. Criticism considers that they were led to assume that the Temple usage, at the time of the Exile, had been in existence in the same shape, and on the same footing, ever since the time of Moses. It is not known whether their materials specified any time or place for the events which are assigned in their narrative to Mosaic times and to the life in the Wilderness. If such time and place appeared in their

materials, it must, according to the Critical theory, have been rejected, and the Wilderness period substituted, in conformity with their misconceptions. They could not, however, have seen much around them in Babylon to give rise to such a misconception; still less to induce them to tamper with their materials. The Priestly Code had, according to Criticism, never been in force before that time, having had its origin, as it stands, at that very time.

If they found in their materials no place or time assigned for the events recorded—a most improbable supposition—they must have inserted the time and place now appearing. And Ezra, when called upon by the people to produce “the book of the Law of Moses,” produced our present record, describing it as “the law of Moses, the man of God.”

Some critics allow that some trustworthy tradition existed among the Jews at the supposed dates of J and E. According to Criticism, however, that tradition has now disappeared, except such traces of it as escaped the vigilance of the Exilic compilers, Ezra, and perhaps others, and have survived to expose their opponents! That compilation not only represents Moses to be the writer of some part, if not the whole, of the work, but also declares that all the events related in it, including the giving of the whole Law, Moral and Ceremonial, took place before the entrance into Canaan. Criticism, as we know, places these events, so far as it recognizes them as facts, at various dates between the Wilderness and Exilic or post-Exilic periods, and, of course, in an entirely different atmosphere. It regards each of the “Sources” as undergoing repeated revisions, “workings over”; in each case receiving colour from any change in prevailing views. In this way J, about the time of Manasseh,¹ is said to have been brought to such a state as to furnish materials for Deuteronomy; for which, however, according to the theory, the editor had to provide the “setting,” consisting mainly of the speeches, which Moses is held to have been too unskilful in “oratory” to have actually made, although he may have said something like them, or in the same “spirit,” and for which the editor of Deut. may have found some warrant in the Tradition. In composing the “setting,” the editor may have acted in accordance with “literary ideas,” such as those which Thucydides is alleged to have followed. Thucydides, however, in fact, acted very

¹ Driver, “Introduction,” p. 87.

differently,¹ and his example was not available at the supposed date of Deut. ! There is no evidence for this theory of its composition.

Again, at a later stage, P, having been repeatedly "worked over," was finally completed, after the Exile, and then embodied in the present text, with such alterations as seemed fit to an editor who was under an illusion, which inverted the history, and so led him to depict a Ceremonial development, which had been gradually unfolding itself during a thousand years or more, as given in the Wilderness, and to make it appear as the foundation and instrument of the training of Israel during the whole term of its national life.

Moses is, indeed, as emphatically and exclusively the proclaimer of the law in J as in P,—there is no other lawgiver mentioned throughout Jewish history; and no trace of any period of legislation except in the Wilderness. The trouble for Criticism is how, in flat contradiction to the unvarying, unhesitating, and concurrent testimony of Scripture and Tradition, to prove that Moses was not the giver of the Law, as all the evidence, including all the "sources" themselves, emphatically declare him to have been, while the bare idea of its being Mosaic is branded by Criticism as ludicrous !

All down the ages the echoes of that testimony are heard, even in the Apocalyptic vision which closes the New Testament. Yet Criticism contradicts and ridicules this universal witness, without being able to produce even a scintilla of fresh evidence; or even, till recently, a dissenting voice.

The attempts to supply the want of evidence by uncertain or unfounded inference have been already noticed. The "Sources" on which Criticism relies cannot be proved to have existed, as such; they cannot be proved to have existed at all, except as part of the Pentateuch, as we have it now. They all bear witness, not to the development of the Law asserted by Criticism, but to the delivery of the Law to Moses in the Wilderness, as all along accepted by the Jews, as well as by the Christian Church in all ages. None of the "Sources" suggest the working over which Criticism requires; except so far as the manipulation of Criticism may be found to coerce them to do so, in contradiction to their

¹ Thucydides says he did his utmost to give accurate reports of speeches, when he was not present at the delivery of them. ("Peloponnesian War," i, 22.)

express statements as to the Wilderness being the scene of the promulgation of the entire Law. Deuteronomy and the Priestly section alike tell the same story; both placing the entire Law in the Mosaic period, neither indicating a development such as Criticism requires. They necessarily do not contemplate such a development, being emphatic that the Ceremonial Law was ordained in the Wilderness through Moses.

Assuming, therefore, that the existence of the Critical "Sources" could be proved, and that they were prior in date to the present Pentateuch, it would, as already remarked, profit Criticism nothing, unless the emphatic statements of these "Sources" could be disproved and displaced. All that Criticism can offer for this purpose is the set of inferences, already examined, from allusion and want of allusion in the historical books, to institutions and laws, and the supposed violations of Laws, declared by the present text, as also by the "Sources," to have been in existence from the Wilderness period. Unless these inferences are sufficient to displace positive statements, concurred in by all authorities, Criticism is left without support, and can only suggest that its mere assertions should be accepted as sufficient evidence! The believer will hardly be tempted to surrender his birth-right for this "morsel of pottage"! It seems like a colossal joke to invite, upon such grounds, the surrender of belief in the truth of the Mosaic history, which lies at the heart of all Jewish and Christian life.

Human Analogies.

In dealing with the narrative, it has been here treated, as the Critics treat it, as "entirely human"; or as Dr. Sanday, quoted with approval by Dr. Driver,¹ expresses it: "In regard to the narrative of events, and to processes of literary composition, there is nothing so exceptional about them as to exempt them from the conditions to which other works would be exposed at the same place and time." It is to be observed, however, that *no* other works—much less any *similar* works, or works with similar features—of the same place and time are, or can be, produced; even if it could properly be assumed, in deciding what that "place and time" were, that they were the "place and time" alleged by Criticism, and that the "outward form and

¹ Driver, "Introduction," preface, p. x (n).

composition " of Scripture are "entirely human." The character of the work, and the conditions under which it was written, the sense of responsibility of the writers, the guarantees for truth, the fact that these were not only national records, but also sacred records of a history and religion claiming emphatically to be unique, and Divine, all those factors—which have, according to Criticism, nothing to do with the matter—must be taken into account. These books are to Criticism like any other book—not any other *similar* book—"at the same place and time." Those Critics who frankly assume that "the religion of Israel is one of the religions of the world, no more and no less," are, at least, adopting an intelligible position; and, indeed, the only position which affords the slightest legitimate basis for treating these books as "like any other books."

The same absence of real similarity vitiates the theory of the "Sources." Criticism can hardly claim that analogy can apply without substantial similarity—not merely superficial similarity, with regard to the matters to be compared. We do not know whence they derive their test of composite authorship; it cannot, as already indicated, have been derived from any book, either similar or dissimilar, of "the same place and time." Even if we assume the Exile to be the time to which the Priestly Code is to be assigned, no instance has been produced of composite authorship, discovered by similar tests, and verified by satisfactory external proof! But Criticism does not affect to confine itself to analogies with books of the same place and time. The addresses of Moses in Deuteronomy are declared to be written by a later hand¹ in accordance with supposed Classical or other pagan "literary" usages.

But the point in dispute, with regard to this question, is whether they were so written. Thucydides is cited as having adopted the practice of composing speeches for his orators. But his own account is, as already remarked, that he did his best to get the exact speech as delivered, and when unable to do so gave as exact an account of it as he could. In the case of Deuteronomy the book declares that the speeches are the actual speeches of Moses, and there is no sufficient evidence that this statement is false.

That Moses could, and would appropriately, have been the original author of the bulk of the Pentateuch can hardly

¹ Driver, "Introduction," p. 90.

be denied,¹ so far as the events recorded in it happened during his life; that he was, in substance, its author is affirmed by the unanimous unvarying judgment of many centuries; and no particle of external proof is produced against that decision, even on "entirely human" lines.²

Critics, in fact, set themselves free even from the slight restrictions they sometimes profess to accept; for example, in spite of the insuperable difficulty they sometimes find in proving—even with the excessive latitude they allow themselves—that a section is composite, they nevertheless hold it to be so on "impressions," or "convictions" of their own, or because "it is difficult not to think" it is so, unsupported by any tangible evidence! In dealing with such questions it seems incredible that the Critics should not even desire further evidence, evidence, for instance, of the actual existence of the "Sources," how they came into existence and when, who combined them and at what date; in short, evidence of every circumstance connected with them. We are told that it is a sacred duty to pursue truth in every detail. Is that only applicable so far as it discredits Scripture? And is full knowledge inimical to truth or to falsehood?

The Issue.

Although this discussion has been mainly occupied with the Scripture writings, our real concern is with the dealings of Jehovah with Israel, and only incidentally with the record of them; because we have no other knowledge of them, except the Tradition, of which the written records are the most accessible part.

The main issue is, whether the entire Law was, in substance, given in the Wilderness; or, as it is often expressed, whether the Law or the Prophets came first. The fact of the giving of the Law was easy to carry down. It has been carried down by the Tradition. That fact is almost unaffected by criticism of the written Tradition. It could only be disproved by surer and better evidence contradicting it. The evidence for the fact is clear, emphatic, and convincing; it can be contradicted only by evidence clearer, more emphatic and more convincing. As already suggested, this

¹ See, however, "The Papal Commission and the Pentateuch," by C. A. Briggs and von Hügel, pp. 11-13.

² Driver, "Introduction," pp. 137, 145.

is the dominant fact until disproved; the fact with which apparently discrepant facts, when themselves proved, must either reconcile themselves or remain contradicted. The Tradition was not formed with any purpose of explaining such discrepancies, and it is surely idle to expect such explanations after thirty centuries! They do not displace the Tradition as to the matters really in issue.

With all its inflated pretensions, unverifiable by facts, untested by time or experience, Criticism, at most, can only destroy, it cannot reconstruct. It can only build on its own speculation—that the Exilic compilers were misled by an obsession that the Ceremonial Law must have been given in the Wilderness, although they had all the evidence before them, which shows, according to Criticism, that it could not have been given there! The claim is, in reality, that Critics are to decide this question, which requires an almost infallible insight. The believer is not bound to surrender his belief to such pretensions, nor can he be justified in doing so.

The evidence which would justify him in doing so has not yet been produced; nor is there any prospect, or apparent possibility, of such production. The strongest arguments put forward by Criticism have been here examined, and shown, it is submitted, to be baseless in fact, and unsound in reasoning; and, even if fully proved, to be insufficient to do more than displace some particular statements, but almost ludicrously insufficient to impeach the Tradition, oral or written, that the entire Law was, in substance, delivered in the Wilderness, through Moses.

CHAPTER X.

KINGS AND CHRONICLES.

Chronicles.

THE books of Kings bring the history down to the reign of Zedekiah and his carrying away to Babylon. The books of Chronicles begin with Adam, but contain little except genealogies until David's time. They end with the decree of Cyrus for the restoration of the Jews, at which point the book of Ezra commences. The 10th Chapter of the First Book of Chronicles introduces the more detailed history abruptly with the death of Saul on Mount Gilboa—the period at which II Samuel begins. The First Book of Chronicles, like II Samuel, contains notes of the reign of David and ends with his death. The Second Book of Chronicles contains notes of subsequent reigns. Many details relating to religion, the priesthood, &c., are given, which abundantly confirm the indications to be found in Samuel and Kings, as well as in Joshua and Judges, showing that an organized priesthood and ritual were fully recognized and in use; and agree with the Tradition, which has all along declared that such an organization existed, as Divinely instituted, from very ancient times, and that it was established through Moses. The ecclesiastical element in Chronicles is perfectly natural on the footing of the Levitical legislation of the Pentateuch, and needs neither explanation nor justification. That element continues to occupy a place in Jewish history, and possibly an increasingly prominent place, after the Exile, although it does not appear to justify the Critical statement that Israel had become a Church instead of a nation.¹ The Critical theory does not, indeed, absolutely deny the existence of a priesthood, or of sacrifice.² But it maintains, as already stated, that the priesthood was concerned "less with sacrifice than with the Divine Torah, which they administer in the sanctuary as successors of

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., pp. 94, 141, 320.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 303, 358, 372.

Moses";¹ that Israel, in fact, had no Divinely ordained sacrificial law or priesthood; and that "worship by sacrifice, and all that belongs to it, is no part of the Divine Torah to Israel. It forms, if you will, part of natural religion, which other nations share with Israel, and which is no feature in the distinctive precepts given at the Exodus."² Although Eli was plainly concerned with sacrifice, and although the administration of the Torah appears, in the early history, to have been exercised by the Judges, and notably by Samuel, rather than by the priests, Criticism would fain ignore these facts, and seeks to base its theory mainly on the silence of those histories as to particular instances of the exercise of sacrificial functions by priests, according to the Levitical Law, and contending, as already noticed, that laymen freely performed such functions.³ It feels, however, that Chronicles, abundantly confirmed as it is, must be put out of the way if its theory is to have any stability, and therefore declares that the Chronicler, spoken of as if the books were the work of a single writer, or of writers acting under a single impulse—spoke from a post-Exilic standpoint, and depicted the past, mainly from that which was present before his eyes.⁴ In support of this theory, besides supposed discrepancies, the superiority, in point of antiquity, of the books of Samuel and Kings, as compared with Chronicles, is relied upon. Because some of the genealogies of Chronicles go down, as is alleged, to a period six, or even eleven, generations after Zerubbabel, and thus, possibly, stretch to contemporaries of Alexander the Great,⁵ while the Book of Kings is said to be largely made up of verbal extracts from much older, but unknown, sources, the Book of Kings is described as "a source of the first class," which, "for many purposes, may be treated as having the practical value of a contemporary history"; while "the Chronicles have a very secondary value."

The Chronicler is described as writing at a time when the institutions of Ezra had universal currency, as having "had no personal knowledge of the greatly different praxis of Israel before the Exile."⁶ Whether the practice as to

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 358.

² *Ibid.*, p. 303.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 141, 235.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

sacrifice, ritual, &c., before the Exile was "greatly different" from that after the Exile is the point in dispute: it is calmly assumed! The practice of Ezra's time is spoken of as "a thousand years after"¹ the death of Joshua, and is said to be "no evidence at all" of the practice a thousand years before. All this appears to be based upon assumptions. Chronicles must nevertheless, as part of the Tradition, be recognized as evidence, at its proper value, until it is shown to be inadmissible. It cannot be decided to be inadmissible by assuming that the evidence of Chronicles is later, and inferior in value to that of Kings. It does not, any more than Kings, profess to be written after the time of Ezra, or all at once; or to represent only the personal knowledge of the writer. But it may have had, at least at its completion, the advantage of comparison of its sources with the books of Samuel and Kings; and probably, or possibly, of comparison with their sources. Indeed, in the case of compilations, the later has the advantage; in the case of original narratives, the advantage is with that nearest the time. The Critics claim to know more than all the earlier writers, including those claiming to be, or actually being, contemporary, although they will not recognize any right in Chronicles to make a far more modest and just claim. Such a claim could properly rest only upon additional sources of information, which sometimes exist, although no fresh facts have yet been produced by the Critics themselves warranting their displacement of ancient tradition.

Mr. Robertson Smith admits that "The Chronicler had access to sources of information which do not appear to have been used by Samuel or Kings." He would have such sources if records of religious matters were kept by the priestly class, and if he had access to them. It may not have come within the scope of the books with which the books of Chronicles are contrasted to refer to such matters at all, or, at any rate, so fully. It is curious that Criticism is not so fastidious as to the lapse of a "thousand years" when dealing with evidence which is thought to favour its own views; for it parades the statement in Nehemiah viii, 17, that the children of Israel had not, until the time of Nehemiah, celebrated the Feast of Tabernacles, since the days of Joshua²—at any rate, not by constructing booths out of

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 311.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 257, 447.

boughs gathered by them, which seems the only way to celebrate it. Similarly in 2 Kings xxiii, 21, 22; 2 Chron. xxxv, 18, 19, it is said that the Passover had never been duly celebrated since the days of the Judges; neither of which statements could be made by the people of those times of their personal knowledge. It may be noticed that these statements run counter to the critical theory that the duty of observing these Feasts had not been imposed. If Chronicles is more than a thousand years after date, because its genealogies are brought down to the time of Alexander the Great, the history in Kings which is brought down to Zedekiah's time is still sufficiently after date to exclude direct knowledge, while modern Critics are altogether out of the competition. But the date of the last events recorded in a compilation is not the date of the sources of information from which it draws. Nor is the date at which a chronicle ends necessarily the date of the last entry in it. The last entry, like the first or any other, cannot, of course, be made before the event. The last entry in Kings may, for aught we know, have been made later than the last entry in Chronicles. Of the sources of either there is no express evidence. Chronicles would appear to have had some sources for its genealogies, which go back as far as Adam; although such sources as the Book of Jasher and the Book of the Wars of the Lord are mentioned, nothing is known as to their contents except what appears in quotations. It is idle, therefore, to talk of the Book of Kings as having "the practical value of a contemporary history," and as "of the first class" as compared with Chronicles. While we are in ignorance of the date of the original sources of either, Chronicles, though continued to a much later date than Kings, may for aught we know to the contrary, have been compiled from more trustworthy and more ancient sources than Kings; and, as the question now is which is the more trustworthy as to the period common to both of them, it is ludicrous to propose as a test the date to which they are brought down. The only bearing the date to which they are brought down can have on the question is as showing that the record which is continued to the later date was probably compiled by a line of writers which survived later or was more anxious and careful to preserve a complete record of events. It may very well be that Kings and Samuel formed a national chronicle, kept by the civil authorities; and that, when these authorities were displaced by the Exile, and when

the national life was suspended, the civil chronicle ceased to be kept up. The record in Chronicles may have been kept by the Priests, and would not necessarily be suspended at the Exile. Upon that footing Chronicles might be the more trustworthy record as to religious matters, which are the matters now in question.

The two instances already referred to, of the Feast of Tabernacles and the Passover, are accepted by Criticism as proving that the Ceremonial Law was not given in the Wilderness. They are, however, double-edged weapons, or, rather, boomerangs. They plainly imply that these Feasts—the same as the Pentateuchal Feasts of Tabernacles and Passover—were in existence, and were observed, more or less, up to the time of Joshua and the Judges respectively, and, from those times, fell—gradually, in all probability—into abeyance. The silence of Samuel and Kings is thus sufficiently accounted for, and is seen not to indicate, as Criticism boldly assumes, that they had not been instituted earlier, or in the Wilderness. The contention—already here submitted—that the silence so much relied upon, was more consistent with either (a) these matters not falling within the scope of those narratives, or (b), if falling within their scope, that the notoriety of their existence, and even of their observance, rendered unnecessary any further reference to them. A similar silence equally prevailed during their observance before the death of Joshua, and during their falling into comparative abeyance later.

The Books of Chronicles, until displaced from the Tradition, or entirely discredited, are fatal to the Critical theory, that the comparative silence of the Books of Samuel and Kings is due, as Criticism assumes, to the want of a Law of Priesthood, ritual or Sacrifice; for we find at the dedication of the Temple a whole host of Priests and Levites already in existence, as there had also been at the installation of the Ark on Mount Zion. These Priests and Levites cannot have suddenly started into existence, and there is no hint anywhere that they had a recent origin. Their appearance, without explanation or remark, sufficiently proves that they had been in existence earlier, and that this fact was notorious, and needed no mention. They are never lost sight of either by Ezra or Nehemiah, whose books continue the history from the Exile, or by the Prophets. We are invited to believe that they had no commission from Jehovah till after the Exile, except, perhaps, as successors of Moses,

but in virtue of their descent from Aaron. Anyhow, they must have existed from Mosaic times, and, consequently, the alleged silence of Samuel and Kings cannot be due to their not being in existence, whether under the express Law or otherwise.

Josiah.

Another instance of critical methods, showing a similar bias against Chronicles, is found in Mr. Robertson Smith's treatment of the accounts of Josiah's destruction of the High Places in 2 Kings xxiii and 2 Chron. xxxiv respectively. He says: "In 2 Kings xxiii, Josiah's action against the High Places is represented as taking place in the 18th year of his reign" (i.e., when he was 26 years old) "as the immediate result of his repentance on hearing the words of the Law found in the Temple, and in pursuance of the covenant of reformation made on that occasion." "But in 2 Chron. xxxiv, the reformation begins in Josiah's 12th year" (i.e., the 20th of his age), "that is as soon as he emerged from his minority. Josiah was a good king, and therefore the Chronicler felt that there must be a mistake in the account which made him wield an independent sceptre for many years before he touched the idolatrous abuses of his land. That the result of this is to put the solemn repentance and covenant of reformation ten years after the reformation itself is an inconsistency which seems never to have struck him."¹

A writer of impartiality and sound judgment would deal with this incident very differently. The absurd inconsistency which the Critic supposes himself to have discovered should have led him to recoil from such a conclusion. Chronicles, moreover, dates Josiah's attack on the High Places only six years earlier than Kings! In order to enhance the reputation of Josiah, by misrepresenting the facts, so as to make his dealing with the High Places begin six years earlier, the Chronicler is assumed to have falsified the history with no better justification than his own ideas of what such a good king would do. The Critic might have credited "the Chronicler" with sufficient scrupulousness to prevent his tampering with his sources, even if he held the theory attributed to him; a theory which is too childish to be attributed to anyone without good positive grounds.

¹ Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 144.

But this is not all. It is common ground in the narratives of both Kings and Chronicles that the actual event which took place in the 18th year of Josiah's reign was the finding—or, as on critical theories it might well be called, the “invention”—of the Book of the Law, and the consequent keeping of the Passover (2 Kings xxii, 3, 8; xxiii, 23; 2 Chron. xxxiv, 8, 14; xxxv, 19). 2 Chron. xxxiv, 8, says that this happened “when he (Josiah) had purged the land” from the High Places, which purging he “began” in the 12th year of his reign (2 Chron. xxxiv, 3). In 2 Kings xxii, xxiii, there is no mark of time for this purging, except that, in the narrative, the mention of it follows the account of Josiah's taking the covenant with all the people (2 Kings xxiii, 5) as the first item in a long list of reforms; while in Chronicles, as above shown, there is a definite period stated during which the purging went on, such a process naturally not being a short one, as the details in 2 Kings xxiii itself show. According to 2 Chron. xxxiv, 3, Josiah “in the 8th year of his reign” (when he was 16 years of age) “began to seek after the God of David his father, and in the 12th year he began to purge Judah and Jerusalem from the High Places,” &c. There is nothing improbable in Josiah's experiencing a strong reaction from the abominations of his grandfather Manasseh; repented of, indeed, by him, revived, however by his son Amon, Josiah's father; or in such a reaction causing Josiah in the 12th year of his reign, when he was 20 years of age, to begin his attack upon the High Places, even without the added stimulus of the finding of the Law. Chronicles thus gives 20 years as the age at which Josiah began his reforms, by purging the land from the High Places, when he had been 12 years on the throne. The writer of Chronicles, therefore, did *not* think that Josiah was too good to sit on the throne for 12 years without overthrowing the High Places! Moreover, it seems quite natural that a young man should deal with the Temple last, when he had done all he could do outside. The purging of the Temple, and the destruction of vessels used in it, might be, or might seem, a more formidable task; this was, however, undertaken under the stimulus and authority of the newly found Law, which set the people on his side. Would not the Scribes, if they were such as Criticism pictures them, have promptly claimed that it was the finding of the Law which wrought all the reforms if it was the fact? At any rate—if Chronicles is entitled to fair

treatment, even on secular principles and on secular canons of criticism—its narrative, which gives specific dates, is decidedly superior to that of Kings, which only gives sequence in the narrative as a mark of time; a mark which the Higher Criticism treats with scorn when it happens to stand in the way of its having “a free hand” to remould Scripture according to its own guesses and preconceptions.

It was the renewal of the covenant, and the keeping of the Passover accordingly, and, possibly, the completion of the purging of the Temple, which followed the finding of the Law, according to Chronicles, not the purging of the land from the High Places, as Criticism contends; Deuteronomy condemning them, as it insists, for the first time at this period, although, according to the evidence, the condemnation in Deuteronomy occurred in the Wilderness.

There is no ground for any other inference from “the Chronicler’s” statement than that his sources warranted his statement, and that the vagueness of Kings as to time was due to imperfect information. If the Chronicler had the statement of Kings before him, his sources apparently enabled him to remedy the vagueness of his predecessor’s account by fixing definite time for the removal of the High Places. “A judicious criticism,” with which the critics credit themselves, should have led them to give a decided preference to his narrative.

It should be noticed that in this case, as in the case of the compilers after the Exile, the circumstance relied upon to clinch the Critical conclusion is the belief of the writers of the text. This belief, in the present case, the Critics assume, although with no sufficient evidence, to be the belief as to what a good king like Josiah must do; and, in the other—the case of the Priestly Code, a belief that the Exilic usage must have dated from the Wilderness. The belief is avowed from first to last! It can only be shown to be mistaken by displacing the Tradition actually existing.

Criticism evidently thinks no proof necessary; the suggestion is considered sufficient, since, if accepted, its case will, it hopes, be accepted by the hypnotized subject, “the common unbiased, unsophisticated mass of mankind.”

Ishbosheth.

Criticism, as represented by the late Mr. Robertson Smith, furnishes some amusing instances of its peculiar mode of reasoning. In the case of Ishbosheth, the son of Saul,

Chronicles (1 Chron. viii, 33; ix, 39) names him Eshbaal, which is accepted by Criticism as the correct form, while 2 Samuel iv, 1 calls him Ishbosheth, which means, it is said, "the man of the shameful thing." Is Chronicles therefore of equal or superior value? No! The argument of the Critic is this: Bosheth was used by the Scribes who, it will be remembered, were, according to the Critics, the compilers of Chronicles, as a euphemism for Baal, a name which they shrank from using, although it was originally, it is said, used without offence of Jehovah, as well as of other national deities of Canaan. One would expect from this that Chronicles as the work of those priests, the Scribes, would have had "Bosheth," and the supposed earlier history would have retained Baal," but both had originally, according to the Critics, "Baal," although 2 Sam. iv, 1, now has "Bosheth." The text of Samuel must, therefore, according to the Critics, have been altered, and by the Scribes! They did not scruple to retain "Baal" in their own record,¹ but could not, it seems, tolerate it in Samuel; and the "Bosheth" which now appears there must have been substituted by them for "Baal." "A veritable correction of the Scribes!" Mr. Robertson Smith triumphantly exclaims. If Chronicles, which has the correct form, gained no credit for itself or for the Scribes, the latter might have hoped to escape the discredit of the error of Samuel. But no, the Scribes are always in the wrong when they do not support the Higher Criticism!

But the reason given for the assumed re-editing is singular enough. Of course no man, and certainly no king, ever bore so absurd a name as "The man of the shameful thing!"² Perhaps not, willingly, but he may easily have borne it derisively. And, whether derisively or euphemistically used, it may have been given in the man's lifetime, and so have appeared in the national chronicle, from which it may have passed, either as a popular, or as an euphemistic expression, into the original narrative of Samuel without any re-editing. But here another critical guess comes in: "In Hosea's time the use of the word (Baal) was felt to be dangerous to true religion."³ For this statement Hosea ii,

¹ See also 1 Chron., viii, 30, where a "Baal" appears among the tribe of Benjamin, and *cp.* Merib-baal in v. 34, with Mephibosheth in 2 Sam., xvi, 1, &c.

² Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

16, 17, and xiii, 1, 2, are cited; but they only show that at some future time, "that day," Jehovah would betroth his people in Northern Israel to Himself, and they should then call him "Ishi" (my husband) and not "Baal" (Lord), and should no more mention Baalim; a passage which seems to have no reference to the present matter, or to the danger of the use of the name, although it may suggest that its application to Jehovah was inappropriate; it seems to point only to the tenderness of Jehovah's relations with His people "in that day," and does not show that the Scribes or priests, or even the prophets, in Judah¹ were then beginning to feel scruples about allowing the name "Baal" to stand in proper names, even in history! The point to be proved is that "scrupulous Israelites"² only began to feel this repugnance after 2 Samuel was written. On the face of the documents "Samuel" avoided the use of the name, assuming with the Critics that Eshbaal is the correct name; but, if so, the Chronicler was not so scrupulous in later times, and so the supposed Priestly history has the obnoxious name in all its nakedness. Yet to the less fastidious writers of Chronicles—by what the Critic evidently considers a brilliant stroke of Criticism—is attributed the absurd inconsistency of tampering with Samuel by veiling there what they left unveiled in their own history! The glaring unsoundness of critical methods is well illustrated in this case; conjecture founded upon conjecture is apparently thought as good or better—because more "brilliant" than facts which can be tested. Here it is impossible to say that the expression in Samuel did not originally stand as it stands now. All the evidence we have is the narrative itself. That shows, on the assumption that Eshbaal was the true name, that the writer or editor of Samuel substituted a euphemism, which Chronicles did not adopt, although Samuel was one of its sources. There is no other information showing when such a scruple, if it was a scruple, arose; instead, we have guesses, in aid of a preconceived theory, that such a scruple could not have existed before the appearance of this name in Samuel; and, if we follow the Critics, not before the editing of Samuel and Kings as one, i.e., not before the time of Zedekiah, when the post-Exilic Scribes awoke to the horror of the name, and altered it in

¹ See Robertson, "Early Religion of Israel," p. 170.

² Robertson Smith, O. T. in J. C., p. 68.

Samuel while leaving it unaltered in Chronicles! It is too obvious to uncritical common sense to need argument, that you cannot decide such matters without some independent test, of which there is not, in this case, even a pretence. It is all conjecture, and conjecture in aid of a preconceived theory. In fact the Critics, in this case, at any rate, rely entirely upon the simple art of begging the question. If Samuel was, as seems to be the case, the National Chronicle, it might be felt to be unsuitable to leave the name unveiled, although there was no such need to take that precaution except for the common people.

CHAPTER XI.

CONCLUSION.

THE Old Testament, stretched on the rack by Criticism, and torn limb from limb in order to extort from it a contradiction of its own statements, still unwaveringly proclaims with what would, if it were mortal, be its dying breath, that those statements are true. That alone is sufficient reason why those who believe its testimony should not surrender that belief unless some other evidence better and surer can be produced to contradict it. No human evidence can be better or surer.

Why then, it may be asked, have so many learned persons been drawn to accept a contradiction based upon insufficient grounds? It is, of course, for them to answer that question. They tell us sometimes that they have been carried to their conclusions by a force which they tried to resist, as a drifting animal is borne struggling down a stream. The only stream that could have carried them away is the general tendency of modern thought and feeling to substitute the natural for the supernatural. This tendency falls in so completely with the natural tendency of man's mind to surrender itself to the ideas which are suggested by the course of physical nature, and the common facts and experiences of human life, that it is always difficult to avoid being carried away by it, even when the victim is conscious that the subject under consideration is or may be largely of a supernatural character.

In the present instance, however, Criticism cannot make out its case, even on "entirely human" lines. In order to handle the question at all on these lines, the Divine influence upon the materials and instruments must be excluded, and it is accordingly excluded, by the "entirely human" pre-supposition, which, in fact, begs the entire question, and is the fundamental unsoundness of the whole process. But, even with this unwarrantable assumption, Criticism can, as shown in the foregoing examination of it, make out no case. Its inferences, analogies, speculations, &c., are plainly not

surer or better than the express, unvarying, emphatic statements of the Tradition—a massive tradition.

Criticism eagerly hunts for discrepancies in points of detail, but with very little success. If those cases are excluded in which the Criticism applies human standards and analogies, the degree of success will be found to be extremely shadowy. And even in the cases in which there is some plausibility in the Critical theories, discrepancies in points of detail cannot, of themselves, warrant the extension of their effect beyond the particular case or detail; and, certainly, do not amount to a contradiction of the cardinal facts of the history as presented; or displace them, even if they amount to a contradiction.

Criticism claims to have shown that the Pentateuch is composite, and tears the history to pieces, and inverts the course of it, substituting a human development for a special Divinely-guided one. It has, however, been shown already that the statements of the history remain unaffected, whether they are supposed to be statements made in the Mosaic age or later, by one writer or by several; they still testify to the same facts, and cannot be displaced without better or surer evidence contradicting them.

The design of Criticism, although not of all Critics, is to sap and undermine these statements, which it cannot contradict; to infuse doubt, suspicion, disbelief. It comes forward, like Goliath, in its cumbrous panoply, terrible and threatening, but the confidence that its weapons will fall from its hands will be justified, and Israel will be delivered!

The grounds upon which the Law is assigned to the Exile have now been examined in sufficient detail. The use of different Divine Names in Genesis and in a steadily diminishing degree in the subsequent history, suggested the possibility of splitting up an acknowledged and unmistakable unity, especially in the Pentateuch. There was an apparent facility in this process in Genesis, which encouraged its application; but this was matched by a corresponding futility in the resultant benefit, since the disintegration of Genesis would not enable Criticism to “lift out” the Law from the Wilderness period, which falls entirely outside Genesis. However, by taking as a nucleus literary and other features, which would, in all probability, never have been noticed except for such predetermined aim, a plastic instrument was fashioned out of the Divine Names and these “concomitants,” which accomplished the purpose of “lifting out” to the satisfaction of Criticism.

Criticism, however, could profit nothing by this achievement, for all the "Sources" were still glued to the Wilderness! A solvent must be found; and it was found by a very simple process, namely, by attributing the adhesive medium to the errant imagination of those who handled the materials. In every case we have found the same explanation. Does the Priestly Code declare that the Law was given, in substance, entirely in the Wilderness? The Exilic compiler's imagination misled him! If evidence of the state of mind of the compiler is demanded, none is produced. All that is produced is evidence on which a doubt might be suggested, but nothing which can pretend to displace the Tradition. The Critic's judgment is really the ultimate basis on which the Tradition is to be contradicted. Even the Partition rests upon the same judgment, and is practically idle in the discussion, since Criticism could as easily have transferred the whole of the Pentateuch to the Exilic period as a part. The question is throughout begged, unless the Critical judgment on the evidence suffices to displace the Tradition that the Law was given in the Wilderness.

It is the same with Deuteronomy. The author was under an obsession of the same kind.

Similarly as to Chronicles. Certain tendencies are attributed to the writers, on the judgment of Critics, upon which the book is ruled out of consideration, although its continuation, in Ezra and Nehemiah, attributed by Criticism to the same writers, or school of writers, is accepted as first-class evidence. In all these cases the Critics bring their presuppositions to the history, they do not find them there. Unable to produce any positive evidence, Criticism, seeking to contradict the Tradition as to the Wilderness scene of the Law, draws unwarranted inferences, largely from the alleged silence of the history, out of which inferences it weaves, with the aid of the assumptions just noticed, its case, which, however, still leaves uncontradicted the statements in issue. It also attacks the authority and truth of the Tradition, and demands from it "first-class" evidence,¹ "contemporary" evidence, although it will not wholly discard it if it fails to meet that demand, but will allow it to occupy, on sufferance, a place somewhere behind Thucydides.²

¹ Driver's "Genesis," Introduction, pp. xliii, lxii.

² *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. xliv.

These claims, impossible, of course, of satisfaction, do not affect those who have already accepted the Tradition; who, on their part, require to be satisfied that they have been misled. The microscopic scrutiny to which Criticism has subjected the Scriptures cannot fairly be said to have, at most, done more than detect some possible errors; errors, if they exist, such as the presence of a human element quite sufficiently accounts for, and such as need no more disturb the present generation than they disturbed their long line of predecessors; they do not displace the witness of the Tradition to the Mosaic origin of the whole Law, Criticism scarcely denies this origin, but seeks to reduce it to a nucleus, a minimum, leaving natural influences to develop the complete body of Law, which was undoubtedly in operation in Israel.

The Critic just quoted,¹ while refusing to accept the Tradition because it is not the work of a contemporary writer, tells us that it is as good for its purpose if it should turn out to be pure fiction! Those who have accepted the Tradition have accepted it as a substantially true record of the dealings of God with Israel; actual dealings in which the revelation of Himself was conveyed. That Revelation might, doubtless, have been conveyed in other forms, as was sometimes the case. It was, however, in Jehovah's actual dealings with Israel, which the historical narrative relates, that He vouchsafed mainly to reveal Himself. The believer will not drop the substance to grasp at the shadow, or exchange life for literature or drama, or actual experience for imaginary.

"Who cannot win the Mistress, woo the Maid."

We have seen the almost frantic efforts of Criticism to displace the cardinal and dominant assertion of Scripture as to the priority of the Law. Without fresh evidence the Critics have been driven, not very reluctantly, to strain the Divine element, first from the outward form and composition of Scripture, and ultimately the special Divine control and guidance from both the substance of Scripture and from the development described in it. Still they could not get their theory over the stile. They have had to fall back on supposed indications, by silence, of ignorance of the existence

¹ Driver's "Genesis," Introduction, pp. lxxviii, § 4, lxxix.

of the Law, as evidence of its not being in existence, and these indications they have treated as the Judge treated the evidence in the "Hunting of the Snark," when

"He summed it so well that it came to much more
Than the witnesses ever had said."

It has had to resort to free speculation, to offer as all the evidence it could produce the dogmatic opinions of Scholars, not experts in spiritual things, if such there be, of any religion or of no religion, yoked together with soi-disant believers, all pulling different ways. But still to no purpose. They could not win to Fact. They had to put up with Speculation, sometimes the handmaid of Fact, but of no authority unless acting under her Mistress's orders.

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